From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: x86@kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Joao Moreira <joao@overdrivepizza.com>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 11:28:16 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221027092842.765195516@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20221027092812.185993858@infradead.org
In order to avoid known hashes (from knowing the boot image),
randomize the CFI hashes with a per-boot random seed.
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 108 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -711,6 +711,24 @@ enum cfi_mode {
};
static enum cfi_mode cfi_mode __ro_after_init = CFI_DEFAULT;
+static bool cfi_rand __ro_after_init = true;
+static u32 cfi_seed __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Re-hash the CFI hash with a boot-time seed while making sure the result is
+ * not a valid ENDBR instruction.
+ */
+static u32 cfi_rehash(u32 hash)
+{
+ hash ^= cfi_seed;
+ while (unlikely(is_endbr(hash) || is_endbr(-hash))) {
+ bool lsb = hash & 1;
+ hash >>= 1;
+ if (lsb)
+ hash ^= 0x80200003;
+ }
+ return hash;
+}
static __init int cfi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
@@ -728,10 +746,13 @@ static __init int cfi_parse_cmdline(char
cfi_mode = CFI_DEFAULT;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
cfi_mode = CFI_OFF;
+ cfi_rand = false;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "kcfi")) {
cfi_mode = CFI_KCFI;
} else if (!strcmp(str, "fineibt")) {
cfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "norand")) {
+ cfi_rand = false;
} else {
pr_err("Ignoring unknown cfi option (%s).", str);
}
@@ -856,7 +877,50 @@ static int cfi_disable_callers(s32 *star
return 0;
}
+static int cfi_enable_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ /*
+ * Re-enable kCFI, undo what cfi_disable_callers() did.
+ */
+ const u8 mov[] = { 0x41, 0xba };
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ u32 hash;
+
+ addr -= fineibt_caller_size;
+ hash = decode_caller_hash(addr);
+ if (!hash) /* nocfi callers */
+ continue;
+
+ text_poke_early(addr, mov, 2);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* .cfi_sites */
+static int cfi_rand_preamble(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ u32 hash;
+
+ hash = decode_preamble_hash(addr);
+ if (WARN(!hash, "no CFI hash found at: %pS %px %*ph\n",
+ addr, addr, 5, addr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hash = cfi_rehash(hash);
+ text_poke_early(addr + 1, &hash, 4);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cfi_rewrite_preamble(s32 *start, s32 *end)
{
s32 *s;
@@ -879,6 +943,25 @@ static int cfi_rewrite_preamble(s32 *sta
}
/* .retpoline_sites */
+static int cfi_rand_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+ s32 *s;
+
+ for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+ void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+ u32 hash;
+
+ addr -= fineibt_caller_size;
+ hash = decode_caller_hash(addr);
+ if (hash) {
+ hash = -cfi_rehash(hash);
+ text_poke_early(addr + 2, &hash, 4);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int cfi_rewrite_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
{
s32 *s;
@@ -915,31 +998,44 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
cfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;
}
- switch (cfi_mode) {
- case CFI_OFF:
- ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+ /*
+ * Rewrite the callers to not use the __cfi_ stubs, such that we might
+ * rewrite them. This disables all CFI. If this succeeds but any of the
+ * later stages fails, we're without CFI.
+ */
+ ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (cfi_rand) {
+ if (builtin)
+ cfi_seed = get_random_u32();
+
+ ret = cfi_rand_preamble(start_cfi, end_cfi);
if (ret)
goto err;
+ ret = cfi_rand_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (cfi_mode) {
+ case CFI_OFF:
if (builtin)
pr_info("Disabling CFI\n");
return;
case CFI_KCFI:
+ ret = cfi_enable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+
if (builtin)
pr_info("Using kCFI\n");
return;
case CFI_FINEIBT:
- /*
- * Rewrite the callers to not use the __cfi_ stubs, such that we might
- * rewrite them. This disables all CFI. If this succeeds but any of the
- * later stages fails, we're without CFI.
- */
- ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
- if (ret)
- goto err;
-
ret = cfi_rewrite_preamble(start_cfi, end_cfi);
if (ret)
goto err;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-27 9:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-27 9:28 [PATCH 0/4] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 9:28 ` [PATCH 1/4] objtool: Add --cfi to generate the .cfi_sites section Peter Zijlstra
2022-11-02 9:20 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 9:28 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 10:11 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-28 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-02 9:20 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 9:28 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/cfi: Boot time selection of CFI scheme Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-28 17:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-11-02 9:19 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-27 9:28 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-10-28 17:42 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization Kees Cook
2022-11-02 9:19 ` [tip: x86/core] " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-28 11:01 ` [PATCH 0/4] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT David Laight
2022-10-28 12:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
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