From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 23/43] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 17:00:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155900.408984976@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.734715884@linuxfoundation.org>
From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
commit 5bdf3437603d4af87f9c7f424b0c8aeed2420745 upstream.
CPUs vulnerable to Spectre-BHB either need to make an SMC-CC firmware
call from the vectors, or run a sequence of branches. This gets added
to the hyp vectors. If there is no support for arch-workaround-1 in
firmware, the indirect vector will be used.
kvm_init_vector_slots() only initialises the two indirect slots if
the platform is vulnerable to Spectre-v3a. pKVM's hyp_map_vectors()
only initialises __hyp_bp_vect_base if the platform is vulnerable to
Spectre-v3a.
As there are about to more users of the indirect vectors, ensure
their entries in hyp_spectre_vector_selector[] are always initialised,
and __hyp_bp_vect_base defaults to the regular VA mapping.
The Spectre-v3a check is moved to a helper
kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors(), and merged with the code
that creates the hyp mappings.
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 5 +++++
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 5 +----
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -711,6 +711,11 @@ static inline void kvm_init_host_cpu_con
ctxt_sys_reg(cpu_ctxt, MPIDR_EL1) = read_cpuid_mpidr();
}
+static inline bool kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors(void)
+{
+ return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A);
+}
+
void kvm_arm_vcpu_ptrauth_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
static inline void kvm_arch_hardware_unsetup(void) {}
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -1458,10 +1458,7 @@ static int kvm_init_vector_slots(void)
base = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs));
kvm_init_vector_slot(base, HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT);
- if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A))
- return 0;
-
- if (!has_vhe()) {
+ if (kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors() && !has_vhe()) {
err = create_hyp_exec_mappings(__pa_symbol(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs),
__BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ, &base);
if (err)
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mm.c
@@ -146,8 +146,10 @@ int hyp_map_vectors(void)
phys_addr_t phys;
void *bp_base;
- if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V3A))
+ if (!kvm_system_needs_idmapped_vectors()) {
+ __hyp_bp_vect_base = __bp_harden_hyp_vecs;
return 0;
+ }
phys = __hyp_pa(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs);
bp_base = (void *)__pkvm_create_private_mapping(phys,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/43] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/43] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/43] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/43] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/43] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/43] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/43] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/43] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/43] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/43] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/43] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/43] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/43] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/43] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/43] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/43] arm64: Add HWCAP for self-synchronising virtual counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/43] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/43] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/43] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/43] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/43] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/43] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/43] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/43] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/43] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/43] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/43] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/43] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/43] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/43] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/43] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/43] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/43] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/43] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/43] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/43] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/43] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/43] slip: fix macro redefine warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/43] block: drop unused includes in <linux/genhd.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Fox Chen
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:14 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10 3:33 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 10:30 ` Anders Roxell
2022-03-10 10:52 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 4:39 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 6:00 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-10 8:10 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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