public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-audit@redhat.com,
	keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
	stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v36 06/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Thu,  9 Jun 2022 16:01:19 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220609230146.319210-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220609230146.319210-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>

Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init()
fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series.
At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
---
 include/linux/security.h |  5 +++--
 kernel/auditfilter.c     |  6 ++++--
 kernel/auditsc.c         | 16 +++++++++++-----
 security/security.c      |  5 +++--
 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 5b0b2a596cee..95ba8c223e0c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
 			     struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
 int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
 			      struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
 void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules);
 
@@ -1974,7 +1974,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob,
+					    u32 field, u32 op,
 					    struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
 {
 	return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index de75bd6ad866..15cd4fe35e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1337,6 +1337,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 
 		for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
 			struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+			struct lsmblob blob;
 			pid_t pid;
 			u32 sid;
 
@@ -1369,8 +1370,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_str) {
 					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-					result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
-						   f->type, f->op,
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+					result = security_audit_rule_match(
+						   &blob, f->type, f->op,
 						   &f->lsm_rules);
 				}
 				break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 1dcdf863adf6..7701dba499f5 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
 	u32 sid;
+	struct lsmblob blob;
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 
 	if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
@@ -678,8 +679,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
-							f->op, &f->lsm_rules);
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, sid);
+				result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
+							f->type, f->op,
+							&f->lsm_rules);
 			}
 			break;
 		case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -692,15 +695,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 			if (f->lsm_str) {
 				/* Find files that match */
 				if (name) {
+					lsmblob_init(&blob, name->osid);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
-								name->osid,
+								&blob,
 								f->type,
 								f->op,
 								&f->lsm_rules);
 				} else if (ctx) {
 					list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+						lsmblob_init(&blob, n->osid);
 						if (security_audit_rule_match(
-							n->osid, f->type, f->op,
+							&blob, f->type, f->op,
 							&f->lsm_rules)) {
 							++result;
 							break;
@@ -710,7 +715,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				/* Find ipc objects that match */
 				if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
 					break;
-				if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+				lsmblob_init(&blob, ctx->ipc.osid);
+				if (security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
 							      f->type, f->op,
 							      &f->lsm_rules))
 					++result;
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 141922732d10..ade59e3638e8 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2697,7 +2697,7 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
 	}
 }
 
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
 			      struct audit_lsm_rules *lsmrules)
 {
 	struct security_hook_list *hp;
@@ -2708,7 +2708,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
 			continue;
 		if (lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot] == NULL)
 			continue;
-		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(secid, field, op,
+		rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
+					field, op,
 					&lsmrules->rule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
-- 
2.35.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-09 23:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20220609230146.319210-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2022-06-09 23:01 ` [PATCH v36 00/33] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 01/33] integrity: disassociate ima_filter_rule from security_audit_rule Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 02/33] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 03/33] LSM: Add the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 04/33] LSM: provide lsm name and id slot mappings Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10  7:51     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 05/33] IMA: avoid label collisions with stacked LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 07/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 08/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 09/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 10/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 11/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_current_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 12/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 13/33] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2022-06-12 19:35     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 14/33] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 15/33] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 16/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 17/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 18/33] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10  3:05     ` kernel test robot
2022-06-23  7:09     ` Dan Carpenter
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 19/33] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 20/33] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 21/33] binder: Pass LSM identifier for confirmation Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 22/33] LSM: Extend security_secid_to_secctx to include module selection Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 23/33] Audit: Keep multiple LSM data in audit_names Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 24/33] Audit: Create audit_stamp structure Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 25/33] LSM: Add a function to report multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 26/33] Audit: Allow multiple records in an audit_buffer Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10 21:04     ` Paul Moore
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 27/33] Audit: Add record for multiple task security contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10 21:06     ` Paul Moore
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 28/33] audit: multiple subject lsm values for netlabel Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10 21:10     ` Paul Moore
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 29/33] Audit: Add record for multiple object contexts Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 30/33] netlabel: Use a struct lsmblob in audit data Casey Schaufler
2022-06-10 21:12     ` Paul Moore
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 31/33] LSM: Removed scaffolding function lsmcontext_init Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 32/33] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2022-06-09 23:01   ` [PATCH v36 33/33] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220609230146.319210-7-casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-audit@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox