From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5.15 50/89] x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability
Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 11:11:24 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220722091136.165566382@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220722091133.320803732@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
commit 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 upstream.
Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this
vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs).
[jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs]
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
3 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA BIT(2) /* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -783,12 +783,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(c
}
early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
};
enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -800,6 +805,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
};
static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -842,6 +849,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_c
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
@@ -858,12 +866,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
- break;
-
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+
+ /*
+ * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+ */
+
break;
}
@@ -893,15 +904,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
break;
}
+ /*
+ * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+ * retbleed= cmdline option.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+ }
+ }
+
pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
- SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1127,24 +1127,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
- BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ BIT(7) | BIT(0xB), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD), SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8), SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | RETBLEED),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
- if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+ if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-07-22 9:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-22 9:10 [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 01/89] x86/traps: Use pt_regs directly in fixup_bad_iret() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 02/89] x86/entry: Switch the stack after error_entry() returns Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 03/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS out of error_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 04/89] x86/entry: Dont call error_entry() for XENPV Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 05/89] objtool: Classify symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 06/89] objtool: Explicitly avoid self modifying code in .altinstr_replacement Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 07/89] objtool: Shrink struct instruction Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 08/89] objtool,x86: Replace alternatives with .retpoline_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 09/89] objtool: Introduce CFI hash Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 10/89] x86/retpoline: Remove unused replacement symbols Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 11/89] x86/asm: Fix register order Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 12/89] x86/asm: Fixup odd GEN-for-each-reg.h usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 13/89] x86/retpoline: Move the retpoline thunk declarations to nospec-branch.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 14/89] x86/retpoline: Create a retpoline thunk array Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 15/89] x86/alternative: Implement .retpoline_sites support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 16/89] x86/alternative: Handle Jcc __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 17/89] x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 18/89] x86/alternative: Add debug prints to apply_retpolines() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 19/89] bpf,x86: Simplify computing label offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 20/89] bpf,x86: Respect X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE* Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 21/89] objtool: Default ignore INT3 for unreachable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 22/89] x86/entry: Remove skip_r11rcx Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 23/89] x86/realmode: build with -D__DISABLE_EXPORTS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 24/89] x86/kvm/vmx: Make noinstr clean Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:10 ` [PATCH 5.15 25/89] x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 26/89] x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 27/89] x86/retpoline: Swizzle retpoline thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 28/89] x86/retpoline: Use -mfunction-return Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 29/89] x86: Undo return-thunk damage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 30/89] x86,objtool: Create .return_sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 31/89] objtool: skip non-text sections when adding return-thunk sites Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 32/89] x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 33/89] x86/ftrace: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 34/89] x86/bpf: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 35/89] x86/kvm: Fix SETcc emulation for return thunks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 36/89] x86/vsyscall_emu/64: Dont use RET in vsyscall emulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 37/89] x86/sev: Avoid using __x86_return_thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 38/89] x86: Use return-thunk in asm code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 39/89] x86/entry: Avoid very early RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 40/89] objtool: Treat .text.__x86.* as noinstr Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 41/89] x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 42/89] x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 43/89] x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 44/89] x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 45/89] x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL value Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 46/89] x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 47/89] x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 48/89] x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 49/89] x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 51/89] intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idle Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 52/89] objtool: Update Retpoline validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 53/89] x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry points Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 54/89] x86/xen: Add UNTRAIN_RET Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 55/89] x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 56/89] x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 57/89] objtool: Add entry UNRET validation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 58/89] x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 59/89] x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 60/89] x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 61/89] x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state change Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 62/89] x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 63/89] x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 64/89] objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 65/89] KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 66/89] KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 67/89] KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 68/89] KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 69/89] x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 70/89] x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madness Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 71/89] x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 72/89] x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 73/89] x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 74/89] x86/entry: Move PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS() back into error_entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 75/89] x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supported Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 76/89] x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 77/89] x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 78/89] x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 79/89] x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunk Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 80/89] x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 81/89] x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_current Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 82/89] efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 83/89] x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 84/89] KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutines Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:11 ` [PATCH 5.15 85/89] tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sources Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 86/89] tools headers cpufeatures: Sync " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 87/89] x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typo Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 88/89] um: Add missing apply_returns() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 9:12 ` [PATCH 5.15 89/89] x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE builds Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-07-22 12:14 ` [PATCH 5.15 00/89] 5.15.57-rc1 review Bagas Sanjaya
2022-07-22 17:58 ` Florian Fainelli
2022-07-22 19:36 ` Naresh Kamboju
2022-07-22 21:59 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-07-23 4:21 ` Ron Economos
2022-07-23 8:55 ` Sudip Mukherjee (Codethink)
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220722091136.165566382@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=cascardo@canonical.com \
--cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox