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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Cc: agk@redhat.com, mka@chromium.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
	dianders@chromium.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	sarthakkukreti@chromium.org
Subject: Re: dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 09:13:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202209080912.00880AD6@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YxoJcG5MN4OdaulL@redhat.com>

On Thu, Sep 08, 2022 at 11:25:36AM -0400, Mike Snitzer wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 07 2022 at  6:34P -0400,
> Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> 
> > On Wed, 7 Sep 2022 13:30:58 -0700, Matthias Kaehlcke wrote:
> > > Verity targets can be configured to ignore corrupted data blocks.
> > > LoadPin must only trust verity targets that are configured to
> > > perform some kind of enforcement when data corruption is detected,
> > > like returning an error, restarting the system or triggering a
> > > panic.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > [...]
> > 
> > Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
> > 
> > [1/1] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement
> >       https://git.kernel.org/kees/c/2e1875c05267
> 
> Does this mean you're intending to send this upstream?  I prefer to
> take all DM changes unless there is an external dependency.

Oh! Yeah, I added it to my tree since you'd asked me to take the
original verity-loadpin series and this was a fix. I'm happy either
way. Shall I drop this change from my tree?

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2022-09-08 16:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-09-07 20:30 [PATCH] dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement Matthias Kaehlcke
2022-09-07 20:45 ` Sarthak Kukreti
2022-09-07 22:34 ` Kees Cook
2022-09-08 15:25   ` Mike Snitzer
2022-09-08 16:13     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-09-08 16:31       ` Mike Snitzer

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