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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10 042/163] random: cleanup integer types
Date: Fri, 27 May 2022 10:48:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220527084833.920642763@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220527084828.156494029@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit d38bb0853589c939573ea50e9cb64f733e0e273d upstream.

Rather than using the userspace type, __uXX, switch to using uXX. And
rather than using variously chosen `char *` or `unsigned char *`, use
`u8 *` uniformly for things that aren't strings, in the case where we
are doing byte-by-byte traversal.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
 
 struct crng_state {
-	__u32		state[16];
+	u32		state[16];
 	unsigned long	init_time;
 	spinlock_t	lock;
 };
@@ -483,9 +483,9 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
 #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
+				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
 static void process_random_ready_list(void);
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 
@@ -509,16 +509,16 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
 struct entropy_store;
 struct entropy_store {
 	/* read-only data: */
-	__u32 *pool;
+	u32 *pool;
 	const char *name;
 
 	/* read-write data: */
 	spinlock_t lock;
-	unsigned short add_ptr;
-	unsigned short input_rotate;
+	u16 add_ptr;
+	u16 input_rotate;
 	int entropy_count;
 	unsigned int last_data_init:1;
-	__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+	u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 };
 
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
@@ -527,7 +527,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e
 				size_t nbytes, int fips);
 
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
+static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
 
 static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
 	.name = "input",
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool =
 	.pool = input_pool_data
 };
 
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+static u32 const twist_table[8] = {
 	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
 	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
 
@@ -554,8 +554,8 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entro
 {
 	unsigned long i;
 	int input_rotate;
-	const unsigned char *bytes = in;
-	__u32 w;
+	const u8 *bytes = in;
+	u32 w;
 
 	input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
 	i = r->add_ptr;
@@ -608,10 +608,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
 }
 
 struct fast_pool {
-	__u32		pool[4];
+	u32		pool[4];
 	unsigned long	last;
-	unsigned short	reg_idx;
-	unsigned char	count;
+	u16		reg_idx;
+	u8		count;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -621,8 +621,8 @@ struct fast_pool {
  */
 static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
 {
-	__u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
-	__u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
+	u32 a = f->pool[0],	b = f->pool[1];
+	u32 c = f->pool[2],	d = f->pool[3];
 
 	a += b;			c += d;
 	b = rol32(b, 6);	d = rol32(d, 27);
@@ -814,14 +814,14 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea
 static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
 	chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
-	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
+	_get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12);
 	crng_init_try_arch(crng);
 	crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
 }
 
 static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
+	_extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(u32) * 12, 0);
 	if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init < 2) {
 		invalidate_batched_entropy();
 		numa_crng_init();
@@ -911,10 +911,10 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo
  * path.  So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
  * bytes processed from cp.
  */
-static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
-	char *p;
+	u8 *p;
 	size_t ret = 0;
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
 		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
@@ -951,14 +951,14 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const char
  * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
  * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
  */
-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long		flags;
-	static unsigned char	lfsr = 1;
-	unsigned char		tmp;
-	unsigned		i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
-	const char *		src_buf = cp;
-	char *			dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	static u8		lfsr = 1;
+	u8			tmp;
+	unsigned int		i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
+	const u8 *		src_buf = cp;
+	u8 *			dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
 		return 0;
@@ -987,8 +987,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 	unsigned long	flags;
 	int		i, num;
 	union {
-		__u8	block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		__u32	key[8];
+		u8	block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u32	key[8];
 	} buf;
 
 	if (r) {
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 }
 
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+			  u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	unsigned long flags, init_time;
 
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	_extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
 }
@@ -1043,26 +1043,26 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA
  * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
  */
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
-				    __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+				    u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	unsigned long	flags;
-	__u32		*s, *d;
+	u32		*s, *d;
 	int		i;
 
-	used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
+	used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32));
 	if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 		extract_crng(tmp);
 		used = 0;
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
+	s = (u32 *) &tmp[used];
 	d = &crng->state[4];
 	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
 		*d++ ^= *s++;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
 
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+static void crng_backtrack_protect(u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
 	_crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
 }
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8
 static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1158,8 +1158,8 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 	struct entropy_store	*r;
 	struct {
 		long jiffies;
-		unsigned cycles;
-		unsigned num;
+		unsigned int cycles;
+		unsigned int num;
 	} sample;
 	long delta, delta2, delta3;
 
@@ -1241,15 +1241,15 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t
 #define add_interrupt_bench(x)
 #endif
 
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
+static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
+	u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs;
 	unsigned int idx;
 
 	if (regs == NULL)
 		return 0;
 	idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
-	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
+	if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(u32))
 		idx = 0;
 	ptr += idx++;
 	WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
@@ -1263,8 +1263,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
 	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
 	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	__u32			c_high, j_high;
-	__u64			ip;
+	u32			c_high, j_high;
+	u64			ip;
 
 	if (cycles == 0)
 		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1282,8 +1282,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 
 	if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
 		if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
-		    crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
-				   sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
+		    crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
 			fast_pool->count = 0;
 			fast_pool->last = now;
 		}
@@ -1380,7 +1379,7 @@ retry:
  *
  * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
  */
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, u8 *out)
 {
 	struct blake2s_state state __aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long));
 	u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -1430,7 +1429,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e
 				size_t nbytes, int fips)
 {
 	ssize_t ret = 0, i;
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+	u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	while (nbytes) {
@@ -1468,7 +1467,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
 				 size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+	u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
@@ -1530,7 +1529,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
  */
 static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
-	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
+	u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
 
