From: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com>,
Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 4/7] x86/amd: Configure necessary MSRs for SNP during CPU init when running as a guest
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2023 10:33:59 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230213103402.1189285-5-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230213103402.1189285-1-jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
Hyper-V may expose the SEV-SNP CPU features to the guest, but it is the
guests kernel's responsibility to configure them.
early_detect_mem_encrypt() checks SYSCFG[MEM_ENCRYPT] and HWCR[SMMLOCK]
and if these are not set the SEV-SNP CPU flags are cleared. These checks
are only really necessary on baremetal and provide no value when running
virtualized. They prevent further initialization from happening, so
check if we are running under a hypervisor and if so - update SYSCFG and
skip the HWCR check.
Signed-off-by: Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index c7884198ad5b..4418a418109b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -565,6 +565,9 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
* don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
*/
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT);
+
/* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
@@ -584,7 +587,7 @@ static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
- if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
goto clear_sev;
return;
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-13 10:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-13 10:33 [RFC PATCH v2 0/7] Support nested SNP KVM guests on Hyper-V Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 1/7] x86/hyperv: Allocate RMP table during boot Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 2/7] x86/sev: Add support for NestedVirtSnpMsr Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` [RFC PATCH v2 3/7] x86/sev: Maintain shadow rmptable on Hyper-V Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:33 ` Jeremi Piotrowski [this message]
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 5/7] iommu/amd: Don't fail snp_enable when running virtualized Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 6/7] crypto: ccp - Introduce quirk to always reclaim pages after SEV-legacy commands Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-13 10:34 ` [RFC PATCH v2 7/7] x86/fault: Handle RMP faults with 0 address when nested Jeremi Piotrowski
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