public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>,
	Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-team@android.com, qperret@google.com
Subject: [PATCH 08/12] KVM: arm64: Add FF-A helpers to share/unshare memory with secure world
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 17:03:31 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221116170335.2341003-9-qperret@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221116170335.2341003-1-qperret@google.com>

From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>

Extend pKVM's memory protection code so that we can update the host's
stage-2 page-table to track pages shared with secure world by the host
using FF-A and prevent those pages from being mapped into a guest.

Co-developed-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Walbran <qwandor@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h |  3 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c         | 68 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
index b7bdbe63deed..0972faccc2af 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ extern struct host_mmu host_mmu;
 enum pkvm_component_id {
 	PKVM_ID_HOST,
 	PKVM_ID_HYP,
+	PKVM_ID_FFA,
 };
 
 extern unsigned long hyp_nr_cpus;
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ int __pkvm_host_share_hyp(u64 pfn);
 int __pkvm_host_unshare_hyp(u64 pfn);
 int __pkvm_host_donate_hyp(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages);
 int __pkvm_hyp_donate_host(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages);
+int __pkvm_host_share_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages);
+int __pkvm_host_unshare_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages);
 
 bool addr_is_memory(phys_addr_t phys);
 int host_stage2_idmap_locked(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
index 552653fa18be..e721fba3bb33 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
@@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ static int check_share(struct pkvm_mem_share *share)
 	case PKVM_ID_HYP:
 		ret = hyp_ack_share(completer_addr, tx, share->completer_prot);
 		break;
+	case PKVM_ID_FFA:
+		/*
+		 * We only check the host; the secure side will check the other
+		 * end when we forward the FFA call.
+		 */
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -863,6 +870,13 @@ static int __do_share(struct pkvm_mem_share *share)
 	case PKVM_ID_HYP:
 		ret = hyp_complete_share(completer_addr, tx, share->completer_prot);
 		break;
+	case PKVM_ID_FFA:
+		/*
+		 * We're not responsible for any secure page-tables, so there's
+		 * nothing to do here.
+		 */
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -911,6 +925,10 @@ static int check_unshare(struct pkvm_mem_share *share)
 	case PKVM_ID_HYP:
 		ret = hyp_ack_unshare(completer_addr, tx);
 		break;
+	case PKVM_ID_FFA:
+		/* See check_share() */
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -939,6 +957,10 @@ static int __do_unshare(struct pkvm_mem_share *share)
 	case PKVM_ID_HYP:
 		ret = hyp_complete_unshare(completer_addr, tx);
 		break;
+	case PKVM_ID_FFA:
+		/* See __do_share() */
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1228,3 +1250,49 @@ void hyp_unpin_shared_mem(void *from, void *to)
 	hyp_unlock_component();
 	host_unlock_component();
 }
+
+int __pkvm_host_share_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct pkvm_mem_share share = {
+		.tx	= {
+			.nr_pages	= nr_pages,
+			.initiator	= {
+				.id	= PKVM_ID_HOST,
+				.addr	= hyp_pfn_to_phys(pfn),
+			},
+			.completer	= {
+				.id	= PKVM_ID_FFA,
+			},
+		},
+	};
+
+	host_lock_component();
+	ret = do_share(&share);
+	host_unlock_component();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int __pkvm_host_unshare_ffa(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages)
+{
+	int ret;
+	struct pkvm_mem_share share = {
+		.tx	= {
+			.nr_pages	= nr_pages,
+			.initiator	= {
+				.id	= PKVM_ID_HOST,
+				.addr	= hyp_pfn_to_phys(pfn),
+			},
+			.completer	= {
+				.id	= PKVM_ID_FFA,
+			},
+		},
+	};
+
+	host_lock_component();
+	ret = do_unshare(&share);
+	host_unlock_component();
+
+	return ret;
+}
-- 
2.38.1.431.g37b22c650d-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-11-16 17:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-16 17:03 [PATCH 00/12] KVM: arm64: FF-A proxy for pKVM Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 01/12] firmware: arm_ffa: Move constants to header file Quentin Perret
2022-12-01 11:43   ` Sudeep Holla
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 02/12] firmware: arm_ffa: Move comment before the field it is documenting Quentin Perret
2022-12-01 11:53   ` Sudeep Holla
2022-12-01 15:49     ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 03/12] KVM: arm64: Block unsafe FF-A calls from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:40   ` Oliver Upton
2023-04-18 12:41     ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:48   ` Oliver Upton
2023-04-18 12:48     ` Will Deacon
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 04/12] KVM: arm64: Probe FF-A version and host/hyp partition ID during init Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 05/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_FEATURES call from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 06/12] KVM: arm64: Allocate pages for hypervisor FF-A mailboxes Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 07/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_RXTX_MAP and FFA_RXTX_UNMAP calls from the host Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` Quentin Perret [this message]
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 09/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_SHARE " Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 10/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_RECLAIM " Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 11/12] KVM: arm64: Handle FFA_MEM_LEND " Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:03 ` [PATCH 12/12] ANDROID: KVM: arm64: pkvm: Add support for fragmented FF-A descriptors Quentin Perret
2022-11-16 17:06   ` Quentin Perret
2022-12-02 11:17 ` [PATCH 00/12] KVM: arm64: FF-A proxy for pKVM Will Deacon

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20221116170335.2341003-9-qperret@google.com \
    --to=qperret@google.com \
    --cc=alexandru.elisei@arm.com \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=james.morse@arm.com \
    --cc=kernel-team@android.com \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu \
    --cc=kvmarm@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=maz@kernel.org \
    --cc=oliver.upton@linux.dev \
    --cc=qwandor@google.com \
    --cc=sudeep.holla@arm.com \
    --cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox