From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.18 52/70] KVM: VMX: Prevent RSB underflow before vmenter
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:07:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220722090653.635310511@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220722090650.665513668@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
commit 07853adc29a058c5fd143c14e5ac528448a72ed9 upstream.
On VMX, there are some balanced returns between the time the guest's
SPEC_CTRL value is written, and the vmenter.
Balanced returns (matched by a preceding call) are usually ok, but it's
at least theoretically possible an NMI with a deep call stack could
empty the RSB before one of the returns.
For maximum paranoia, don't allow *any* returns (balanced or otherwise)
between the SPEC_CTRL write and the vmenter.
[ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ]
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: header conflict fixup at arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 --------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h | 2 +-
7 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <asm/bootparam.h>
#include <asm/suspend.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include "../kvm/vmx/vmx.h"
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
#include <xen/interface/xen.h>
@@ -90,4 +91,9 @@ static void __used common(void)
OFFSET(TSS_sp0, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp0);
OFFSET(TSS_sp1, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp1);
OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
+ BLANK();
+ OFFSET(VMX_spec_ctrl, vcpu_vmx, spec_ctrl);
+ }
}
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
}
/*
- * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
- * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM. VMX spec_ctrl handling is
+ * done in vmenter.S.
*/
void
x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
#include <asm/vmx.h>
-#include "lapic.h"
-#include "x86.h"
+#include "../lapic.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
extern bool __read_mostly enable_vpid;
extern bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled;
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S
@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
#include <asm/bitsperlong.h>
#include <asm/kvm_vcpu_regs.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include "run_flags.h"
@@ -73,6 +75,33 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vmx_vcpu_run)
lea (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_ARG2
call vmx_update_host_rsp
+ ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lspec_ctrl_done", "", X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL
+
+ /*
+ * SPEC_CTRL handling: if the guest's SPEC_CTRL value differs from the
+ * host's, write the MSR.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: To avoid RSB underflow attacks and any other nastiness,
+ * there must not be any returns or indirect branches between this code
+ * and vmentry.
+ */
+ mov 2*WORD_SIZE(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_DI
+ movl VMX_spec_ctrl(%_ASM_DI), %edi
+ movl PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %esi
+ cmp %edi, %esi
+ je .Lspec_ctrl_done
+ mov $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+ xor %edx, %edx
+ mov %edi, %eax
+ wrmsr
+
+.Lspec_ctrl_done:
+
+ /*
+ * Since vmentry is serializing on affected CPUs, there's no need for
+ * an LFENCE to stop speculation from skipping the wrmsr.
+ */
+
/* Load @regs to RAX. */
mov (%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_AX
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6989,14 +6989,6 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kv
kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
- /*
- * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
- * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
- * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
- * being speculatively taken.
- */
- x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h
@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
#include <asm/intel_pt.h>
#include "capabilities.h"
-#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
+#include "../kvm_cache_regs.h"
#include "posted_intr.h"
#include "vmcs.h"
#include "vmx_ops.h"
-#include "cpuid.h"
+#include "../cpuid.h"
#include "run_flags.h"
#define MSR_TYPE_R 1
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
#include "evmcs.h"
#include "vmcs.h"
-#include "x86.h"
+#include "../x86.h"
asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault);
__attribute__((regparm(0))) void vmread_error_trampoline(unsigned long field,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-22 9:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-22 9:06 [PATCH 5.18 00/70] 5.18.14-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 01/70] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 02/70] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 03/70] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:06 ` [PATCH 5.18 04/70] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 05/70] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 06/70] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 07/70] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 08/70] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 09/70] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 10/70] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 11/70] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 12/70] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 13/70] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-25 5:44 ` Jiri Slaby
2022-07-25 8:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-25 11:49 ` Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 14/70] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 15/70] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 16/70] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 17/70] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 18/70] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 19/70] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 20/70] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 21/70] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 22/70] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 23/70] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 24/70] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 25/70] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 26/70] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 27/70] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 28/70] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 29/70] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 30/70] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 31/70] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 32/70] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 33/70] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 34/70] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 35/70] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 36/70] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 37/70] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 38/70] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 39/70] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 40/70] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 41/70] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 42/70] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 43/70] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 44/70] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 45/70] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 46/70] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 47/70] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 48/70] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 49/70] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 50/70] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 51/70] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 53/70] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 54/70] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 55/70] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 56/70] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 57/70] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 58/70] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 59/70] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 60/70] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 61/70] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 62/70] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 63/70] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:07 ` [PATCH 5.18 64/70] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 65/70] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 66/70] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 67/70] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 68/70] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 69/70] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:08 ` [PATCH 5.18 70/70] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 18:37 ` [PATCH 5.18 00/70] 5.18.14-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-07-22 18:55 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-22 19:33 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-23 2:02 ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-23 8:39 ` Rudi Heitbaum
2022-07-23 8:53 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
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