From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5972FC433F5 for ; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 07:19:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S243748AbiC3HU4 (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Mar 2022 03:20:56 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:52356 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S242175AbiC3HUv (ORCPT ); Wed, 30 Mar 2022 03:20:51 -0400 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk (irc.codon.org.uk [IPv6:2a00:1098:84:22e::2]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 58D8F1903E4; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 00:19:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: by cavan.codon.org.uk (Postfix, from userid 1000) id DC2BB40A71; Wed, 30 Mar 2022 08:18:59 +0100 (BST) Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2022 08:18:59 +0100 From: Matthew Garrett To: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: Daniel Kiper , Alec Brown , Kanth Ghatraju , Ross Philipson , "dpsmith@apertussolutions.com" , "piotr.krol@3mdeb.com" , "krystian.hebel@3mdeb.com" , "persaur@gmail.com" , "Yoder, Stuart" , Andrew Cooper , "michal.zygowski@3mdeb.com" , James Bottomley , "lukasz@hawrylko.pl" , linux-efi , Linux Kernel Mailing List , The development of GNU GRUB , Kees Cook Subject: Re: Linux DRTM on UEFI platforms Message-ID: <20220330071859.GA992@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20220329174057.GA17778@srcf.ucam.org> <20220330071103.GA809@srcf.ucam.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 09:12:19AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote: > On Wed, 30 Mar 2022 at 09:11, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > The EFI stub carries out a bunch of actions that have meaningful > > security impact, and that's material that should be measured. Having the > > secure launch kernel execute the stub without awareness of what it does > > means it would need to measure the code without measuring the state, > > while the goal of DRTM solutions is to measure state rather than the > > code. > > But how is that any different from the early kernel code? >From a conceptual perspective we've thought of the EFI stub as being logically part of the bootloader rather than the early kernel, and the bootloader is a point where the line is drawn. My guy feeling is that jumping into the secure kernel environment before EBS has been called is likely to end badly.