From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 01/70] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret()
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:06:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220722090650.801320383@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220722090650.665513668@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
commit 0aca53c6b522f8d6e2681ca875acbbe105f5fdcf upstream.
Always stash the address error_entry() is going to return to, in %r12
and get rid of the void *error_entry_ret; slot in struct bad_iret_stack
which was supposed to account for it and pt_regs pushed on the stack.
After this, both fixup_bad_iret() and sync_regs() can work on a struct
pt_regs pointer directly.
[ bp: Rewrite commit message, touch ups. ]
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220503032107.680190-2-jiangshanlai@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 5 ++++-
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 19 +++++++------------
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1062,9 +1062,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_entry)
* Pretend that the exception came from user mode: set up pt_regs
* as if we faulted immediately after IRET.
*/
- mov %rsp, %rdi
+ popq %r12 /* save return addr in %12 */
+ movq %rsp, %rdi /* arg0 = pt_regs pointer */
call fixup_bad_iret
mov %rax, %rsp
+ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
+ pushq %r12
jmp .Lerror_entry_from_usermode_after_swapgs
SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
asmlinkage __visible notrace struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs);
asmlinkage __visible notrace
-struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s);
+struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs);
void __init trap_init(void);
asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);
#endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -892,14 +892,10 @@ sync:
}
#endif
-struct bad_iret_stack {
- void *error_entry_ret;
- struct pt_regs regs;
-};
-
-asmlinkage __visible noinstr
-struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(struct bad_iret_stack *s)
+asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret(struct pt_regs *bad_regs)
{
+ struct pt_regs tmp, *new_stack;
+
/*
* This is called from entry_64.S early in handling a fault
* caused by a bad iret to user mode. To handle the fault
@@ -908,19 +904,18 @@ struct bad_iret_stack *fixup_bad_iret(st
* just below the IRET frame) and we want to pretend that the
* exception came from the IRET target.
*/
- struct bad_iret_stack tmp, *new_stack =
- (struct bad_iret_stack *)__this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
+ new_stack = (struct pt_regs *)__this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.sp0) - 1;
/* Copy the IRET target to the temporary storage. */
- __memcpy(&tmp.regs.ip, (void *)s->regs.sp, 5*8);
+ __memcpy(&tmp.ip, (void *)bad_regs->sp, 5*8);
/* Copy the remainder of the stack from the current stack. */
- __memcpy(&tmp, s, offsetof(struct bad_iret_stack, regs.ip));
+ __memcpy(&tmp, bad_regs, offsetof(struct pt_regs, ip));
/* Update the entry stack */
__memcpy(new_stack, &tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- BUG_ON(!user_mode(&new_stack->regs));
+ BUG_ON(!user_mode(new_stack));
return new_stack;
}
#endif
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-22 9:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-22 9:06 [PATCH 5.18 00/70] 5.18.14-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/70] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/70] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/70] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/70] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/70] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/70] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/70] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/70] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/70] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/70] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/70] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/70] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-25 5:44 ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-25 8:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-25 11:49 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/70] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/70] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/70] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/70] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/70] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/70] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/70] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/70] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/70] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/70] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/70] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/70] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/70] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/70] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/70] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/70] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/70] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/70] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/70] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/70] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/70] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/70] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/70] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/70] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/70] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/70] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/70] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/70] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/70] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/70] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/70] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/70] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/70] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/70] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 48/70] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 49/70] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 50/70] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 51/70] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 52/70] KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 53/70] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 54/70] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 55/70] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 56/70] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 57/70] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 58/70] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 59/70] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 60/70] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 61/70] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 62/70] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 63/70] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 64/70] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 65/70] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 66/70] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 67/70] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 68/70] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 69/70] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 70/70] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 18:37 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/70] 5.18.14-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-22 18:55 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-22 19:33 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-23 2:02 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-23 8:39 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-07-23 8:53 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
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