From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>,
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.16 52/53] xen/netfront: react properly to failing gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref()
Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2022 15:09:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220310140813.327590202@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220310140811.832630727@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Commit 66e3531b33ee51dad17c463b4d9c9f52e341503d upstream.
When calling gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref() the returned value must
be tested and the reaction to that value should be appropriate.
In case of failure in xennet_get_responses() the reaction should not be
to crash the system, but to disable the network device.
The calls in setup_netfront() can be replaced by calls of
gnttab_end_foreign_access(). While at it avoid double free of ring
pages and grant references via xennet_disconnect_backend() in this case.
This is CVE-2022-23042 / part of XSA-396.
Reported-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -988,7 +988,6 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
struct device *dev = &queue->info->netdev->dev;
struct bpf_prog *xdp_prog;
struct xdp_buff xdp;
- unsigned long ret;
int slots = 1;
int err = 0;
u32 verdict;
@@ -1030,8 +1029,13 @@ static int xennet_get_responses(struct n
goto next;
}
- ret = gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
- BUG_ON(!ret);
+ if (!gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0)) {
+ dev_alert(dev,
+ "Grant still in use by backend domain\n");
+ queue->info->broken = true;
+ dev_alert(dev, "Disabled for further use\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
gnttab_release_grant_reference(&queue->gref_rx_head, ref);
@@ -1252,6 +1256,10 @@ static int xennet_poll(struct napi_struc
&need_xdp_flush);
if (unlikely(err)) {
+ if (queue->info->broken) {
+ spin_unlock(&queue->rx_lock);
+ return 0;
+ }
err:
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&tmpq)))
__skb_queue_tail(&errq, skb);
@@ -1916,7 +1924,7 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
struct netfront_queue *queue, unsigned int feature_split_evtchn)
{
struct xen_netif_tx_sring *txs;
- struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs;
+ struct xen_netif_rx_sring *rxs = NULL;
grant_ref_t gref;
int err;
@@ -1936,21 +1944,21 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, txs, 1, &gref);
if (err < 0)
- goto grant_tx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
queue->tx_ring_ref = gref;
rxs = (struct xen_netif_rx_sring *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_NOIO | __GFP_HIGH);
if (!rxs) {
err = -ENOMEM;
xenbus_dev_fatal(dev, err, "allocating rx ring page");
- goto alloc_rx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
}
SHARED_RING_INIT(rxs);
FRONT_RING_INIT(&queue->rx, rxs, XEN_PAGE_SIZE);
err = xenbus_grant_ring(dev, rxs, 1, &gref);
if (err < 0)
- goto grant_rx_ring_fail;
+ goto fail;
queue->rx_ring_ref = gref;
if (feature_split_evtchn)
@@ -1963,22 +1971,28 @@ static int setup_netfront(struct xenbus_
err = setup_netfront_single(queue);
if (err)
- goto alloc_evtchn_fail;
+ goto fail;
return 0;
/* If we fail to setup netfront, it is safe to just revoke access to
* granted pages because backend is not accessing it at this point.
*/
-alloc_evtchn_fail:
- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_rx_ring_fail:
- free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
-alloc_rx_ring_fail:
- gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0);
-grant_tx_ring_fail:
- free_page((unsigned long)txs);
-fail:
+ fail:
+ if (queue->rx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->rx_ring_ref, 0,
+ (unsigned long)rxs);
+ queue->rx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+ } else {
+ free_page((unsigned long)rxs);
+ }
+ if (queue->tx_ring_ref != GRANT_INVALID_REF) {
+ gnttab_end_foreign_access(queue->tx_ring_ref, 0,
+ (unsigned long)txs);
+ queue->tx_ring_ref = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
+ } else {
+ free_page((unsigned long)txs);
+ }
return err;
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-10 14:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-10 14:09 [PATCH 5.16 00/53] 5.16.14-rc2 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 01/53] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 02/53] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 03/53] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 04/53] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 05/53] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 06/53] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 07/53] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 08/53] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 09/53] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 10/53] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 11/53] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 12/53] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 13/53] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 14/53] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 15/53] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 16/53] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 17/53] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 18/53] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 19/53] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 20/53] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 21/53] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 22/53] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 23/53] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 24/53] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 25/53] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 26/53] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 27/53] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 28/53] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 29/53] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 30/53] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 31/53] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 32/53] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 33/53] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 34/53] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 35/53] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 36/53] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 37/53] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 38/53] ARM: fix co-processor register typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 39/53] ARM: Do not use NOCROSSREFS directive with ld.lld Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 40/53] arm64: Do not include __READ_ONCE() block in assembly files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 41/53] ARM: fix build warning in proc-v7-bugs.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 42/53] xen/xenbus: dont let xenbus_grant_ring() remove grants in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 43/53] xen/grant-table: add gnttab_try_end_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 44/53] xen/blkfront: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() for mapped status Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 45/53] xen/netfront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 46/53] xen/scsifront: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 47/53] xen/gntalloc: dont use gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 48/53] xen: remove gnttab_query_foreign_access() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 49/53] xen/9p: use alloc/free_pages_exact() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 50/53] xen/pvcalls: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 51/53] xen/gnttab: fix gnttab_end_foreign_access() without page specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 14:09 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-10 14:09 ` [PATCH 5.16 53/53] Revert "ACPI: PM: s2idle: Cancel wakeup before dispatching EC GPE" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 19:32 ` [PATCH 5.16 00/53] 5.16.14-rc2 review Shuah Khan
2022-03-10 21:30 ` Justin Forbes
2022-03-10 21:53 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-03-10 23:20 ` Ron Economos
2022-03-10 23:20 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-03-11 0:14 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-11 1:03 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-11 3:11 ` Zan Aziz
2022-03-11 8:14 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-03-11 10:55 ` Bagas Sanjaya
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