public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.9 208/264] random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()
Date: Thu, 23 Jun 2022 18:43:21 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220623164349.956445361@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220623164344.053938039@linuxfoundation.org>

From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>

commit 7c3a8a1db5e03d02cc0abb3357a84b8b326dfac3 upstream.

Before these were returning signed values, but the API is intended to be
used with unsigned values.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/char/random.c  |  195 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 include/linux/random.h |   24 +++---
 2 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
  *
  * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
  *
- *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *	void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
  *	u32 get_random_u32()
  *	u64 get_random_u64()
  *	unsigned int get_random_int()
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs
 };
 
 /* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
 
 /* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
 static void crng_reseed(void)
@@ -404,24 +404,24 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s
 	local_irq_restore(flags);
 }
 
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
-	size_t len;
+	size_t first_block_len;
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (!len)
 		return;
 
-	len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
-	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
-	nbytes -= len;
-	buf += len;
+	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+	len -= first_block_len;
+	buf += first_block_len;
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		if (nbytes < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+	while (len) {
+		if (len < CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 			chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
-			memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
+			memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
 			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
 			break;
 		}
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
 		chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
-		nbytes -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		len -= CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 		buf += CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE;
 	}
 
@@ -446,20 +446,20 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
  * at any point prior.
  */
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	warn_unseeded_randomness();
-	_get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
+	_get_random_bytes(buf, len);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
 
-static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *ubuf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t len, left, ret = 0;
+	size_t block_len, left, ret = 0;
 	u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
 	u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	if (!nbytes)
+	if (!len)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 	 * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
 	 * the user directly.
 	 */
-	if (nbytes <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
-		ret = nbytes - copy_to_user(buf, &chacha_state[4], nbytes);
+	if (len <= CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) {
+		ret = len - copy_to_user(ubuf, &chacha_state[4], len);
 		goto out_zero_chacha;
 	}
 
@@ -483,17 +483,17 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voi
 		if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
 			++chacha_state[13];
 
-		len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
-		left = copy_to_user(buf, output, len);
+		block_len = min_t(size_t, len, CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		left = copy_to_user(ubuf, output, block_len);
 		if (left) {
-			ret += len - left;
+			ret += block_len - left;
 			break;
 		}
 
-		buf += len;
-		ret += len;
-		nbytes -= len;
-		if (!nbytes)
+		ubuf += block_len;
+		ret += block_len;
+		len -= block_len;
+		if (!len)
 			break;
 
 		BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE != 0);
@@ -664,24 +664,24 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo
  * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
  * bytes filled in.
  */
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t left = nbytes;
+	size_t left = len;
 	u8 *p = buf;
 
 	while (left) {
 		unsigned long v;
-		size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+		size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
 
 		if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
 			break;
 
-		memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
-		p += chunk;
-		left -= chunk;
+		memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+		p += block_len;
+		left -= block_len;
 	}
 
-	return nbytes - left;
+	return len - left;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
 
@@ -692,15 +692,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
  *
  * Callers may add entropy via:
  *
- *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
  *
- *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
+ *     static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  *
  * Finally, extract entropy via:
  *
- *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+ *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
@@ -722,9 +722,9 @@ static struct {
 	.lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
 };
 
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
+	blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -732,12 +732,12 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *
  * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
  * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
  */
-static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-	_mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 
@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i
  * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
  * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
  */
-static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
@@ -774,12 +774,12 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
 
-	while (nbytes) {
-		i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+	while (len) {
+		i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
 		/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
 		++block.counter;
 		blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
-		nbytes -= i;
+		len -= i;
 		buf += i;
 	}
 
@@ -787,16 +787,16 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
 	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
 }
 
-static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbits)
+static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
 {
 	static struct execute_work set_ready;
 	unsigned int new, orig, add;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (crng_ready() || !nbits)
+	if (crng_ready() || !bits)
 		return;
 
