public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, babu.moger@amd.com,
	chang.seok.bae@intel.com, pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com,
	jmattson@google.com, jing2.liu@intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
	sblbir@amazon.com, keescook@chromium.org, tony.luck@intel.com,
	jane.malalane@citrix.com, bigeasy@linutronix.de
Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 09/42] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2022 21:13:17 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220720011350.1024134-9-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220720011350.1024134-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>

[ Upstream commit 6b80b59b3555706508008f1f127b5412c89c7fd8 ]

Report that AMD x86 CPUs are vulnerable to the RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions) attack.

  [peterz: add hygon]
  [kim: invert parity; fam15h]

Co-developed-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c         | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c       | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/base/cpu.c                 |  8 ++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 57dc9f822e8b..fd93c0a5f85a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -441,5 +441,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2c512ff2ee10..c62ea37ca38a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1987,6 +1987,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -2032,6 +2037,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+		return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2088,4 +2096,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *at
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index bd390c56e551..d5488cff3e01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1095,16 +1095,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
 #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
 					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
 					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
 
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
 #define SRBDS		BIT(0)
 /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO		BIT(1)
 /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO_SBDS	BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1137,6 +1148,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1238,6 +1254,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index fddd08e482fc..55405ebf23ab 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -570,6 +570,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -580,6 +586,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -592,6 +599,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+	&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index eb3394f5b109..6102a21a01d9 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 					struct device_attribute *attr,
 					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
-- 
2.35.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-20  1:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-20  1:13 [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 01/42] Revert "evm: Fix memleak in init_desc" Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 02/42] ARM: rockchip: Add missing of_node_put() in rockchip_suspend_init() Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 03/42] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 04/42] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 05/42] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 06/42] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Don't use RET in vsyscall emulation Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 07/42] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 08/42] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 10/42] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 11/42] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 12/42] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 13/42] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 14/42] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 15/42] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 16/42] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 17/42] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 18/42] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 19/42] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 20/42] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 21/42] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 22/42] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 23/42] wifi: mac80211: check skb_shared in ieee80211_8023_xmit() Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 24/42] wifi: mac80211: do not wake queues on a vif that is being stopped Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 25/42] wifi: cfg80211: Allow P2P client interface to indicate port authorization Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 26/42] drm: panel-orientation-quirks: Add quirk for the Lenovo Yoga Tablet 2 830 Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 27/42] nilfs2: fix incorrect masking of permission flags for symlinks Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 28/42] ASoC: ti: omap-mcbsp: duplicate sysfs error Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 29/42] ASoC: tlv320adcx140: Fix tx_mask check Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 30/42] ASoC: wm5102: Fix event generation for output compensation Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 31/42] ASoC: wm8998: Fix event generation for input mux Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 32/42] ASoC: cs47l92: Fix event generation for OUT1 demux Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 33/42] ASoC: arizona: Update arizona_aif_cfg_changed to use RX_BCLK_RATE Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 34/42] scsi: target: Fix WRITE_SAME No Data Buffer crash Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 35/42] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 36/42] platform/x86: asus-wmi: Add key mappings Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 37/42] platform/x86: intel_atomisp2_led: Also turn off the always-on camera LED on the Asus T100TAF Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 38/42] scsi: ufs: core: Fix missing clk change notification on host reset Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 39/42] scsi: pm80xx: Fix 'Unknown' max/min linkrate Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 40/42] scsi: pm80xx: Set stopped phy's linkrate to Disabled Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 41/42] KVM: nVMX: Always enable TSC scaling for L2 when it was enabled for L1 Sasha Levin
2022-07-20  1:13 ` [PATCH AUTOSEL 5.15 42/42] ubsan: disable UBSAN_DIV_ZERO for clang Sasha Levin

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20220720011350.1024134-9-sashal@kernel.org \
    --to=sashal@kernel.org \
    --cc=alexandre.chartre@oracle.com \
    --cc=babu.moger@amd.com \
    --cc=bigeasy@linutronix.de \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=chang.seok.bae@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=jane.malalane@citrix.com \
    --cc=jing2.liu@intel.com \
    --cc=jmattson@google.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kim.phillips@amd.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=sandipan.das@amd.com \
    --cc=sblbir@amazon.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox