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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 08/18] x86/reboot: Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization
Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 13:42:22 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230310214232.806108-9-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230310214232.806108-1-seanjc@google.com>

Assert that IRQs are disabled when turning off virtualization in an
emergency.  KVM enables hardware via on_each_cpu(), i.e. could re-enable
hardware if a pending IPI were delivered after disabling virtualization.

Remove a misleading comment from emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization()
about "just" needing to guarantee the CPU is stable (see above).

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 8 +++++++-
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
index dd7def3d4144..f0d405bc718e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c
@@ -561,6 +561,13 @@ void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
 {
 	cpu_emergency_virt_cb *callback;
 
+	/*
+	 * IRQs must be disabled as KVM enables virtualization in hardware via
+	 * function call IPIs, i.e. IRQs need to be disabled to guarantee
+	 * virtualization stays disabled.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	callback = rcu_dereference(cpu_emergency_virt_callback);
 	if (callback)
@@ -570,7 +577,6 @@ void cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization(void)
 
 static void emergency_reboot_disable_virtualization(void)
 {
-	/* Just make sure we won't change CPUs while doing this */
 	local_irq_disable();
 
 	/*
-- 
2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-03-10 21:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-03-10 21:42 [PATCH v2 00/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Clean up "emergency" virt code Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] x86/reboot: Expose VMCS crash hooks if and only if KVM_INTEL is enabled Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13  0:31   ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 18:31     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14  1:19       ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] x86/reboot: Harden virtualization hooks for emergency reboot Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13  8:26   ` Chao Gao
2023-03-13 17:08     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Handle VMXOFF in KVM's reboot callback Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] x86/reboot: KVM: Disable SVM during reboot via virt/KVM " Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13  0:52   ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 17:18     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14  0:42       ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-15  0:47         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-15  1:30           ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] x86/reboot: Hoist "disable virt" helpers above "emergency reboot" path Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] x86/reboot: Disable virtualization during reboot iff callback is registered Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13  0:54   ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 18:40     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14  0:50       ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_vmx() in KVM VMX Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move VMXOFF helpers into " Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] KVM: SVM: Make KVM_AMD depend on CPU_SUP_AMD or CPU_SUP_HYGON Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] x86/virt: Drop unnecessary check on extended CPUID level in cpu_has_svm() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] x86/virt: KVM: Open code cpu_has_svm() into kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] KVM: SVM: Check that the current CPU supports SVM in kvm_is_svm_supported() Sean Christopherson
2023-03-13  2:47   ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-13 17:29     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-14  0:17       ` Huang, Kai
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] KVM: VMX: Ensure CPU is stable when probing basic VMX support Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] x86/virt: KVM: Move "disable SVM" helper into KVM SVM Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] KVM: x86: Force kvm_rebooting=true during emergency reboot/crash Sean Christopherson
2023-03-10 21:42 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] KVM: SVM: Use "standard" stgi() helper when disabling SVM Sean Christopherson

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