From: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>,
Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Jacob jun Pan <jacob.jun.pan@intel.com>,
Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Date: Sun, 1 May 2022 19:24:32 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220501112434.874236-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220501112434.874236-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
As domain->force_snooping only impacts the devices attached with the
domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. At the same
time, for a brand new domain (hasn't been attached to any device), the
force_snooping field could be set, but the attach_dev callback will
return failure if it wants to attach to a device which IOMMU has no
snoop control capability.
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
---
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 18 +++++++++++++
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
index ab4408c824a5..583ea67fc783 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
bool fault_ignore);
int vcmd_alloc_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, u32 *pasid);
void vcmd_free_pasid(struct intel_iommu *iommu, u32 pasid);
+void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
+ struct device *dev, u32 pasid);
#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
index 98050943d863..3c1c228f9031 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c
@@ -4554,13 +4554,61 @@ static phys_addr_t intel_iommu_iova_to_phys(struct iommu_domain *domain,
return phys;
}
+static bool domain_support_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
+{
+ struct device_domain_info *info;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ bool support = true;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
+ if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
+ goto out;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link) {
+ if (!ecap_sc_support(info->iommu->ecap)) {
+ support = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
+ return support;
+}
+
+static void domain_set_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
+{
+ struct device_domain_info *info;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The
+ * iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit.
+ */
+ if (!domain_use_first_level(domain))
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
+ if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link)
+ intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(info->iommu, info->dev,
+ PASID_RID2PASID);
+
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
+}
+
static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct iommu_domain *domain)
{
struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
- if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping(NULL))
+ if (!domain_support_force_snooping(dmar_domain))
return false;
+
+ domain_set_force_snooping(dmar_domain);
dmar_domain->force_snooping = true;
+
return true;
}
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
index f8d215d85695..815c744e6a34 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
@@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
return 0;
}
+
+/*
+ * Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up.
+ */
+void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
+ struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
+{
+ struct pasid_entry *pte;
+ u16 did;
+
+ pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid);
+ if (WARN_ON(!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present(pte)))
+ return;
+
+ pasid_set_pgsnp(pte);
+ did = pasid_get_domain_id(pte);
+ pasid_flush_caches(iommu, pte, pasid, did);
+}
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-01 11:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-01 11:24 [PATCH 0/5] iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement Lu Baolu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 1/5] iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:04 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:05 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 7:25 ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-04 13:31 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 14:37 ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` Lu Baolu [this message]
2022-05-02 13:17 ` [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 7:58 ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-02 21:31 ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04 8:06 ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-02 21:36 ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04 8:47 ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 8:49 ` Baolu Lu
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