* fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@ 2023-12-04 21:44 kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2023-12-04 21:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: 33cc938e65a98f1d29d0a18403dbbee050dcad9a
commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
date: 1 year, 4 months ago
config: x86_64-alldefconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231205/202312050445.sUkSCUIl-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231205/202312050445.sUkSCUIl-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312050445.sUkSCUIl-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *parent @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: expected struct task_struct *parent
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *tsk @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: expected struct task_struct *tsk
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
vim +1307 fs/exec.c
1243
1244 /*
1245 * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
1246 * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
1247 * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
1248 * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
1249 */
1250 int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1251 {
1252 struct task_struct *me = current;
1253 int retval;
1254
1255 /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
1256 retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
1257 if (retval)
1258 return retval;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
1262 */
1263 bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
1267 */
1268 retval = de_thread(me);
1269 if (retval)
1270 goto out;
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
1274 */
1275 io_uring_task_cancel();
1276
1277 /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
1278 retval = unshare_files();
1279 if (retval)
1280 goto out;
1281
1282 /*
1283 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
1284 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
1285 * to be lockless.
1286 */
1287 retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
1288 if (retval)
1289 goto out;
1290
1291 /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
1292 would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
1293 if (bprm->have_execfd)
1294 would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
1298 */
1299 acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
1300 retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
1301 if (retval)
1302 goto out;
1303
1304 bprm->mm = NULL;
1305
1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1310 exit_itimers(me);
1311 flush_itimer_signals();
1312 #endif
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Make the signal table private.
1316 */
1317 retval = unshare_sighand(me);
1318 if (retval)
1319 goto out_unlock;
1320
1321 me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
1322 PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
1323 flush_thread();
1324 me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1325
1326 clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
1327
1328 /*
1329 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1330 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1331 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1332 * undergoing exec(2).
1333 */
1334 do_close_on_exec(me->files);
1335
1336 if (bprm->secureexec) {
1337 /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
1338 me->pdeath_signal = 0;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
1342 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
1343 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
1344 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
1345 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
1346 */
1347 if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
1348 bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
1349 }
1350
1351 me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
1352
1353 /*
1354 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
1355 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
1356 * bprm->secureexec instead.
1357 */
1358 if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
1359 !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
1360 gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
1361 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
1362 else
1363 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
1364
1365 perf_event_exec();
1366 __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
1367
1368 /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
1369 group */
1370 WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
1371 flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
1372
1373 retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
1374 if (retval < 0)
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376
1377 /*
1378 * install the new credentials for this executable
1379 */
1380 security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
1381
1382 commit_creds(bprm->cred);
1383 bprm->cred = NULL;
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Disable monitoring for regular users
1387 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
1388 * wait until new credentials are committed
1389 * by commit_creds() above
1390 */
1391 if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
1392 perf_event_exit_task(me);
1393 /*
1394 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
1395 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
1396 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
1397 */
1398 security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
1399
1400 /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
1401 if (bprm->have_execfd) {
1402 retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
1403 if (retval < 0)
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
1406 bprm->executable = NULL;
1407 bprm->execfd = retval;
1408 }
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 out_unlock:
1412 up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
1413 out:
1414 return retval;
1415 }
1416 EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
1417
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@ 2023-12-05 21:45 kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2023-12-05 21:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: bee0e7762ad2c6025b9f5245c040fcc36ef2bde8
commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
date: 1 year, 4 months ago
config: x86_64-alldefconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231206/202312060556.19mMzKjL-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231206/202312060556.19mMzKjL-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312060556.19mMzKjL-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *parent @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: expected struct task_struct *parent
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *tsk @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: expected struct task_struct *tsk
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
vim +1307 fs/exec.c
1243
1244 /*
1245 * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
1246 * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
1247 * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
1248 * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
1249 */
1250 int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1251 {
1252 struct task_struct *me = current;
1253 int retval;
1254
1255 /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
1256 retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
1257 if (retval)
1258 return retval;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
1262 */
1263 bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
1267 */
1268 retval = de_thread(me);
1269 if (retval)
1270 goto out;
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
1274 */
1275 io_uring_task_cancel();
1276
1277 /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
1278 retval = unshare_files();
1279 if (retval)
1280 goto out;
1281
1282 /*
1283 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
1284 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
1285 * to be lockless.
1286 */
1287 retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
1288 if (retval)
1289 goto out;
1290
1291 /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
1292 would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
1293 if (bprm->have_execfd)
1294 would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
1298 */
1299 acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
1300 retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
1301 if (retval)
1302 goto out;
1303
1304 bprm->mm = NULL;
1305
1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1310 exit_itimers(me);
1311 flush_itimer_signals();
1312 #endif
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Make the signal table private.
1316 */
1317 retval = unshare_sighand(me);
1318 if (retval)
1319 goto out_unlock;
1320
1321 me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
1322 PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
1323 flush_thread();
1324 me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1325
1326 clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
1327
1328 /*
1329 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1330 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1331 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1332 * undergoing exec(2).
1333 */
1334 do_close_on_exec(me->files);
1335
1336 if (bprm->secureexec) {
1337 /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
1338 me->pdeath_signal = 0;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
1342 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
1343 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
1344 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
1345 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
1346 */
1347 if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
1348 bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
1349 }
1350
1351 me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
1352
1353 /*
1354 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
1355 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
1356 * bprm->secureexec instead.
1357 */
1358 if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
1359 !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
1360 gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
1361 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
1362 else
1363 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
1364
1365 perf_event_exec();
1366 __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
1367
1368 /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
1369 group */
1370 WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
1371 flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
1372
1373 retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
1374 if (retval < 0)
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376
1377 /*
1378 * install the new credentials for this executable
1379 */
1380 security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
1381
1382 commit_creds(bprm->cred);
1383 bprm->cred = NULL;
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Disable monitoring for regular users
1387 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
1388 * wait until new credentials are committed
1389 * by commit_creds() above
1390 */
1391 if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
1392 perf_event_exit_task(me);
1393 /*
1394 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
1395 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
1396 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
1397 */
1398 security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
1399
1400 /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
1401 if (bprm->have_execfd) {
1402 retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
1403 if (retval < 0)
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
1406 bprm->executable = NULL;
1407 bprm->execfd = retval;
1408 }
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 out_unlock:
1412 up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
1413 out:
1414 return retval;
1415 }
1416 EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
1417
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@ 2023-12-10 6:35 kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2023-12-10 6:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: c527f5606aa545233a4d2c6d5c636ed82b8633ef
commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
date: 1 year, 4 months ago
config: x86_64-alldefconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231210/202312101400.APynrk7M-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231210/202312101400.APynrk7M-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312101400.APynrk7M-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *parent @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: expected struct task_struct *parent
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *tsk @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: expected struct task_struct *tsk
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
vim +1307 fs/exec.c
1243
1244 /*
1245 * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
1246 * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
1247 * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
1248 * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
1249 */
1250 int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1251 {
1252 struct task_struct *me = current;
1253 int retval;
1254
1255 /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
1256 retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
1257 if (retval)
1258 return retval;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
1262 */
1263 bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
1267 */
1268 retval = de_thread(me);
1269 if (retval)
1270 goto out;
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
1274 */
1275 io_uring_task_cancel();
1276
1277 /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
1278 retval = unshare_files();
1279 if (retval)
1280 goto out;
1281
1282 /*
1283 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
1284 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
1285 * to be lockless.
1286 */
1287 retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
1288 if (retval)
1289 goto out;
1290
1291 /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
1292 would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
1293 if (bprm->have_execfd)
1294 would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
1298 */
1299 acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
1300 retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
1301 if (retval)
1302 goto out;
1303
1304 bprm->mm = NULL;
1305
1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1310 exit_itimers(me);
1311 flush_itimer_signals();
1312 #endif
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Make the signal table private.
1316 */
1317 retval = unshare_sighand(me);
1318 if (retval)
1319 goto out_unlock;
1320
1321 me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
1322 PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
1323 flush_thread();
1324 me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1325
1326 clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
1327
1328 /*
1329 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1330 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1331 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1332 * undergoing exec(2).
