From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 35F6CC433EF for ; Fri, 27 May 2022 09:06:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1350225AbiE0JGy (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2022 05:06:54 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:35196 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1350262AbiE0I6r (ORCPT ); Fri, 27 May 2022 04:58:47 -0400 Received: from ams.source.kernel.org (ams.source.kernel.org [145.40.68.75]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0DED55640D; Fri, 27 May 2022 01:55:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from smtp.kernel.org (relay.kernel.org [52.25.139.140]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ams.source.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B5430B823DD; Fri, 27 May 2022 08:55:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EACDBC385A9; Fri, 27 May 2022 08:55:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1653641711; bh=3Tqro75dduuDCTez7Zs5xe13wkt4FGkHIS0ja0Jgt9E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=iRVaHFlYAAjFVvrlHYIwZtr6pgNQa7z0BRYykzrzjkDKSprOdRZ8bi2yZdliU5lnR nKfJf1ErZAo54pZg3THOAq2UG26gu5JiPiKsUcqZXXUcSd3ZV9uopxpUStPh2EYAli cpw3bQd3+7xz/SyQGtWdnmqEtppF5FXqcTM8ng2U= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Tso , Eric Biggers , Dominik Brodowski , "Jason A. Donenfeld" Subject: [PATCH 5.17 023/111] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:48:55 +0200 Message-Id: <20220527084822.751087885@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.36.1 In-Reply-To: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20220527084819.133490171@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.66 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" commit 0791e8b655cc373718f0f58800fdc625a3447ac5 upstream. Now that we have an explicit base_crng generation counter, we don't need a separate one for batched entropy. Rather, we can just move the generation forward every time we change crng_init state or update the base_crng key. Cc: Theodore Ts'o Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/random.c | 29 ++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -430,8 +430,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); -static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); - /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of @@ -454,7 +452,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const void src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); + ++base_crng.generation; crng_init = 1; } spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags); @@ -531,7 +529,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen); WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies); if (crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; finalize_init = true; } @@ -1256,8 +1253,9 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname()))); extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key)); + ++base_crng.generation; + if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) { - invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n"); } @@ -1607,8 +1605,6 @@ static int __init random_sysctls_init(vo device_initcall(random_sysctls_init); #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ -static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIC_INIT(0); - struct batched_entropy { union { /* @@ -1622,8 +1618,8 @@ struct batched_entropy { u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))]; }; local_lock_t lock; + unsigned long generation; unsigned int position; - int generation; }; /* @@ -1643,14 +1639,14 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; - int next_gen; + unsigned long next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64); - next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) || next_gen != batch->generation) { _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64)); @@ -1677,14 +1673,14 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; static void *previous; - int next_gen; + unsigned long next_gen; warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous); local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags); batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32); - next_gen = atomic_read(&batch_generation); + next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) || next_gen != batch->generation) { _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32)); @@ -1700,15 +1696,6 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); -/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might - * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by - * bumping the generation counter. - */ -static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) -{ - atomic_inc(&batch_generation); -} - /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.