From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev, oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev,
bp@alien8.de, mingo@redhat.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, dionnaglaze@google.com,
pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
nikunj@amd.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 12:08:29 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202311291150.VUYNaQGy-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231128125959.1810039-11-nikunj@amd.com>
Hi Nikunj,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on tip/x86/mm]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.7-rc3 next-20231128]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core kvm/queue kvm/linux-next]
[If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Nikunj-A-Dadhania/virt-sev-guest-Move-mutex-to-SNP-guest-device-structure/20231128-220026
base: tip/x86/mm
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128125959.1810039-11-nikunj%40amd.com
patch subject: [PATCH v6 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231129/202311291150.VUYNaQGy-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 16.0.4 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git ae42196bc493ffe877a7e3dff8be32035dea4d07)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231129/202311291150.VUYNaQGy-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202311291150.VUYNaQGy-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c:216:13: warning: no previous prototype for function 'amd_enc_init' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
void __init amd_enc_init(void)
^
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c:216:1: note: declare 'static' if the function is not intended to be used outside of this translation unit
void __init amd_enc_init(void)
^
static
1 warning generated.
vim +/amd_enc_init +216 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c
215
> 216 void __init amd_enc_init(void)
217 {
218 snp_secure_tsc_prepare();
219 }
220
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-11-29 4:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-11-28 12:59 [PATCH v6 00/16] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 01/16] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 02/16] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 03/16] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 04/16] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 05/16] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 06/16] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-06 22:21 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-07 6:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 07/16] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 22:50 ` kernel test robot
2023-11-29 2:40 ` kernel test robot
2023-12-05 17:13 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-06 4:24 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 08/16] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 09/16] x86/cpufeatures: Add synthetic Secure TSC bit Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 10/16] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-29 4:08 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 11/16] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 12/16] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-05 17:16 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-06 4:37 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-12-06 18:45 ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-07 6:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 13/16] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 14/16] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 15/16] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-11-28 12:59 ` [PATCH v6 16/16] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-12-06 17:46 ` [PATCH v6 00/16] Add Secure TSC support " Peter Gonda
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