From: joeyli <jlee@suse.com>
To: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>
Cc: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Markus Elfring <Markus.Elfring@web.de>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2023 22:48:42 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230728144842.GA14791@linux-l9pv.suse> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABBYNZJZisYm0Vgfzd8F2ge9RPJvUYBVGpj-4iySerT_wUTJNA@mail.gmail.com>
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
On Thu, Jul 27, 2023 at 03:29:42PM -0700, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> Hi Joeyli,
>
> On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 5:25 PM Luiz Augusto von Dentz
> <luiz.dentz@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > Hi Joeyli,
> >
> > On Wed, Jul 19, 2023 at 8:49 AM joeyli <jlee@suse.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
> > >
> > > On Tue, Jul 18, 2023 at 10:22:26AM -0700, Luiz Augusto von Dentz wrote:
> > > > Hi Chun-Yi,
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Jul 17, 2023 at 8:43 PM Lee, Chun-Yi <joeyli.kernel@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the
> > > > > CVE:
> > > > >
> > > > > Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification
> > > > > 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof
> > > > > the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge
> > > > > of the PIN. [1]
> > > >
> > > > Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation
> > > > is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Yes, the key generation be handled by link manager. I will mention it
> > > in patch description.
> > >
> > > > > The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
> > > > > BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
> > > > > [2]
> > > > >
> > > > > It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the
> > > > > attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
> > > > >
> > > > > We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification
> > > > > event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in
> > > > > btstack project. [3]
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore
> > > > the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded
> > > > and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still
> > > > consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and
> > > > disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I am new on bluetooth field. Did you mean like this patch? Sending
> > > HCI_Disconnect when we found zero link key?
> > >
> > > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > index ff0c331f53d6..3482031cbbb8 100644
> > > --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > @@ -4698,6 +4700,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
> > > if (!conn)
> > > goto unlock;
> > >
> > > + /* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */
> > > + if (!memcmp(ev->link_key, ZERO_KEY, HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE)) {
> > > + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR", &ev->bdaddr);
> > > + hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
> > > + hci_conn_drop(conn);
> > > + goto unlock;
> > > + }
> >
> > Yeah, something like that should do it, btw I hope you are testing
> > these changes do actually work properly, even better if you could
> > introduce a test into the likes of mgmt-tester to generate a ZERO_KEY
> > so we are not caught by surprise if something doesn't quite work as
> > expected, or some change cause a regression where this key is accepted
> > again.
>
> Are you still planning on updating these changes so we can apply it?
>
Sorry for my delay! I am stucking at other stuff.
I will improve the patch and send new version again.
THanks a lot!
Joey Lee
> > > hci_conn_hold(conn);
> > > conn->disc_timeout = HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT;
> > > hci_conn_drop(conn);
> > >
> > >
> > > Is there anything I'm missing? Thanks a lot!
> > >
> > > > > v2:
> > > > > - Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
> > > > > - Used bt_dev_dbg instead of BT_DBG
> > > > > - Added Fixes: tag
> > > > >
> > > > > Fixes: 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")
> > > > > Link: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-26555 [1]
> > > > > Link: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/9474325/authors#authors [2]
> > > > > Link: https://github.com/bluekitchen/btstack/blob/master/src/hci.c#L3722 [3]
> > > > > Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com>
> > > > > ---
> > > > > net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++
> > > > > 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
> > > > >
> > > > > diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > > > index 95816a938cea..ff0c331f53d6 100644
> > > > > --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > > > +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
> > > > > @@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,
> > > > > bool persistent;
> > > > > u8 pin_len = 0;
> > > > >
> > > > > + /* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */
> > > > > + if (!memcmp(ev->link_key, ZERO_KEY, HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE)) {
> > > > > + bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR", &ev->bdaddr);
> > > > > + return;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > +
> > > > > bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
> > > > >
> > > > > hci_dev_lock(hdev);
> > > > > --
> > > > > 2.35.3
> > > > >
> > >
> > > Thanks a lot!
> > > Joey Lee
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Luiz Augusto von Dentz
>
>
>
> --
> Luiz Augusto von Dentz
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-07-28 14:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-07-18 3:43 [PATCH v2] Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key Lee, Chun-Yi
2023-07-18 5:40 ` Paul Menzel
2023-07-19 15:38 ` joeyli
2023-07-19 15:59 ` Dan Carpenter
2023-07-18 17:22 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2023-07-19 15:49 ` joeyli
2023-07-20 0:25 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2023-07-27 22:29 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2023-07-28 14:48 ` joeyli [this message]
[not found] ` <79669635-9a07-7fa2-e73e-bf31f554816d@web.de>
2023-07-19 15:40 ` joeyli
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