-	add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);
+	add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
 
 	do {
 		orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
@@ -832,13 +832,11 @@ static void credit_init_bits(size_t nbit
  * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
  * the above entropy accumulation routines:
  *
- *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
- *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
- *					size_t entropy);
- *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
+ *	void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ *	void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ *	void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
  *	void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
- *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- *	                          unsigned int value);
+ *	void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
  *	void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
  *
  * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
@@ -902,7 +900,7 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 {
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
 	unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
-	unsigned long rv;
+	unsigned long entropy;
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
 	static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
@@ -910,13 +908,13 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
 #endif
 
 	for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
-	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
-		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
-		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
-			rv = random_get_entropy();
-			arch_bytes -= sizeof(rv);
+	     i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+		if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+		    !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+			entropy = random_get_entropy();
+			arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
 		}
-		_mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
+		_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
 	}
 	_mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
 	_mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
@@ -939,14 +937,14 @@ int __init random_init(const char *comma
  * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
  * identical devices.
  */
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
 	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
 	unsigned long flags;
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 	_mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
-	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
@@ -956,10 +954,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
  * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
  * when our pool is full.
  */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
-				size_t entropy)
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
 {
-	mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	credit_init_bits(entropy);
 
 	/*
@@ -975,11 +972,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random
  * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
  * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
  */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
 {
-	mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
+	mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
 	if (trust_bootloader)
-		credit_init_bits(size * 8);
+		credit_init_bits(len * 8);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
 
@@ -1179,8 +1176,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct
 		credit_init_bits(bits);
 }
 
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
-			  unsigned int value)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
 {
 	static unsigned char last_value;
 	static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
@@ -1299,8 +1295,7 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
  *
  **********************************************************************/
 
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
-		flags)
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
 {
 	if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1312,8 +1307,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (count > INT_MAX)
-		count = INT_MAX;
+	if (len > INT_MAX)
+		len = INT_MAX;
 
 	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
 		int ret;
@@ -1324,7 +1319,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
 		if (unlikely(ret))
 			return ret;
 	}
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
 static unsigned int random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
@@ -1333,21 +1328,21 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct f
 	return crng_ready() ? POLLIN | POLLRDNORM : POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM;
 }
 
-static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
+static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t len)
 {
-	size_t len;
+	size_t block_len;
 	int ret = 0;
 	u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
 
-	while (count) {
-		len = min(count, sizeof(block));
-		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) {
+	while (len) {
+		block_len = min(len, sizeof(block));
+		if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, block_len)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
 			goto out;
 		}
-		count -= len;
-		ubuf += len;
-		mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
+		len -= block_len;
+		ubuf += block_len;
+		mix_pool_bytes(block, block_len);
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
@@ -1356,20 +1351,20 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
-			    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+			    size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
+	ret = write_pool(ubuf, len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	return (ssize_t)count;
+	return (ssize_t)len;
 }
 
-static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			    loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			    size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	static int maxwarn = 10;
 
@@ -1379,22 +1374,22 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file
 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
 			--maxwarn;
 			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
-				  current->comm, nbytes);
+				  current->comm, len);
 		}
 	}
 
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
-static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
-			   loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *ubuf,
+			   size_t len, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return ret;
-	return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
+	return get_random_bytes_user(ubuf, len);
 }
 
 static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
@@ -1517,8 +1512,8 @@ static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
  * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
  * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
  */
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
-			void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
+			size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
 	char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
@@ -1544,14 +1539,14 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table
 	}
 
 	snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
-	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 /* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
-static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buffer,
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void __user *buf,
 			    size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+	return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
 }
 
 extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -12,12 +12,12 @@
 
 struct notifier_block;
 
-void add_device_randomness(const void *, size_t);
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, size_t);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
 void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 			  unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
 void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
 
 #if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(vo
 static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
 #endif
 
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
-size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
 u32 get_random_u32(void);
 u64 get_random_u64(void);
 static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -62,18 +62,18 @@ static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
-	static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+	static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
 		int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
 		if (unlikely(ret)) \
 			return ret; \
-		*out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+		*out = get_random_ ## name(); \
 		return 0; \
 	}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
 #undef declare_get_random_var
 
 /*



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-06-23 17:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 270+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-23 16:39 [PATCH 4.9 000/264] 4.9.320-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 001/264] 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 002/264] random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 003/264] random: remove stale urandom_init_wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 004/264] random: remove variable limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 005/264] random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:39 ` [PATCH 4.9 006/264] random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 007/264] random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 008/264] random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 009/264] random: silence compiler warnings and fix race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 010/264] random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 011/264] random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 012/264] random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 013/264] random: do not ignore early device randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 014/264] random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 015/264] random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 016/264] random: fix warning message on ia64 and parisc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 017/264] random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 018/264] random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 019/264] random: fix possible sleeping allocation from irq context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 020/264] random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 021/264] random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 022/264] char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 023/264] Revert "char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 024/264] random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 025/264] random: fix data race on crng_node_pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 026/264] crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 027/264] random: always fill buffer in get_random_bytes_wait Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 028/264] random: optimize add_interrupt_randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 029/264] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused dont_count_entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 030/264] random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 031/264] random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 032/264] random: add a config option to trust the CPUs hwrng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 033/264] random: remove preempt disabled region Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 034/264] random: Make crng state queryable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 035/264] random: make CPU trust a boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 036/264] drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 037/264] drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 038/264] drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 039/264] random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 040/264] random: move rand_initialize() earlier Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 041/264] random: document get_random_int() family Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 042/264] latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 043/264] random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 044/264] random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 045/264] fdt: add support for rng-seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 046/264] random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 047/264] char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 048/264] Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 049/264] crypto: Deduplicate le32_to_cpu_array() and cpu_to_le32_array() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 050/264] crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 051/264] lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 052/264] lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 053/264] random: Dont wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 054/264] random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that dont warn Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 055/264] random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 056/264] random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 057/264] random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 058/264] random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 059/264] random: remove the blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 060/264] random: delete code to pull data into pools Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 061/264] random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 062/264] random: remove unnecessary unlikely() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 063/264] random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 064/264] random: Add and use pr_fmt() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 065/264] random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:40 ` [PATCH 4.9 066/264] random: remove some dead code of poolinfo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 067/264] random: split primary/secondary crng init paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 068/264] random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 069/264] x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 070/264] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 071/264] linux/random.h: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 072/264] linux/random.h: Use false with bool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 073/264] linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 074/264] powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 075/264] random: add arch_get_random_*long_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 076/264] random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 077/264] random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 078/264] MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 079/264] crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h> Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 080/264] crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 081/264] random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 082/264] random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 083/264] random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 084/264] random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 085/264] random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 086/264] random: mix bootloader randomness into pool Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 087/264] random: harmonize "crng init done" messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 088/264] random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 089/264] random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 090/264] random: early initialization of ChaCha constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 091/264] random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 092/264] random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 093/264] random: fix typo in comments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 094/264] random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 095/264] crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again) Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 096/264] random: cleanup integer types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 097/264] random: remove incomplete last_data logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 098/264] random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 099/264] random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 100/264] random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 101/264] random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 102/264] random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 103/264] random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_ Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 104/264] random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 105/264] random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 106/264] random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 107/264] random: continually use hwgenerator randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 108/264] random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 109/264] random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 110/264] random: use computational hash for entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 111/264] random: simplify entropy debiting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 112/264] random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 113/264] random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 114/264] random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 115/264] random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 116/264] random: remove batched entropy locking Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 117/264] random: fix locking in crng_fast_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 118/264] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 119/264] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 120/264] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 121/264] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 122/264] random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 123/264] random: use hash function for crng_slow_load() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 124/264] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 125/264] random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:41 ` [PATCH 4.9 126/264] random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 127/264] random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 128/264] random: remove unused tracepoints Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 129/264] random: add proper SPDX header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 130/264] random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 131/264] random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 132/264] random: remove useless header comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 133/264] random: remove whitespace and reorder includes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 134/264] random: group initialization wait functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 135/264] random: group entropy extraction functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 136/264] random: group entropy collection functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 137/264] random: group userspace read/write functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 138/264] random: group sysctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 139/264] random: rewrite header introductory comment Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 140/264] workqueue: make workqueue available early during boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 141/264] random: defer fast pool mixing to worker Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 142/264] random: do not take pool spinlock at boot Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 143/264] random: unify early init crng load accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 144/264] random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 145/264] hwrng: core - do not use multiple blank lines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 146/264] hwrng: core - rewrite better comparison to NULL Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 147/264] hwrng: core - Rewrite the header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 148/264] hwrng: core - Move hwrng miscdev minor number to include/linux/miscdevice.