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From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@de.ibm.com, nrb@linux.ibm.com,
	nsg@linux.ibm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com, jgg@nvidia.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: fix race in gmap_make_secure
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 15:48:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230426134834.35199-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230426134834.35199-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>

This patch fixes a potential race in gmap_make_secure and removes the
last user of follow_page without FOLL_GET.

Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Fixes: 214d9bbcd3a6 ("s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guests")
---
 arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 32 +++++++++++---------------------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index 9f18a4af9c13..cb2ee06df286 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -192,21 +192,10 @@ static int expected_page_refs(struct page *page)
 	return res;
 }
 
-static int make_secure_pte(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
-			   struct page *exp_page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
+static int make_page_secure(struct page *page, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)
 {
-	pte_t entry = READ_ONCE(*ptep);
-	struct page *page;
 	int expected, cc = 0;
 
-	if (!pte_present(entry))
-		return -ENXIO;
-	if (pte_val(entry) & _PAGE_INVALID)
-		return -ENXIO;
-
-	page = pte_page(entry);
-	if (page != exp_page)
-		return -ENXIO;
 	if (PageWriteback(page))
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	expected = expected_page_refs(page);
@@ -304,17 +293,18 @@ int gmap_make_secure(struct gmap *gmap, unsigned long gaddr, void *uvcb)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENXIO;
-	page = follow_page(vma, uaddr, FOLL_WRITE);
-	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(page))
-		goto out;
-
-	lock_page(page);
 	ptep = get_locked_pte(gmap->mm, uaddr, &ptelock);
-	if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
-		uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
-	rc = make_secure_pte(ptep, uaddr, page, uvcb);
+	if (pte_present(*ptep) && !(pte_val(*ptep) & _PAGE_INVALID) && pte_write(*ptep)) {
+		page = pte_page(*ptep);
+		rc = -EAGAIN;
+		if (trylock_page(page)) {
+			if (should_export_before_import(uvcb, gmap->mm))
+				uv_convert_from_secure(page_to_phys(page));
+			rc = make_page_secure(page, uvcb);
+			unlock_page(page);
+		}
+	}
 	pte_unmap_unlock(ptep, ptelock);
-	unlock_page(page);
 out:
 	mmap_read_unlock(gmap->mm);
 
-- 
2.40.0


  reply	other threads:[~2023-04-26 13:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-26 13:48 [PATCH v2 0/1] fix race in gmap_make_secure Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-26 13:48 ` Claudio Imbrenda [this message]
2023-04-27 10:53   ` [PATCH v2 1/1] KVM: s390: " Heiko Carstens
2023-04-27 11:46     ` Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-27 12:01       ` Heiko Carstens
2023-04-27 12:17         ` Claudio Imbrenda
2023-04-27 12:45           ` Heiko Carstens

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