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From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
To: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>,
	Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Jacob jun Pan <jacob.jun.pan@intel.com>,
	Liu Yi L <yi.l.liu@intel.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Date: Mon, 2 May 2022 10:17:47 -0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220502131747.GJ8364@nvidia.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220501112434.874236-4-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>

On Sun, May 01, 2022 at 07:24:32PM +0800, Lu Baolu wrote:
> +static bool domain_support_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
> +{
> +	struct device_domain_info *info;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +	bool support = true;
> +
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
> +	if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
> +		goto out;

Why? list_for_each_entry will just do nothing..

> +	list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link) {
> +		if (!ecap_sc_support(info->iommu->ecap)) {
> +			support = false;
> +			break;
> +		}
> +	}
> +out:
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
> +	return support;
> +}
> +
> +static void domain_set_force_snooping(struct dmar_domain *domain)
> +{
> +	struct device_domain_info *info;
> +	unsigned long flags;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Second level page table supports per-PTE snoop control. The
> +	 * iommu_map() interface will handle this by setting SNP bit.
> +	 */
> +	if (!domain_use_first_level(domain))
> +		return;
> +
> +	spin_lock_irqsave(&device_domain_lock, flags);
> +	if (list_empty(&domain->devices))
> +		goto out_unlock;
> +
> +	list_for_each_entry(info, &domain->devices, link)
> +		intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(info->iommu, info->dev,
> +						     PASID_RID2PASID);
> +
> +out_unlock:
> +	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&device_domain_lock, flags);
> +}
> +
>  static bool intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency(struct iommu_domain *domain)
>  {
>  	struct dmar_domain *dmar_domain = to_dmar_domain(domain);
>  
> -	if (!domain_update_iommu_snooping(NULL))
> +	if (!domain_support_force_snooping(dmar_domain))
>  		return false;

Maybe exit early if force_snooping = true?

> +	domain_set_force_snooping(dmar_domain);
>  	dmar_domain->force_snooping = true;
> +
>  	return true;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
> index f8d215d85695..815c744e6a34 100644
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c
> @@ -762,3 +762,21 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
>  
>  	return 0;
>  }
> +
> +/*
> + * Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up.
> + */

So the 'first level' is only used with pasid?

> +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu,
> +					  struct device *dev, u32 pasid)
> +{
> +	struct pasid_entry *pte;
> +	u16 did;
> +
> +	pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid);
> +	if (WARN_ON(!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present(pte)))
> +		return;
> +
> +	pasid_set_pgsnp(pte);

Doesn't this need to be done in other places too, like when a new attach
is made? Patch 5 removed it, but should that be made if
domain->force_snooping?

Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2022-05-02 13:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-01 11:24 [PATCH 0/5] iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement Lu Baolu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 1/5] iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:04   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 2/5] iommu/vt-d: Set SNP bit only in second-level page table entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:05   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04  7:25     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-04 13:31       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04 14:37         ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 3/5] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:17   ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2022-05-04  7:58     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-02 21:31   ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04  8:06     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 4/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-02 21:36   ` Jacob Pan
2022-05-04  8:47     ` Baolu Lu
2022-05-01 11:24 ` [PATCH 5/5] iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries Lu Baolu
2022-05-02 13:19   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2022-05-04  8:49     ` Baolu Lu

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