1333 */
1334 do_close_on_exec(me->files);
1335
1336 if (bprm->secureexec) {
1337 /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
1338 me->pdeath_signal = 0;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
1342 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
1343 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
1344 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
1345 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
1346 */
1347 if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
1348 bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
1349 }
1350
1351 me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
1352
1353 /*
1354 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
1355 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
1356 * bprm->secureexec instead.
1357 */
1358 if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
1359 !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
1360 gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
1361 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
1362 else
1363 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
1364
1365 perf_event_exec();
1366 __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
1367
1368 /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
1369 group */
1370 WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
1371 flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
1372
1373 retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
1374 if (retval < 0)
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376
1377 /*
1378 * install the new credentials for this executable
1379 */
1380 security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
1381
1382 commit_creds(bprm->cred);
1383 bprm->cred = NULL;
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Disable monitoring for regular users
1387 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
1388 * wait until new credentials are committed
1389 * by commit_creds() above
1390 */
1391 if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
1392 perf_event_exit_task(me);
1393 /*
1394 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
1395 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
1396 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
1397 */
1398 security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
1399
1400 /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
1401 if (bprm->have_execfd) {
1402 retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
1403 if (retval < 0)
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
1406 bprm->executable = NULL;
1407 bprm->execfd = retval;
1408 }
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 out_unlock:
1412 up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
1413 out:
1414 return retval;
1415 }
1416 EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
1417
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@ 2023-12-28 19:27 kernel test robot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2023-12-28 19:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: f5837722ffecbbedf1b1dbab072a063565f0dad1
commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
date: 1 year, 5 months ago
config: x86_64-alldefconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231229/202312290301.jAqPvG1w-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20231229/202312290301.jAqPvG1w-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312290301.jAqPvG1w-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *parent @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: expected struct task_struct *parent
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *tsk @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: expected struct task_struct *tsk
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
vim +1307 fs/exec.c
1243
1244 /*
1245 * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
1246 * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
1247 * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
1248 * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
1249 */
1250 int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1251 {
1252 struct task_struct *me = current;
1253 int retval;
1254
1255 /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
1256 retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
1257 if (retval)
1258 return retval;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
1262 */
1263 bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
1267 */
1268 retval = de_thread(me);
1269 if (retval)
1270 goto out;
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
1274 */
1275 io_uring_task_cancel();
1276
1277 /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
1278 retval = unshare_files();
1279 if (retval)
1280 goto out;
1281
1282 /*
1283 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
1284 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
1285 * to be lockless.
1286 */
1287 retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
1288 if (retval)
1289 goto out;
1290
1291 /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
1292 would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
1293 if (bprm->have_execfd)
1294 would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
1298 */
1299 acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
1300 retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
1301 if (retval)
1302 goto out;
1303
1304 bprm->mm = NULL;
1305
1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1310 exit_itimers(me);
1311 flush_itimer_signals();
1312 #endif
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Make the signal table private.
1316 */
1317 retval = unshare_sighand(me);
1318 if (retval)
1319 goto out_unlock;
1320
1321 me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
1322 PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
1323 flush_thread();
1324 me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1325
1326 clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
1327
1328 /*
1329 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1330 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1331 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1332 * undergoing exec(2).
1333 */
1334 do_close_on_exec(me->files);
1335
1336 if (bprm->secureexec) {
1337 /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
1338 me->pdeath_signal = 0;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
1342 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
1343 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
1344 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
1345 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
1346 */
1347 if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
1348 bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
1349 }
1350
1351 me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
1352
1353 /*
1354 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
1355 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
1356 * bprm->secureexec instead.
1357 */
1358 if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
1359 !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
1360 gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
1361 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
1362 else
1363 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
1364
1365 perf_event_exec();
1366 __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
1367
1368 /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
1369 group */
1370 WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
1371 flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
1372
1373 retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
1374 if (retval < 0)
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376
1377 /*
1378 * install the new credentials for this executable
1379 */
1380 security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
1381
1382 commit_creds(bprm->cred);
1383 bprm->cred = NULL;
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Disable monitoring for regular users
1387 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
1388 * wait until new credentials are committed
1389 * by commit_creds() above
1390 */
1391 if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
1392 perf_event_exit_task(me);
1393 /*
1394 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
1395 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
1396 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
1397 */
1398 security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
1399
1400 /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
1401 if (bprm->have_execfd) {
1402 retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
1403 if (retval < 0)
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
1406 bprm->executable = NULL;
1407 bprm->execfd = retval;
1408 }
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 out_unlock:
1412 up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
1413 out:
1414 return retval;
1415 }
1416 EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
1417
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
@ 2024-01-11 2:44 kernel test robot
2024-01-12 15:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2024-01-11 2:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Thomas Gleixner
tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
head: acc657692aed438e9931438f8c923b2b107aebf9
commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
date: 1 year, 5 months ago
config: x86_64-randconfig-121-20240107 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240111/202401111036.STMizmwE-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-12 (Debian 12.2.0-14) 12.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240111/202401111036.STMizmwE-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202401111036.STMizmwE-lkp@intel.com/
sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
fs/exec.c:415:39: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:415:39: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:415:39: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in return expression (different address spaces) @@ expected char const [noderef] __user * @@ got void * @@
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: expected char const [noderef] __user *
fs/exec.c:422:31: sparse: got void *
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1051:48: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *parent @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: expected struct task_struct *parent
fs/exec.c:1158:56: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) @@ expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand @@ got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand @@
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: expected struct sighand_struct *oldsighand
fs/exec.c:1193:47: sparse: got struct sighand_struct [noderef] __rcu *sighand
>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock
fs/exec.c:1309:28: sparse: got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu *
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct task_struct *tsk @@ got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent @@
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: expected struct task_struct *tsk
fs/exec.c:1766:70: sparse: got struct task_struct [noderef] __rcu *parent
vim +1307 fs/exec.c
1243
1244 /*
1245 * Calling this is the point of no return. None of the failures will be
1246 * seen by userspace since either the process is already taking a fatal
1247 * signal (via de_thread() or coredump), or will have SEGV raised
1248 * (after exec_mmap()) by search_binary_handler (see below).
1249 */
1250 int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
1251 {
1252 struct task_struct *me = current;
1253 int retval;
1254
1255 /* Once we are committed compute the creds */
1256 retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm);
1257 if (retval)
1258 return retval;
1259
1260 /*
1261 * Ensure all future errors are fatal.
1262 */
1263 bprm->point_of_no_return = true;
1264
1265 /*
1266 * Make this the only thread in the thread group.
1267 */
1268 retval = de_thread(me);
1269 if (retval)
1270 goto out;
1271
1272 /*
1273 * Cancel any io_uring activity across execve
1274 */
1275 io_uring_task_cancel();
1276
1277 /* Ensure the files table is not shared. */
1278 retval = unshare_files();
1279 if (retval)
1280 goto out;
1281
1282 /*
1283 * Must be called _before_ exec_mmap() as bprm->mm is
1284 * not visible until then. This also enables the update
1285 * to be lockless.
1286 */
1287 retval = set_mm_exe_file(bprm->mm, bprm->file);
1288 if (retval)
1289 goto out;
1290
1291 /* If the binary is not readable then enforce mm->dumpable=0 */
1292 would_dump(bprm, bprm->file);
1293 if (bprm->have_execfd)
1294 would_dump(bprm, bprm->executable);
1295
1296 /*
1297 * Release all of the old mmap stuff
1298 */
1299 acct_arg_size(bprm, 0);
1300 retval = exec_mmap(bprm->mm);
1301 if (retval)
1302 goto out;
1303
1304 bprm->mm = NULL;
1305
1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
1310 exit_itimers(me);
1311 flush_itimer_signals();
1312 #endif
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Make the signal table private.
1316 */
1317 retval = unshare_sighand(me);
1318 if (retval)
1319 goto out_unlock;
1320
1321 me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC |
1322 PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
1323 flush_thread();
1324 me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear;
1325
1326 clear_syscall_work_syscall_user_dispatch(me);
1327
1328 /*
1329 * We have to apply CLOEXEC before we change whether the process is
1330 * dumpable (in setup_new_exec) to avoid a race with a process in userspace
1331 * trying to access the should-be-closed file descriptors of a process
1332 * undergoing exec(2).
1333 */
1334 do_close_on_exec(me->files);
1335
1336 if (bprm->secureexec) {
1337 /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */
1338 me->pdeath_signal = 0;
1339
1340 /*
1341 * For secureexec, reset the stack limit to sane default to
1342 * avoid bad behavior from the prior rlimits. This has to
1343 * happen before arch_pick_mmap_layout(), which examines
1344 * RLIMIT_STACK, but after the point of no return to avoid
1345 * needing to clean up the change on failure.
1346 */
1347 if (bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur > _STK_LIM)
1348 bprm->rlim_stack.rlim_cur = _STK_LIM;
1349 }
1350
1351 me->sas_ss_sp = me->sas_ss_size = 0;
1352
1353 /*
1354 * Figure out dumpability. Note that this checking only of current
1355 * is wrong, but userspace depends on it. This should be testing
1356 * bprm->secureexec instead.
1357 */
1358 if (bprm->interp_flags & BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ||
1359 !(uid_eq(current_euid(), current_uid()) &&
1360 gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
1361 set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
1362 else
1363 set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
1364
1365 perf_event_exec();
1366 __set_task_comm(me, kbasename(bprm->filename), true);
1367
1368 /* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread
1369 group */
1370 WRITE_ONCE(me->self_exec_id, me->self_exec_id + 1);
1371 flush_signal_handlers(me, 0);
1372
1373 retval = set_cred_ucounts(bprm->cred);
1374 if (retval < 0)
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376
1377 /*
1378 * install the new credentials for this executable
1379 */
1380 security_bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
1381
1382 commit_creds(bprm->cred);
1383 bprm->cred = NULL;
1384
1385 /*
1386 * Disable monitoring for regular users
1387 * when executing setuid binaries. Must
1388 * wait until new credentials are committed
1389 * by commit_creds() above
1390 */
1391 if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
1392 perf_event_exit_task(me);
1393 /*
1394 * cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
1395 * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's
1396 * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked.
1397 */
1398 security_bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
1399
1400 /* Pass the opened binary to the interpreter. */
1401 if (bprm->have_execfd) {
1402 retval = get_unused_fd_flags(0);
1403 if (retval < 0)
1404 goto out_unlock;
1405 fd_install(retval, bprm->executable);
1406 bprm->executable = NULL;
1407 bprm->execfd = retval;
1408 }
1409 return 0;
1410
1411 out_unlock:
1412 up_write(&me->signal->exec_update_lock);
1413 out:
1414 return retval;
1415 }
1416 EXPORT_SYMBOL(begin_new_exec);
1417
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces)
2024-01-11 2:44 kernel test robot
@ 2024-01-12 15:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Thomas Gleixner @ 2024-01-12 15:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kernel test robot, Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo
Cc: oe-kbuild-all, linux-kernel, Paul E. McKenney, Christian Brauner
On Thu, Jan 11 2024 at 10:44, kernel test robot wrote:
> tree: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git master
> head: acc657692aed438e9931438f8c923b2b107aebf9
> commit: e362359ace6f87c201531872486ff295df306d13 posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
> date: 1 year, 5 months ago
I'm amused that it took 17 month ....
>>> fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) @@ expected struct spinlock [usertype] *lock @@ got struct spinlock [noderef] __rcu * @@
> 1305
> 1306 #ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
>> 1307 spin_lock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
> 1308 posix_cpu_timers_exit(me);
> 1309 spin_unlock_irq(&me->sighand->siglock);
> 1310 exit_itimers(me);
> 1311 flush_itimer_signals();
> 1312 #endif
So this warning is clearly wrong because 'current->sighand->siglock' is
safe to dereference w/o RCU protection for 'current'.
The real issue is this commit:
913292c97d75 ("sched.h: Annotate sighand_struct with __rcu")
which blindly 'fixed' a sparse warning in signal.c w/o even trying to
look at the consequences. There are 170+ instances of spin_[un]lock()
variants which should emit exactly the same warning...
I think the right fix is to annotate this legit case of derefencing
current->sighand->siglock so sparse knows that this is safe.
Thanks,
tglx
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2024-01-12 15:32 UTC | newest]
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2023-12-10 6:35 fs/exec.c:1307:26: sparse: sparse: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) kernel test robot
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2024-01-11 2:44 kernel test robot
2024-01-12 15:32 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-12-28 19:27 kernel test robot
2023-12-05 21:45 kernel test robot
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