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 149/264] hwrng: core - remove unused PFX macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 150/264] hwrng: use rng source with best quality Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 151/264] hwrng: remember rng chosen by user Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 152/264] random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 153/264] random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 154/264] random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 155/264] random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 156/264] random: cleanup UUID handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 157/264] random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 158/264] random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 159/264] random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 160/264] random: dont let 644 read-only sysctls be written to Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 161/264] random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 162/264] random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 163/264] random: make consistent usage of crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 164/264] random: reseed more often immediately after booting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 165/264] random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 166/264] random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 167/264] random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 168/264] random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 169/264] random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 170/264] random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 171/264] random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 172/264] random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 173/264] random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 174/264] random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 175/264] random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 176/264] random: fix sysctl documentation nits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 177/264] init: call time_init() before rand_initialize() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 178/264] ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 179/264] s390: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 180/264] parisc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 181/264] alpha: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 182/264] powerpc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 183/264] timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 184/264] m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 185/264] mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:42 ` [PATCH 4.9 186/264] arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 187/264] nios2: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 188/264] x86/tsc: Use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 189/264] um: use " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 190/264] sparc: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 191/264] xtensa: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 192/264] uapi: rename ext2_swab() to swab() and share globally in swab.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 193/264] random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 194/264] random: do not use batches when !crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 195/264] random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 196/264] random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 197/264] random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 198/264] random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 199/264] siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 200/264] random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 201/264] random: avoid initializing twice in credit race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 202/264] random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 203/264] random: use proper jiffies comparison macro Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 204/264] random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 205/264] random: credit architectural init the exact amount Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 206/264] random: use static branch for crng_ready() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 207/264] random: remove extern from functions in header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 209/264] random: move initialization functions out of hot pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 210/264] random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 211/264] random: convert to using fops->write_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 212/264] random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 213/264] random: check for signals after page of pool writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 214/264] Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 215/264] crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 216/264] crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 217/264] crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 218/264] crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 219/264] crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 220/264] crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 221/264] crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 222/264] random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 223/264] random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 224/264] random: account for arch randomness in bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 225/264] ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 226/264] ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 227/264] ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 228/264] ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 229/264] ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 230/264] ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 231/264] scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 232/264] scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 233/264] virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 234/264] nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 235/264] ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 236/264] net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 237/264] random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 238/264] pNFS: Dont keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 239/264] misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 240/264] irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 241/264] irqchip/gic-v3: Iterate over possible CPUs by for_each_possible_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 242/264] comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 243/264] USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 244/264] USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 245/264] usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:43 ` [PATCH 4.9 246/264] serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 247/264] ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 248/264] ext4: make variable "count" signed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 249/264] ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 250/264] l2tp: dont use inet_shutdown on ppp session destroy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 251/264] l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 252/264] s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 253/264] xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 254/264] swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 255/264] Reinstate some of "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE"" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 256/264] fuse: fix pipe buffer lifetime for direct_io Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 257/264] tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 258/264] tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 259/264] secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 260/264] tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 261/264] tcp: add small random increments to the source port Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 262/264] tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 263/264] tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 16:44 ` [PATCH 4.9 264/264] tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-06-23 19:30 ` [PATCH 4.9 000/264] 4.9.320-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-06-23 20:11 ` Pavel Machek
2022-06-24  0:54 ` Shuah Khan
2022-06-24 23:33 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-06-25 13:53 ` Naresh Kamboju

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220623164349.956445361@linuxfoundation.org \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox