From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org,
john.allen@amd.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, chao.gao@intel.com,
binbin.wu@linux.intel.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v5 09/19] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed
Date: Thu, 3 Aug 2023 00:27:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230803042732.88515-10-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230803042732.88515-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Save guest CET supervisor states, i.e.,PL{0,1,2}_SSP, when vCPU
is exiting to userspace or being preempted. Reload the MSRs
before vm-entry.
Embeded the helpers in {vmx,svm}_prepare_switch_to_guest() and
vmx_prepare_switch_to_host()/svm_prepare_host_switch() to employ
existing guest state management and optimize the invocation of
the helpers.
Enabling CET supervisor state management in KVM due to:
-Introducing unnecessary XSAVE operation when switch to non-vCPU
userspace within current FPU framework.
-Forcing allocating additional space for CET supervisor states in
each thread context regardless whether it's vCPU thread or not.
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 11 +++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 3 +++
6 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 20bbcd95511f..69cbc9d9b277 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -805,6 +805,7 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_arch {
u64 xcr0;
u64 guest_supported_xcr0;
u64 guest_supported_xss;
+ u64 cet_s_ssp[3];
struct kvm_pio_request pio;
void *pio_data;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
index b1658c0de847..b221a663de4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h
@@ -232,4 +232,15 @@ static __always_inline bool guest_pv_has(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
return vcpu->arch.pv_cpuid.features & (1u << kvm_feature);
}
+/*
+ * FIXME: When the "KVM-governed" enabling patchset is merge, rebase this
+ * series on top of that and add a new patch for CET to replace this helper
+ * with the qualified one.
+ */
+static __always_inline bool guest_can_use(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int feature)
+{
+ return kvm_cpu_cap_has(feature) && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, feature);
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 1bc0936bbd51..8652e86fbfb2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1515,11 +1515,13 @@ static void svm_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (likely(tsc_aux_uret_slot >= 0))
kvm_set_user_return_msr(tsc_aux_uret_slot, svm->tsc_aux, -1ull);
+ reload_cet_supervisor_ssp(vcpu);
svm->guest_state_loaded = true;
}
static void svm_prepare_host_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
+ save_cet_supervisor_ssp(vcpu);
to_svm(vcpu)->guest_state_loaded = false;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index c8d9870cfecb..6aa76124e81e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1323,6 +1323,7 @@ void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
#endif
+ reload_cet_supervisor_ssp(vcpu);
vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
}
@@ -1362,6 +1363,7 @@ static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
+ save_cet_supervisor_ssp(&vmx->vcpu);
vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
vmx->guest_uret_msrs_loaded = false;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d68ef87fe007..5b63441fd2d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11128,6 +11128,31 @@ static void kvm_put_guest_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
trace_kvm_fpu(0);
}
+void save_cet_supervisor_ssp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[0]);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[1]);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[2]);
+ /*
+ * Omit reset to host PL{1,2}_SSP because Linux will never use
+ * these MSRs.
+ */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, 0);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(save_cet_supervisor_ssp);
+
+void reload_cet_supervisor_ssp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (unlikely(guest_can_use(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK))) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[0]);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[1]);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp[2]);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reload_cet_supervisor_ssp);
+
int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_queued_exception *ex = &vcpu->arch.exception;
@@ -12133,6 +12158,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
vcpu->arch.cr3 = 0;
kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
+ memset(vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.cet_s_ssp));
/*
* CR0.CD/NW are set on RESET, preserved on INIT. Note, some versions
@@ -12313,6 +12339,7 @@ void kvm_arch_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
pmu->need_cleanup = true;
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_PMU, vcpu);
}
+
static_call(kvm_x86_sched_in)(vcpu, cpu);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 6e6292915f8c..c69fc027f5ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -501,6 +501,9 @@ static inline void kvm_machine_check(void)
void kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
void kvm_load_host_xsave_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void save_cet_supervisor_ssp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+void reload_cet_supervisor_ssp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
int kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(u64 value);
bool __kvm_is_valid_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4);
int kvm_handle_memory_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int r,
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-08-03 7:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-08-03 4:27 [PATCH v5 00/19] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 01/19] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 02/19] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 03/19] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 04/19] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 16:02 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:43 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-08 14:20 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07 6:55 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 0:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10 1:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 05/19] KVM:x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:08 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 06/19] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 07/19] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 9:07 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 08/19] KVM:x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 10:39 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 3:13 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 5:51 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 18:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 22:01 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-08 15:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-06 8:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 18:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-08 15:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:47 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:14 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2023-08-03 11:15 ` [PATCH v5 09/19] KVM:x86: Make guest supervisor states as non-XSAVE managed Chao Gao
2023-08-04 3:26 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 20:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 20:59 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-08-04 21:32 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 2:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-09 2:39 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 9:29 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-10 14:29 ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-10 15:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-10 15:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-11 3:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-28 21:00 ` Dave Hansen
2023-08-29 7:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 10/19] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 11/19] KVM:VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 5:14 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 21:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-04 21:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04 22:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-07 7:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-06 8:44 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07 7:00 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-04 8:28 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 7:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:40 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 3:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 12/19] KVM:x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 7:53 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-04 15:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-06 9:14 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 13/19] KVM:VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-07 1:16 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 6:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 14/19] KVM:VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 15/19] KVM:x86: Optimize CET supervisor SSP save/reload Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 8:43 ` Chao Gao
2023-08-09 9:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 16/19] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 17/19] KVM:x86: Enable guest CET supervisor xstate bit support Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 22:02 ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-08-09 6:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 18/19] KVM:nVMX: Refine error code injection to nested VM Yang Weijiang
2023-08-04 21:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-08-09 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-08-03 4:27 ` [PATCH v5 19/19] KVM:nVMX: Enable CET support for " Yang Weijiang
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