@@ -1724,7 +1723,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback)
 int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
 {
 	int left = nbytes;
-	char *p = buf;
+	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
 	while (left) {
@@ -1866,7 +1865,7 @@ static int
 write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t bytes;
-	__u32 t, buf[16];
+	u32 t, buf[16];
 	const char __user *p = buffer;
 
 	while (count > 0) {
@@ -1876,7 +1875,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, cons
 		if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
-		for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
+		for (b = bytes; b > 0; b -= sizeof(u32), i++) {
 			if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
 				break;
 			buf[i] ^= t;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-27 11:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 177+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-27  8:48 [PATCH 5.10 000/163] 5.10.119-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 001/163] lockdown: also lock down previous kgdb use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 002/163] staging: rtl8723bs: prevent ->Ssid overflow in rtw_wx_set_scan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 003/163] KVM: x86: Properly handle APF vs disabled LAPIC situation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 004/163] KVM: x86/mmu: fix NULL pointer dereference on guest INVPCID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 005/163] tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 006/163] secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 007/163] media: vim2m: Register video device after setting up internals Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 008/163] media: vim2m: initialize the media device earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 009/163] ACPI: sysfs: Make sparse happy about address space in use Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 010/163] ACPI: sysfs: Fix BERT error region memory mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 011/163] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 012/163] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 013/163] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 014/163] MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 015/163] crypto: lib/blake2s - Move selftest prototype into header file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 016/163] crypto: blake2s - define shash_alg structs using macros Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 017/163] crypto: x86/blake2s " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 018/163] crypto: blake2s - remove unneeded includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 019/163] crypto: blake2s - move update and final logic to internal/blake2s.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 020/163] crypto: blake2s - share the "shash" API boilerplate code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 021/163] crypto: blake2s - optimize blake2s initialization Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 022/163] crypto: blake2s - add comment for blake2s_state fields Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 023/163] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 024/163] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 025/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 026/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 027/163] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 028/163] lib/crypto: blake2s: avoid indirect calls to compression function for Clang CFI Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 029/163] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 030/163] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 031/163] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 032/163] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 033/163] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 034/163] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 035/163] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 036/163] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 037/163] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 038/163] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 039/163] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 040/163] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 041/163] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 043/163] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 044/163] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 045/163] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 046/163] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 047/163] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 049/163] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 050/163] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 051/163] random: selectively clang-format where it makes sense Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 052/163] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 053/163] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 054/163] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 055/163] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 056/163] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 057/163] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 058/163] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 059/163] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 060/163] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 061/163] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 062/163] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 063/163] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 064/163] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 065/163] random: get rid of secondary crngs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 066/163] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 067/163] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 068/163] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 069/163] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 070/163] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 071/163] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 072/163] random: make more consistent use of integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 073/163] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 074/163] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 075/163] random: fix locking for crng_init in crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 076/163] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 077/163] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 078/163] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 079/163] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 080/163] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 081/163] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 082/163] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 083/163] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 084/163] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 085/163] random: group crng functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 086/163] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 087/163] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 088/163] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 089/163] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 090/163] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 091/163] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 092/163] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 093/163] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 094/163] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 095/163] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 096/163] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 097/163] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 098/163] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 099/163] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 100/163] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 101/163] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 102/163] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 103/163] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 104/163] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 105/163] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 106/163] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 107/163] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 108/163] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 109/163] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 110/163] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 111/163] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 112/163] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 113/163] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 114/163] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 115/163] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 116/163] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 117/163] random: allow partial reads if later user copies fail Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 118/163] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:49 ` [PATCH 5.10 119/163] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 120/163] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 121/163] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 122/163] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 123/163] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 124/163] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 125/163] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 126/163] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 127/163] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 128/163] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 129/163] riscv: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 130/163] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 131/163] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 132/163] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 133/163] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 134/163] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 135/163] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 136/163] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 137/163] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 138/163] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 139/163] random: use first 128 bits of input as fast init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 140/163] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 141/163] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 142/163] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 143/163] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 144/163] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 145/163] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 146/163] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 147/163] random: move initialization out of reseeding hot path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 148/163] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 149/163] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 150/163] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 151/163] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 152/163] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 153/163] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 154/163] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 155/163] random: make consistent use of buf and len Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 156/163] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 157/163] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 158/163] random: unify batched entropy implementations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 159/163] random: convert to using fops->read_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 160/163] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 161/163] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 162/163] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27  8:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 163/163] ALSA: ctxfi: Add SB046x PCI ID Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 14:14 ` [PATCH 5.10 000/163] 5.10.119-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2022-05-27 15:53   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-27 16:59     ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-27 17:39       ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-27 21:10       ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-27 22:38         ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28  6:03           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-05-27 21:04   ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-06-01  6:13     ` Chris Paterson
2022-05-27 22:38 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-05-28 11:07 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-05-28 15:29 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-05-28 22:24 ` Fox Chen
2022-05-30  1:09 ` Samuel Zou

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