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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 070/234] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:42:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220623164345.042251607@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 6c0eace6e1499712583b6ee62d95161e8b3449f5 upstream.

This gets rid of another abstraction we no longer need. It would be nice
if we could instead make pool an array rather than a pointer, but the
latent entropy plugin won't be able to do its magic in that case. So
instead we put all accesses to the input pool's actual data through the
input_pool_data array directly.

Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c |  222 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@
  *
  * The primary kernel interface is
  *
- * 	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
  *
  * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
  * and place it in the requested buffer.  This is equivalent to a
@@ -132,10 +132,10 @@
  *
  * For less critical applications, there are the functions:
  *
- * 	u32 get_random_u32()
- * 	u64 get_random_u64()
- * 	unsigned int get_random_int()
- * 	unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *	u32 get_random_u32()
+ *	u64 get_random_u64()
+ *	unsigned int get_random_int()
+ *	unsigned long get_random_long()
  *
  * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
  * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much.  These are recommended
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@
  * from the devices are:
  *
  *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * 	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
  *                                unsigned int value);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- * 	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
  *					size_t entropy);
  *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
@@ -296,8 +296,8 @@
  * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
  * by using the commands:
  *
- * 	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * 	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
+ *	mknod /dev/random c 1 8
+ *	mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
  *
  * Acknowledgements:
  * =================
@@ -443,9 +443,9 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list
 static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
 
 struct crng_state {
-	u32		state[16];
-	unsigned long	init_time;
-	spinlock_t	lock;
+	u32 state[16];
+	unsigned long init_time;
+	spinlock_t lock;
 };
 
 static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = false
 #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
 static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
 static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
+#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
 static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE]);
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
 				    u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
@@ -496,17 +496,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
 static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
 
 static struct {
-	/* read-only data: */
-	u32 *pool;
-
-	/* read-write data: */
 	spinlock_t lock;
 	u16 add_ptr;
 	u16 input_rotate;
 	int entropy_count;
 } input_pool = {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
-	.pool = input_pool_data
 };
 
 static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, int min);
@@ -514,7 +509,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *bu
 
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool);
 
-static u32 const twist_table[8] = {
+static const u32 twist_table[8] = {
 	0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
 	0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
 
@@ -544,15 +539,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *
 		i = (i - 1) & POOL_WORDMASK;
 
 		/* XOR in the various taps */
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[i];
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
-		w ^= input_pool.pool[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[i];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDMASK];
+		w ^= input_pool_data[(i + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDMASK];
 
 		/* Mix the result back in with a twist */
-		input_pool.pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
+		input_pool_data[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
 
 		/*
 		 * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
@@ -584,10 +579,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
 }
 
 struct fast_pool {
-	u32		pool[4];
-	unsigned long	last;
-	u16		reg_idx;
-	u8		count;
+	u32 pool[4];
+	unsigned long last;
+	u16 reg_idx;
+	u8 count;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -715,7 +710,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
-	nbits = min(nbits,  POOL_BITS);
+	nbits = min(nbits, POOL_BITS);
 
 	credit_entropy_bits(nbits);
 	return 0;
@@ -727,7 +722,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(int
  *
  *********************************************************************/
 
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ)
 
 static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
 
@@ -751,9 +746,9 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_tr
 
 static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	int		i;
-	bool		arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long	rv;
+	int i;
+	bool arch_init = true;
+	unsigned long rv;
 
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
@@ -769,9 +764,9 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct cr
 
 static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
 {
-	int		i;
-	bool		arch_init = true;
-	unsigned long	rv;
+	int i;
+	bool arch_init = true;
+	unsigned long rv;
 
 	for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
@@ -841,7 +836,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct wor
 	struct crng_state *crng;
 	struct crng_state **pool;
 
-	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+	pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL);
 	for_each_online_node(i) {
 		crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
 				    GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
@@ -897,7 +892,7 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
 		return 0;
 	}
-	p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
 	while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
 		p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
 		cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
@@ -927,12 +922,12 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c
  */
 static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, size_t len)
 {
-	unsigned long		flags;
-	static u8		lfsr = 1;
-	u8			tmp;
-	unsigned int		i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
-	const u8 *		src_buf = cp;
-	u8 *			dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+	unsigned long flags;
+	static u8 lfsr = 1;
+	u8 tmp;
+	unsigned int i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
+	const u8 *src_buf = cp;
+	u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4];
 
 	if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
 		return 0;
@@ -943,7 +938,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
 	if (len > max)
 		max = len;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
 		tmp = lfsr;
 		lfsr >>= 1;
 		if (tmp & 1)
@@ -958,11 +953,11 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,
 
 static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, bool use_input_pool)
 {
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	int		i, num;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int i, num;
 	union {
-		u8	block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-		u32	key[8];
+		u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
+		u32 key[8];
 	} buf;
 
 	if (use_input_pool) {
@@ -976,11 +971,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-		unsigned long	rv;
+		unsigned long rv;
 		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
 		    !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
 			rv = random_get_entropy();
-		crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
+		crng->state[i + 4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
 	}
 	memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
 	WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
@@ -988,8 +983,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
 	crng_finalize_init(crng);
 }
 
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
-			  u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
+static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE])
 {
 	unsigned long flags, init_time;
 
@@ -1018,9 +1012,9 @@ static void extract_crng(u8 out[CHACHA20
 static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
 				    u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
 {
-	unsigned long	flags;
-	u32		*s, *d;
-	int		i;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	u32 *s, *d;
+	int i;
 
 	used = round_up(used, sizeof(u32));
 	if (used + CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
@@ -1028,9 +1022,9 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru
 		used = 0;
 	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
-	s = (u32 *) &tmp[used];
+	s = (u32 *)&tmp[used];
 	d = &crng->state[4];
-	for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
 		*d++ ^= *s++;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
 }
@@ -1075,7 +1069,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
 	return ret;
 }
 
-
 /*********************************************************************
  *
  * Entropy input management
@@ -1170,11 +1163,11 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 	 * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
 	 * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
 	 */
-	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
+	credit_entropy_bits(min_t(int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
 }
 
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-				 unsigned int value)
+			  unsigned int value)
 {
 	static unsigned char last_value;
 
@@ -1194,19 +1187,19 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool,
 #ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
 static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
 
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8     /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
+#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1))
 
 static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
 {
-        long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
+	long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
 
-        /* Use a weighted moving average */
-        delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_cycles += delta;
-        /* And average deviation */
-        delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
-        avg_deviation += delta;
+	/* Use a weighted moving average */
+	delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+	avg_cycles += delta;
+	/* And average deviation */
+	delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
+	avg_deviation += delta;
 }
 #else
 #define add_interrupt_bench(x)
@@ -1214,7 +1207,7 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t
 
 static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs;
+	u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs;
 	unsigned int idx;
 
 	if (regs == NULL)
@@ -1229,12 +1222,12 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f,
 
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 {
-	struct fast_pool	*fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
-	struct pt_regs		*regs = get_irq_regs();
-	unsigned long		now = jiffies;
-	cycles_t		cycles = random_get_entropy();
-	u32			c_high, j_high;
-	u64			ip;
+	struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+	struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+	unsigned long now = jiffies;
+	cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
+	u32 c_high, j_high;
+	u64 ip;
 
 	if (cycles == 0)
 		cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1244,8 +1237,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 	fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
 	ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
 	fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
-	fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
-		get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
+	fast_pool->pool[3] ^=
+		(sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 : get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
 
 	fast_mix(fast_pool);
 	add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
@@ -1259,8 +1252,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
-	    !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
+	if ((fast_pool->count < 64) && !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
 		return;
 
 	if (!spin_trylock(&input_pool.lock))
@@ -1324,7 +1316,7 @@ retry:
 		entropy_count = 0;
 	}
 	nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-	if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
+	if ((size_t)entropy_count > nfrac)
 		entropy_count -= nfrac;
 	else
 		entropy_count = 0;
@@ -1369,7 +1361,7 @@ static void extract_buf(u8 *out)
 
 	/* Generate a hash across the pool */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool, POOL_BYTES);
+	blake2s_update(&state, (const u8 *)input_pool_data, POOL_BYTES);
 	blake2s_final(&state, hash); /* final zeros out state */
 
 	/*
@@ -1427,10 +1419,9 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy(void *buf
 }
 
 #define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
-	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
+	_warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
 
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
-				      void **previous)
+static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
 	const bool print_once = false;
@@ -1438,8 +1429,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
 	static bool print_once __read_mostly;
 #endif
 
-	if (print_once ||
-	    crng_ready() ||
+	if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
 	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
 		return;
 	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
@@ -1447,9 +1437,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
 	print_once = true;
 #endif
 	if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
-		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS "
-				"with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller,
-				crng_init);
+		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
+				func_name, caller, crng_init);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1492,7 +1481,6 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-
 /*
  * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
  * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1531,7 +1519,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
 	timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
 	while (!crng_ready()) {
 		if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
-			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
+			mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
 		mix_pool_bytes(&stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
 		schedule();
 		stack.now = random_get_entropy();
@@ -1741,9 +1729,8 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk
 }
 #endif
 
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-		    loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+				   size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1753,8 +1740,8 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, c
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+			    loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1768,8 +1755,8 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u
 	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
 }
 
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
+			   loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -1779,8 +1766,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us
 	return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
 }
 
-static __poll_t
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
 {
 	__poll_t mask;
 
@@ -1794,8 +1780,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl
 	return mask;
 }
 
-static int
-write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
 {
 	size_t bytes;
 	u32 t, buf[16];
@@ -1897,35 +1882,35 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct
 }
 
 const struct file_operations random_fops = {
-	.read  = random_read,
+	.read = random_read,
 	.write = random_write,
-	.poll  = random_poll,
+	.poll = random_poll,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
 };
 
 const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
-	.read  = urandom_read,
+	.read = urandom_read,
 	.write = random_write,
 	.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
 	.fasync = random_fasync,
 	.llseek = noop_llseek,
 };
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
-		unsigned int, flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
+		flags)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE))
+	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
 	 * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
 	 * no sense.
 	 */
-	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
+	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (count > INT_MAX)
@@ -2073,7 +2058,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
 #endif
 	{ }
 };
-#endif 	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+#endif	/* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
 
 struct batched_entropy {
 	union {
@@ -2093,7 +2078,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {
  * point prior.
  */
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
+	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
 };
 
 u64 get_random_u64(void)
@@ -2118,7 +2103,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
-	.batch_lock	= __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
+	.batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
 };
 u32 get_random_u32(void)
 {
@@ -2150,7 +2135,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v
 	int cpu;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
+	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
 
 		batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
@@ -2179,8 +2164,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v
  * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
  * @start is returned.
  */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
 {
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
 		range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-23 17:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 241+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-23 16:41 [PATCH 4.19 000/234] 4.19.249-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 001/234] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 002/234] drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 003/234] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 004/234] drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 005/234] random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 006/234] random: move rand_initialize() earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 007/234] random: document get_random_int() family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 008/234] latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 009/234] random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 010/234] random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 011/234] fdt: add support for rng-seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 012/234] random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 013/234] char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 014/234] Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 015/234] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 016/234] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 017/234] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 018/234] random: Dont wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 019/234] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 020/234] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 021/234] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 022/234] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 023/234] char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 024/234] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 025/234] random: remove the blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 026/234] random: delete code to pull data into pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 027/234] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 028/234] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 029/234] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 030/234] random: Add and use pr_fmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 031/234] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 032/234] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 033/234] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 034/234] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 035/234] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 036/234] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 037/234] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 038/234] linux/random.h: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 039/234] linux/random.h: Use false with bool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 040/234] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 041/234] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 042/234] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 043/234] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 044/234] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 045/234] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 046/234] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 047/234] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 048/234] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 049/234] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 050/234] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 051/234] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 052/234] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 053/234] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 054/234] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 055/234] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 056/234] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 057/234] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 058/234] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 059/234] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 060/234] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 061/234] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 062/234] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 063/234] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 064/234] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 065/234] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 066/234] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 067/234] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 068/234] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 069/234] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 071/234] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 072/234] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 073/234] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 074/234] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 075/234] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 076/234] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 077/234] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 078/234] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 079/234] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 080/234] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 081/234] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 082/234] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 083/234] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 084/234] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 085/234] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 086/234] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 087/234] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 088/234] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 089/234] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 090/234] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 091/234] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 092/234] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 093/234] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 094/234] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 095/234] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 096/234] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 097/234] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 098/234] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 099/234] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 100/234] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 101/234] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 102/234] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 103/234] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 104/234] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 105/234] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 106/234] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 107/234] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 108/234] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 109/234] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 110/234] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 111/234] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 112/234] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 113/234] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 114/234] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 115/234] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 116/234] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 117/234] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 118/234] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 119/234] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 120/234] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 121/234] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 122/234] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 123/234] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 124/234] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 125/234] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 126/234] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 127/234] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 128/234] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 129/234] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 130/234] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 131/234] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 132/234] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 133/234] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 134/234] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 135/234] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 136/234] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 137/234] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 138/234] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 139/234] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 140/234] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 141/234] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 142/234] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 143/234] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 144/234] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 145/234] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 146/234] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 147/234] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 148/234] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 149/234] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 150/234] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 151/234] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 152/234] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 153/234] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 154/234] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 155/234] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 156/234] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 157/234] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 158/234] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 159/234] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 160/234] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 161/234] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 162/234] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 163/234] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 164/234] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 165/234] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 166/234] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 167/234] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 168/234] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 169/234] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 170/234] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 171/234] crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 172/234] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 173/234] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 174/234] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 175/234] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 176/234] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 177/234] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 178/234] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 179/234] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 180/234] random: account for arch randomness in bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 181/234] powerpc/kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in __get_wchan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 182/234] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 183/234] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 184/234] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 185/234] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 186/234] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 187/234] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 188/234] ASoC: es8328: Fix event generation for deemphasis control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 189/234] ASoC: wm_adsp: Fix event generation for wm_adsp_fw_put() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 190/234] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 191/234] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 192/234] scsi: ipr: Fix missing/incorrect resource cleanup in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 193/234] scsi: pmcraid: Fix missing " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 194/234] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 195/234] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 196/234] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 197/234] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 198/234] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 199/234] pNFS: Dont keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 200/234] i40e: Fix adding ADQ filter to TC0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 201/234] i40e: Fix call trace in setup_tx_descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 202/234] tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 203/234] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 204/234] mlxsw: spectrum_cnt: Reorder counter pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 205/234] net: bgmac: Fix an erroneous kfree() in bgmac_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 206/234] arm64: ftrace: fix branch range checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 207/234] certs/blacklist_hashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 208/234] faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures, the sequel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 209/234] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 210/234] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix refcount leak in gic_populate_ppi_partitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 211/234] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 212/234] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 213/234] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 214/234] usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 215/234] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 216/234] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 217/234] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 218/234] ext4: make variable "count" signed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 219/234] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 220/234] virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 221/234] net: openvswitch: fix misuse of the cached connection on tuple changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 222/234] net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 223/234] RISC-V: fix barrier() use in <vdso/processor.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 224/234] powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 225/234] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 226/234] usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC address Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 227/234] xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 228/234] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 229/234] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 230/234] tcp: add small random increments to the source port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 231/234] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 232/234] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 4.19 233/234] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 4.19 234/234] Revert "hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 20:10 ` [PATCH 4.19 000/234] 4.19.249-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2022-06-24  0:53 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-24  3:30 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-24 10:47 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-24 23:34 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-25 13:45 ` Naresh Kamboju

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