public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 36/43] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2
Date: Wed,  9 Mar 2022 17:00:20 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155900.778511912@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.734715884@linuxfoundation.org>

From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>

commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream.

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of
a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that
previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2.

Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
to also show the state of the BHB mitigation.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h |    2 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c  |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -93,5 +93,7 @@ void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(s
 
 enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
 
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
+
 #endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif	/* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
@@ -96,14 +96,39 @@ static bool spectre_v2_mitigations_off(v
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static const char *get_bhb_affected_string(enum mitigation_state bhb_state)
+{
+	switch (bhb_state) {
+	case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+		return "";
+	default:
+	case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+		return ", but not BHB";
+	case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+		return ", BHB";
+	}
+}
+
 ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			    char *buf)
 {
+	enum mitigation_state bhb_state = arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
+	const char *bhb_str = get_bhb_affected_string(bhb_state);
+	const char *v2_str = "Branch predictor hardening";
+
 	switch (spectre_v2_state) {
 	case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
-		return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+		if (bhb_state == SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED)
+			return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * Platforms affected by Spectre-BHB can't report
+		 * "Not affected" for Spectre-v2.
+		 */
+		v2_str = "CSV2";
+		fallthrough;
 	case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
-		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening\n");
+		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: %s%s\n", v2_str, bhb_str);
 	case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
 		fallthrough;
 	default:
@@ -771,6 +796,13 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 	}
 }
 
+static enum mitigation_state spectre_bhb_state;
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
+{
+	return spectre_bhb_state;
+}
+
 /* Patched to NOP when enabled */
 void noinstr spectre_bhb_patch_loop_mitigation_enable(struct alt_instr *alt,
 						     __le32 *origptr,



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/43] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/43] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/43] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/43] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/43] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/43] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/43] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/43] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/43] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/43] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/43] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/43] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/43] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/43] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/43] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/43] arm64: Add HWCAP for self-synchronising virtual counter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/43] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/43] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/43] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/43] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/43] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/43] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/43] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/43] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/43] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/43] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/43] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/43] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/43] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/43] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/43] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/43] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/43] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/43] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/43] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/43] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/43] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/43] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/43] slip: fix macro redefine warning Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/43] block: drop unused includes in <linux/genhd.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:39 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/43] 5.15.28-rc1 review Fox Chen
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:14 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10  3:33   ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10 10:30   ` Anders Roxell
2022-03-10 10:52     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10  4:39 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-10  6:00 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-10  8:10 ` Bagas Sanjaya

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220309155900.778511912@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox