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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 52/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2022 20:39:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220712183238.990422350@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220712183236.931648980@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

commit 07853adc29a058c5fd143c14e5ac528448a72ed9 upstream.

On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's
SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.

Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's
at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could
empty the RSB before one of the returns.

For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise)
between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.

  [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: header conflict fixup at arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |    6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c      |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S      |   29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          |    8 --------
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h          |    4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h      |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include "../kvm/vmx/vmx.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
@@ -90,4 +91,9 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1);
 	OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
+
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
+		BLANK();
+		OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl);
+	}
 }
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
- * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM.  VMX spec_ctrl handling is
+ * done in vmenter.S.
  */
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
 
-#include "lapic.h"
-#include "x86.h"
+#include "../lapic.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
 
 extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid;
 extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled;
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 #include "run_flags.h"
 
@@ -73,6 +75,33 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
 	lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
 	call vmx_update_host_rsp
 
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+
+	/*
+	 * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the
+	 * host's, write the MSR.
+	 *
+	 * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness,
+	 * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code
+	 * and vmentry.
+	 */
+	mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
+	movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi
+	movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi
+	cmp %edi, %esi
+	je .Lspec_ctrl_done
+	mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+	xor %edx, %edx
+	mov %edi, %eax
+	wrmsr
+
+.Lspec_ctrl_done:
+
+	/*
+	 * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for
+	 * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr.
+	 */
+
 	/* Load @regs to RAX. */
 	mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6989,14 +6989,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kv
 
 	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
 
-	/*
-	 * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
-	 * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
-	 * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
-	 * being speculatively taken.
-	 */
-	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
 	/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
 	vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 
 #include "capabilities.h"
-#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
 #include "posted_intr.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmx_ops.h"
-#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "../cpuid.h"
 #include "run_flags.h"
 
 #define MSR_TYPE_R	1
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 #include "evmcs.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
-#include "x86.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
 
 asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault);
 __attribute__((regparm(0))) void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field,



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-12 19:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-12 18:38 [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/61] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:38 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/61] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/61] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/61] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/61] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/61] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/61] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/61] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/61] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/61] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/61] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/61] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/61] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/61] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/61] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/61] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/61] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/61] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/61] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/61] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/61] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/61] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/61] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/61] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/61] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/61] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/61] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/61] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/61] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/61] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/61] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/61] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/61] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13  7:45   ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13  7:54     ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13  8:17       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13  9:21         ` Borislav Petkov
2022-07-13  9:50           ` [PATCH] x86/asm/32: fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32bit Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:45     ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-13 10:52     ` tip-bot2 for Jiri Slaby
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/61] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/61] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/61] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/61] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/61] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/61] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/61] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/61] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/61] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/61] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/61] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/61] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/61] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 48/61] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 49/61] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 50/61] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 51/61] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 53/61] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 54/61] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 55/61] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 56/61] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 57/61] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 58/61] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 59/61] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 60/61] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 18:39 ` [PATCH 5.18 61/61] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-12 23:52 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/61] 5.18.12-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-13  0:43 ` Zan Aziz
2022-07-13  3:16 ` Shuah Khan
2022-07-13  8:30 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-13 10:06 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
2022-07-13 10:17 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-13 11:03 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 13:03   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-13 13:58     ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-13 16:54       ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-13 14:12     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-07-13 22:18 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-13 22:21 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-07-15 11:27 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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