linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 164/234] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:43:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220623164347.695256092@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220623164343.042598055@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream.

Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be
used with unsigned values.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  |  195 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 include/linux/random.h |   24 +++---
 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
  *
  * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
  *
- *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
  *	u32 get_random_u32()
  *	u64 get_random_u64()
  *	unsigned int get_random_int()
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs
 };
 
 /* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
 
 /* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
 static void crng_reseed(void)
@@ -403,24 +403,24 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	size_t len;
+	size_t first_block_len;
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (!len)
 		return;
 
-	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
-	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
-	nbytes -= len;
-	buf += len;
+	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+	len -= first_block_len;
+	buf += first_block_len;
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (nbytes < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	while (len) {
+		if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
-			memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+			memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
 			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 			break;
 		}
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
 		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
-		nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 		buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 
@@ -445,20 +445,20 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
  * at any point prior.
  */
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	warn_unseeded_randomness();
-	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+	_get_random_bytes(buf, len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t len, left, ret = 0;
+	size_t block_len, left, ret = 0;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (!len)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -472,8 +472,8 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
 	 * the user directly.
 	 */
-	if (nbytes <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
-		ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes);
+	if (len <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len);
 		goto out_zero_chacha;
 	}
 
@@ -482,17 +482,17 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
-		len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len);
+		block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len);
 		if (left) {
-			ret += len - left;
+			ret += block_len - left;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		buf += len;
-		ret += len;
-		nbytes -= len;
-		if (!nbytes)
+		ubuf += block_len;
+		ret += block_len;
+		len -= block_len;
+		if (!len)
 			break;
 
 		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
@@ -663,24 +663,24 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo
  * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
  * bytes filled in.
  */
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t left = nbytes;
+	size_t left = len;
 	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+		size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
-		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
-		p += chunk;
-		left -= chunk;
+		memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+		p += block_len;
+		left -= block_len;
 	}
 
-	return nbytes - left;
+	return len - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
@@ -691,15 +691,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
  *
  * Callers may add entropy via:
  *
- *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
  *
- *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
+ *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  *
  * Finally, extract entropy via:
  *
- *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
@@ -721,9 +721,9 @@ static struct {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -731,12 +731,12 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *
  * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
  * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
  * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
  * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -773,12 +773,12 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	while (len) {
+		i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
 		++block.counter;
 		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
-		nbytes -= i;
+		len -= i;
 		buf += i;
 	}
 
@@ -786,16 +786,16 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
 	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
-static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
+static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 {
 	static struct execute_work set_ready;
 	unsigned int new, orig, add;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (crng_ready() || !nbits)
+	if (crng_ready() || !bits)
 		return;
 
-	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
 
 	do {
 		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
@@ -831,13 +831,11 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
- *					size_t entropy);
- *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *	                          unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
  *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
@@ -901,7 +899,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 {
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
 	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
-	unsigned long rv;
+	unsigned long entropy;
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
 	static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
@@ -909,13 +907,13 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 #endif
 
 	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv);
+	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+			entropy = random_get_entropy();
+			arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
 		}
-		_mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 	}
 	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
 	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
@@ -938,14 +936,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
  * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
  * identical devices.
  */
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
@@ -955,10 +953,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
  * when our pool is full.
  */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
-				size_t entropy)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
-	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	credit_init_bits(entropy);
 
 	/*
@@ -974,11 +971,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
  * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
  * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	if (trust_bootloader)
-		credit_init_bits(size * 8);
+		credit_init_bits(len * 8);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
 
@@ -1178,8 +1175,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 		credit_init_bits(bits);
 }
 
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-			  unsigned int value)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
 {
 	static unsigned char last_value;
 	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
@@ -1298,8 +1294,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
-		flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
 {
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1311,8 +1306,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (count > INT_MAX)
-		count = INT_MAX;
+	if (len > INT_MAX)
+		len = INT_MAX;
 
 	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
 		int ret;
@@ -1323,7 +1318,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 	}
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
 static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
@@ -1332,21 +1327,21 @@ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file
 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
 }
 
-static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t len;
+	size_t block_len;
 	int ret = 0;
 	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	while (count) {
-		len = min(count, sizeof(block));
-		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) {
+	while (len) {
+		block_len = min(len, sizeof(block));
+		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, block_len)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		count -= len;
-		ubuf += len;
-		mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
+		len -= block_len;
+		ubuf += block_len;
+		mix_pool_bytes(block, block_len);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
@@ -1355,20 +1350,20 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+			    size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
+	ret = write_pool(ubuf, len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	return (ssize_t)count;
+	return (ssize_t)len;
 }
 
-static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			    loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			    size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1378,22 +1373,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file
 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
 			--maxwarn;
 			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
-				  current->comm, nbytes);
+				  current->comm, len);
 		}
 	}
 
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			   loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1516,8 +1511,8 @@ static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
  * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
  * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
  */
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
 	char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
@@ -1543,14 +1538,14 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table
 	}
 
 	snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
-	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
-static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer,
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
 			    size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@
 
 struct notifier_block;
 
-void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t);
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(vo
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
 #endif
 
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
 u32 get_random_u32(void);
 u64 get_random_u64(void);
 static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -81,18 +81,18 @@ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
 			return ret; \
-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
 		return 0; \
 	}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
 #undef declare_get_random_var
 
