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[198.145.64.163]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id j18-20020a635952000000b004cd1f1a14f6sm7519083pgm.86.2023.01.19.17.08.04 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Thu, 19 Jan 2023 17:08:04 -0800 (PST) Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 17:08:04 -0800 From: Kees Cook To: Rick Edgecombe Cc: x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Borislav Petkov , Cyrill Gorcunov , Dave Hansen , Eugene Syromiatnikov , Florian Weimer , "H . J . Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , Randy Dunlap , Weijiang Yang , "Kirill A . Shutemov" , John Allen , kcc@google.com, eranian@google.com, rppt@kernel.org, jamorris@linux.microsoft.com, dethoma@microsoft.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com, christina.schimpe@intel.com, Yu-cheng Yu Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Message-ID: <202301191708.F1C43C9D8@keescook> References: <20230119212317.8324-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> <20230119212317.8324-38-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20230119212317.8324-38-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jan 19, 2023 at 01:23:15PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote: > From: Yu-cheng Yu > > Some applications (like GDB) would like to tweak shadow stack state via > ptrace. This allows for existing functionality to continue to work for > seized shadow stack applications. Provide an regset interface for > manipulating the shadow stack pointer (SSP). > > There is already ptrace functionality for accessing xstate, but this > does not include supervisor xfeatures. So there is not a completely > clear place for where to put the shadow stack state. Adding it to the > user xfeatures regset would complicate that code, as it currently shares > logic with signals which should not have supervisor features. > > Don't add a general supervisor xfeature regset like the user one, > because it is better to maintain flexibility for other supervisor > xfeatures to define their own interface. For example, an xfeature may > decide not to expose all of it's state to userspace, as is actually the > case for shadow stack ptrace functionality. A lot of enum values remain > to be used, so just put it in dedicated shadow stack regset. > > The only downside to not having a generic supervisor xfeature regset, > is that apps need to be enlightened of any new supervisor xfeature > exposed this way (i.e. they can't try to have generic save/restore > logic). But maybe that is a good thing, because they have to think > through each new xfeature instead of encountering issues when new a new > supervisor xfeature was added. > > By adding a shadow stack regset, it also has the effect of including the > shadow stack state in a core dump, which could be useful for debugging. > > The shadow stack specific xstate includes the SSP, and the shadow stack > and WRSS enablement status. Enabling shadow stack or wrss in the kernel > involves more than just flipping the bit. The kernel is made aware that > it has to do extra things when cloning or handling signals. That logic > is triggered off of separate feature enablement state kept in the task > struct. So the flipping on HW shadow stack enforcement without notifying > the kernel to change its behavior would severely limit what an application > could do without crashing, and the results would depend on kernel > internal implementation details. There is also no known use for controlling > this state via prtace today. So only expose the SSP, which is something > that userspace already has indirect control over. > > Tested-by: Pengfei Xu > Tested-by: John Allen > Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe > Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe Reviewed-by: Kees Cook -- Kees Cook