From: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, chao.gao@intel.com,
rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, mlevitsk@redhat.com,
john.allen@amd.com, weijiang.yang@intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v7 23/26] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields
Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 00:53:27 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231124055330.138870-24-weijiang.yang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231124055330.138870-1-weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly.
Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after
post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it)
and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/
VM-Exit sequence.
Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible
to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field
to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP
before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/
SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc.
Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set
in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Suggested-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
index 41a4533f9989..ee8938818c8a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void)
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
}
+static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void)
+{
+ return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE);
+}
static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void)
{
return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index e484333eddb0..c658f2f230df 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -4375,6 +4375,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
+
+ /*
+ * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e.,
+ * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM
+ * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0,
+ * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm
+ * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace,
+ * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter
+ * 3 and 4 for details.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) {
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0);
+ vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0);
+ }
}
void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5792ed16e61b..c6b57ede0f57 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static u64 __read_mostly efer_reserved_bits = ~((u64)EFER_SCE);
#endif
static u64 __read_mostly cr4_reserved_bits = CR4_RESERVED_BITS;
+u64 __read_mostly host_s_cet;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(host_s_cet);
#define KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_VALID_MASK (1 << KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE)
@@ -9773,6 +9775,18 @@ static int __kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops)
return -EIO;
}
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, host_s_cet);
+ /*
+ * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so
+ * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may
+ * clobber the host values. Yell and refuse to load if SSS is
+ * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(host_s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN))
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
x86_emulator_cache = kvm_alloc_emulator_cache();
if (!x86_emulator_cache) {
pr_err("failed to allocate cache for x86 emulator\n");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 6e42ede335f5..d9cc352cf421 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ fastpath_t handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
extern u64 host_xcr0;
extern u64 host_xss;
extern u64 host_arch_capabilities;
+extern u64 host_s_cet;
extern struct kvm_caps kvm_caps;
--
2.27.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-24 8:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-24 5:53 [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 01/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Always preserve non-user xfeatures/flags in __state_perm Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Refine CET user xstate bit enabling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:40 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:50 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-28 1:31 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 7:52 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:26 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 1:03 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 15:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 14:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 9:30 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-13 13:31 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-13 17:01 ` Chang S. Bae
2023-12-14 3:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Add CET supervisor mode state support Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 9:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-11-27 4:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:34 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:27 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce XFEATURE_MASK_KERNEL_DYNAMIC xfeature set Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 1:46 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-28 8:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:33 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 7:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:55 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 3:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 16:11 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce fpu_guest_cfg for guest FPU configuration Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 14:58 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:12 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-29 17:08 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 13:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-30 18:02 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-30 17:29 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Create guest fpstate with guest specific config Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:19 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:16 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:36 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 9:57 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Warn if kernel dynamic xfeatures detected in normal fpstate Yang Weijiang
2023-11-28 15:25 ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-11-29 14:18 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] KVM: x86: Rework cpuid_get_supported_xcr0() to operate on vCPU data Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] KVM: x86: Rename kvm_{g,s}et_msr() to menifest emulation operations Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] KVM: x86: Refine xsave-managed guest register/MSR reset handling Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:36 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] KVM: x86: Add kvm_msr_{read,write}() helpers Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] KVM: x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] KVM: x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:37 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] KVM: x86: Initialize kvm_caps.supported_xss Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] KVM: x86: Load guest FPU state when access XSAVE-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:38 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] KVM: x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] KVM: x86: Report KVM supported CET MSRs as to-be-saved Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] KVM: VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] KVM: x86: Use KVM-governed feature framework to track "SHSTK/IBT enabled" Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:40 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] KVM: VMX: Emulate read and write to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:41 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] KVM: x86: Save and reload SSP to/from SMRAM Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:42 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 2:23 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-04 0:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:02 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 8:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] KVM: VMX: Set up interception for CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:44 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 6:33 ` Chao Gao
2023-12-05 10:04 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 9:45 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` Yang Weijiang [this message]
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] KVM: x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:46 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-01 16:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:07 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] KVM: nVMX: Introduce new VMX_BASIC bit for event error_code delivery to L1 Yang Weijiang
2023-11-24 5:53 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] KVM: nVMX: Enable CET support for nested guest Yang Weijiang
2023-11-30 17:53 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-04 8:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-05 10:12 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-06 9:22 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-06 17:24 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-08 15:15 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-08 15:22 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-12 8:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-12-12 11:09 ` Maxim Levitsky
2023-12-15 2:29 ` [PATCH v7 00/26] Enable CET Virtualization Yang, Weijiang
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