From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 24/61] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:21 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220712183237.922322019@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220712183236.931648980@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 upstream.
Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.
[peterz: add hygon]
[kim: invert parity; fam15h]
Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++++++++
include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++
5 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -450,5 +450,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1987,6 +1987,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
}
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf, unsigned int bug)
{
@@ -2032,6 +2037,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+ case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+ return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
default:
break;
}
@@ -2088,4 +2096,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct
{
return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1231,16 +1231,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
{}
};
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
#define SRBDS BIT(0)
/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO BIT(1)
/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED BIT(3)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ -1273,6 +1284,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
{}
};
@@ -1374,6 +1390,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
return;
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(
return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
}
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -580,6 +586,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444
static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -592,6 +599,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+ &dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
NULL
};
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct dev
extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
extern __printf(4, 5)
struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-12 19:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-12 18:38 [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/61] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/61] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/61] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/61] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/61] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/61] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/61] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/61] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/61] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/61] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/61] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/61] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/61] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/61] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/61] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/61] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/61] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/61] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/61] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/61] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/61] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/61] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/61] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/61] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/61] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/61] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/61] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/61] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/61] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/61] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/61] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/61] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13 7:45 ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 7:54 ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 8:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13 9:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-13 9:50 ` [PATCH] x86/asm/32: fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32bit Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:45 ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:52 ` tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/61] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/61] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/61] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/61] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/61] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/61] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/61] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/61] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/61] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/61] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/61] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/61] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/61] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 48/61] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 49/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 50/61] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 51/61] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 52/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 53/61] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 54/61] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 55/61] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 56/61] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 57/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 58/61] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 59/61] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 60/61] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 61/61] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 23:52 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-13 0:43 ` Zan Aziz
2022-07-13 3:16 ` Shuah Khan
2022-07-13 8:30 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-13 10:06 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2022-07-13 10:17 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-13 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 13:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13 13:58 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 16:54 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-13 14:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-13 22:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-13 22:21 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-07-15 11:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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