 /*



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-23 18:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 241+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-23 16:41 [PATCH 4.19 000/234] 4.19.249-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 001/234] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 002/234] drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 003/234] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 004/234] drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 005/234] random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 006/234] random: move rand_initialize() earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 007/234] random: document get_random_int() family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 008/234] latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 009/234] random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 010/234] random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 011/234] fdt: add support for rng-seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 012/234] random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 013/234] char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 014/234] Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 015/234] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 016/234] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 017/234] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 018/234] random: Dont wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 019/234] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 020/234] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 021/234] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 022/234] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 023/234] char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 024/234] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 025/234] random: remove the blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 026/234] random: delete code to pull data into pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 027/234] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 028/234] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 029/234] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 030/234] random: Add and use pr_fmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 031/234] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 032/234] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 033/234] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 034/234] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 035/234] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 036/234] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 037/234] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 038/234] linux/random.h: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 039/234] linux/random.h: Use false with bool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 040/234] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 041/234] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 042/234] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 043/234] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 044/234] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 045/234] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 046/234] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 047/234] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 048/234] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 049/234] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 050/234] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 051/234] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.19 052/234] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 053/234] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 054/234] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 055/234] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 056/234] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 057/234] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 058/234] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 059/234] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 060/234] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 061/234] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 062/234] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 063/234] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 064/234] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 065/234] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 066/234] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 067/234] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 068/234] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 069/234] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 070/234] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 071/234] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 072/234] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 073/234] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 074/234] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 075/234] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 076/234] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 077/234] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 078/234] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 079/234] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 080/234] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 081/234] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 082/234] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 083/234] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 084/234] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 085/234] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 086/234] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 087/234] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 088/234] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 089/234] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 090/234] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 091/234] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 092/234] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 093/234] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 094/234] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 095/234] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 096/234] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 097/234] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 098/234] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 099/234] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 100/234] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 101/234] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 102/234] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 103/234] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 104/234] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 105/234] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 106/234] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 107/234] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 108/234] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 109/234] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 110/234] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 111/234] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.19 112/234] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 113/234] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 114/234] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 115/234] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 116/234] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 117/234] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 118/234] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 119/234] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 120/234] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 121/234] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 122/234] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 123/234] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 124/234] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 125/234] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 126/234] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 127/234] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 128/234] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 129/234] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 130/234] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 131/234] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 132/234] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 133/234] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 134/234] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 135/234] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 136/234] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 137/234] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 138/234] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 139/234] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 140/234] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 141/234] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 142/234] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 143/234] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 144/234] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 145/234] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 146/234] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 147/234] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 148/234] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 149/234] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 150/234] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 151/234] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 152/234] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 153/234] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 154/234] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 155/234] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 156/234] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 157/234] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 158/234] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 159/234] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 160/234] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 161/234] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 162/234] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 163/234] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 165/234] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 166/234] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 167/234] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 168/234] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 169/234] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 170/234] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 171/234] crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.19 172/234] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 173/234] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 174/234] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 175/234] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 176/234] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 177/234] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 178/234] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 179/234] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 180/234] random: account for arch randomness in bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 181/234] powerpc/kasan: Silence KASAN warnings in __get_wchan() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 182/234] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 183/234] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 184/234] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 185/234] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 186/234] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 187/234] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 188/234] ASoC: es8328: Fix event generation for deemphasis control Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 189/234] ASoC: wm_adsp: Fix event generation for wm_adsp_fw_put() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 190/234] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 191/234] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 192/234] scsi: ipr: Fix missing/incorrect resource cleanup in error case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 193/234] scsi: pmcraid: Fix missing " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 194/234] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 195/234] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 196/234] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 197/234] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 198/234] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 199/234] pNFS: Dont keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 200/234] i40e: Fix adding ADQ filter to TC0 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 201/234] i40e: Fix call trace in setup_tx_descriptors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 202/234] tty: goldfish: Fix free_irq() on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 203/234] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 204/234] mlxsw: spectrum_cnt: Reorder counter pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 205/234] net: bgmac: Fix an erroneous kfree() in bgmac_remove() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 206/234] arm64: ftrace: fix branch range checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 207/234] certs/blacklist_hashes.c: fix const confusion in certs blacklist Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 208/234] faddr2line: Fix overlapping text section failures, the sequel Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 209/234] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 210/234] irqchip/gic-v3: Fix refcount leak in gic_populate_ppi_partitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 211/234] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 212/234] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 213/234] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 214/234] usb: dwc2: Fix memory leak in dwc2_hcd_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 215/234] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 216/234] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 217/234] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 218/234] ext4: make variable "count" signed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 219/234] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 220/234] virtio-pci: Remove wrong address verification in vp_del_vqs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 221/234] net: openvswitch: fix misuse of the cached connection on tuple changes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 222/234] net: openvswitch: fix leak of nested actions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 223/234] RISC-V: fix barrier() use in <vdso/processor.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 224/234] powerpc/mm: Switch obsolete dssall to .long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 225/234] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 226/234] usb: gadget: u_ether: fix regression in setting fixed MAC address Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 227/234] xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 228/234] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 229/234] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 230/234] tcp: add small random increments to the source port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 231/234] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.19 232/234] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 4.19 233/234] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:45 ` [PATCH 4.19 234/234] Revert "hwmon: Make chip parameter for with_info API mandatory" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 20:10 ` [PATCH 4.19 000/234] 4.19.249-rc1 review Pavel Machek
2022-06-24  0:53 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-24  3:30 ` Samuel Zou
2022-06-24 10:47 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2022-06-24 23:34 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-25 13:45 ` Naresh Kamboju

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220623164347.695256092@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).