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From: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 18/20] riscv signal: Save and restore of shadow stack for signal
Date: Sun, 12 Feb 2023 20:53:47 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230213045351.3945824-19-debug@rivosinc.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230213045351.3945824-1-debug@rivosinc.com>

Save shadow stack pointer in ucontext structure while delivering signal.
Restore shadow stack pointer from ucontext on sigreturn.

Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
---
 arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
index bfb2afa4135f..b963bbce5879 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
 	struct task_struct *task;
+	struct thread_info *info = NULL;
 	sigset_t set;
 
 	/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
@@ -124,6 +125,27 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
 		goto badframe;
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK)
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Restore shadow stack as a form of token stored on shadow stack itself as a safe
+	 * way to restore.
+	 * A token on shadow gives following properties
+	 *	- Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow stack
+	 *	  must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore of shadow
+	 *	  stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow stack with
+	 *	  address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore without a save
+	 *	  is quite difficult for an attacker to perform.
+	 *	- A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in shadow stack
+	 *	  So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack segments.
+	 *	  Any sspop; sscheckra will detect the condition and fault to kernel.
+	 */
+	info = current_thread_info();
+	if (info->user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en &&
+	    __copy_from_user(&info->user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk, &frame->uc.uc_ss_ptr,
+				sizeof(unsigned long)))
+		goto badframe;
+#endif
+
 	regs->cause = -1UL;
 
 	return regs->a0;
@@ -180,6 +202,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
+	struct thread_info *info = NULL;
 	long err = 0;
 
 	frame = get_sigframe(ksig, regs, sizeof(*frame));
@@ -191,6 +214,23 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	/* Create the ucontext. */
 	err |= __put_user(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags);
 	err |= __put_user(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link);
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK)
+	/*
+	 * TODO: Save a pointer to shadow stack itself on shadow stack as a form of token.
+	 * A token on shadow gives following properties
+	 *	- Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow stack
+	 *	  must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore of shadow
+	 *	  stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow stack with
+	 *	  address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore without a save
+	 *	  is quite difficult for an attacker to perform.
+	 *	- A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in shadow stack
+	 *	  So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack segments. Any
+	 *	  sspop; sscheckra will detect the condition and fault to kernel.
+	 */
+	info = current_thread_info();
+	if (info->user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en)
+		err |= __put_user(info->user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk, &frame->uc.uc_ss_ptr);
+#endif
 	err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
 	err |= setup_sigcontext(frame, regs);
 	err |= __copy_to_user(&frame->uc.uc_sigmask, set, sizeof(*set));
@@ -201,6 +241,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 #ifdef CONFIG_MMU
 	regs->ra = (unsigned long)VDSO_SYMBOL(
 		current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn);
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_SHADOW_STACK)
+	/* if bcfi is enabled x1 (ra) and x5 (t0) must match */
+	if (info->user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en)
+		regs->t0 = regs->ra;
+#endif
 #else
 	/*
 	 * For the nommu case we don't have a VDSO.  Instead we push two
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-13  4:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-13  4:53 [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 00/20] riscv control-flow integrity for U mode Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 01/20] sslp stubs: shadow stack and landing pad stubs Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 02/20] riscv: zisslpcfi enumeration Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 03/20] riscv: zisslpcfi extension csr and bit definitions Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 04/20] riscv: kernel enabling user code for shadow stack and landing pad Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 05/20] mmap : Introducing new protection "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" for mmap Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 06/20] riscv: Implementing "PROT_SHADOWSTACK" on riscv Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 07/20] elf: ELF header parsing in GNU property for cfi state Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 08/20] riscv: ELF header parsing in GNU property for riscv zisslpcfi Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 09/20] riscv mmu: riscv shadow stack page fault handling Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 10/20] riscv mmu: write protect and shadow stack Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 11/20] mmu: maybe_mkwrite updated to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 12:05   ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-13 14:37     ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13 14:56       ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-13 20:01         ` Deepak Gupta
2023-02-14 12:10           ` David Hildenbrand
2023-02-14 18:27             ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 12/20] riscv mm: manufacture shadow stack pte and is vma shadowstack Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 13/20] riscv: illegal instruction handler for cfi violations Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 14/20] riscv: audit mode " Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 15/20] sslp prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for shadow stack and landing pad instr Deepak Gupta
2023-05-25 17:17   ` Mark Brown
2023-06-07 20:22   ` Mark Brown
2023-10-09 21:22     ` Deepak Gupta
2023-10-10 16:17       ` Mark Brown
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 16/20] riscv: Implements sslp prctls Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 17/20] riscv ucontext: adding shadow stack pointer field in ucontext Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` Deepak Gupta [this message]
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 19/20] config: adding two new config for control flow integrity Deepak Gupta
2023-02-13  4:53 ` [PATCH v1 RFC Zisslpcfi 20/20] riscv: select config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support Deepak Gupta

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