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From: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@Huawei.com>
To: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>,
	Alison Schofield <alison.schofield@intel.com>,
	Vishal Verma <vishal.l.verma@intel.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	<linux-cxl@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Fix CEL logic for poison and security commands
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 16:19:46 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230904161946.000050b8@Huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230903-cxl-cel-fix-v1-1-e260c9467be3@intel.com>

On Sun, 03 Sep 2023 14:42:58 -0700
Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> wrote:

> The following debug output was observed while testing CXL
> 
> cxl_core:cxl_walk_cel:721: cxl_mock_mem cxl_mem.0: Opcode 0x4300 unsupported by driver
> 
> opcode 0x4300 (Get Poison) is supported by the driver and the mock
> device supports it.  The logic should be checking that the opcode is
> both not poison and not security.
> 
> Fix the logic to allow poison and security commands.
> 
> Fixes: ad64f5952ce3 ("cxl/memdev: Only show sanitize sysfs files when supported")
> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
> Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>

Makes sense.
Acked-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>

> ---
>  drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> index ca60bb8114f2..b315bdab9197 100644
> --- a/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> +++ b/drivers/cxl/core/mbox.c
> @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static void cxl_walk_cel(struct cxl_memdev_state *mds, size_t size, u8 *cel)
>  		u16 opcode = le16_to_cpu(cel_entry[i].opcode);
>  		struct cxl_mem_command *cmd = cxl_mem_find_command(opcode);
>  
> -		if (!cmd && (!cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) ||
> -			     !cxl_is_security_command(opcode))) {
> +		if (!cmd && !cxl_is_poison_command(opcode) &&
> +		    !cxl_is_security_command(opcode)) {
>  			dev_dbg(dev,
>  				"Opcode 0x%04x unsupported by driver\n", opcode);
>  			continue;
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 1c59d383390f970b891b503b7f79b63a02db2ec5
> change-id: 20230903-cxl-cel-fix-9da269bf0f21
> 
> Best regards,


  reply	other threads:[~2023-09-04 15:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-09-03 21:42 [PATCH] cxl/mbox: Fix CEL logic for poison and security commands Ira Weiny
2023-09-04 15:19 ` Jonathan Cameron [this message]
2023-09-04 17:24 ` Davidlohr Bueso
2023-09-12 22:39 ` Dan Williams
2023-09-13 18:17   ` Ira Weiny
2023-09-13 19:45   ` Davidlohr Bueso

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