From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il>,
Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il>,
Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>, Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 08/11] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:45:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220623164321.442250829@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220623164321.195163701@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
commit 4c2c8f03a5ab7cb04ec64724d7d176d00bcc91e5 upstream.
Moshe Kol, Amit Klein, and Yossi Gilad reported being able to accurately
identify a client by forcing it to emit only 40 times more connections
than there are entries in the table_perturb[] table. The previous two
improvements consisting in resalting the secret every 10s and adding
randomness to each port selection only slightly improved the situation,
and the current value of 2^8 was too small as it's not very difficult
to make a client emit 10k connections in less than 10 seconds.
Thus we're increasing the perturb table from 2^8 to 2^16 so that the
same precision now requires 2.6M connections, which is more difficult in
this time frame and harder to hide as a background activity. The impact
is that the table now uses 256 kB instead of 1 kB, which could mostly
affect devices making frequent outgoing connections. However such
components usually target a small set of destinations (load balancers,
database clients, perf assessment tools), and in practice only a few
entries will be visited, like before.
A live test at 1 million connections per second showed no performance
difference from the previous value.
Reported-by: Moshe Kol <moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il>
Reported-by: Yossi Gilad <yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il>
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -675,11 +675,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
* Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
* because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
* property might be used by clever attacker.
- * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
- * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
- * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
*/
-#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SIZE (1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT)
static u32 *table_perturb;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-23 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-23 16:45 [PATCH 5.4 00/11] 5.4.201-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/11] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/11] dm: remove special-casing of bio-based immutable singleton target on NVMe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/11] usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC address Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/11] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/11] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/11] tcp: add small random increments to the source port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/11] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/11] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/11] arm64: mm: Dont invalidate FROM_DEVICE buffers at start of DMA transfer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/11] Revert "hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 19:43 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/11] 5.4.201-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-24 0:53 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-24 6:43 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-24 10:45 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-24 23:35 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-25 13:42 ` Naresh Kamboju
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220623164321.442250829@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=aksecurity@gmail.com \
--cc=ben@decadent.org.uk \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=moshe.kol@mail.huji.ac.il \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=w@1wt.eu \
--cc=yossi.gilad@mail.huji.ac.il \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).