From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com>,
Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>,
Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
Nicolas Schier <nicolas@fjasle.eu>,
Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>,
Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 03:09:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202402060308.0FF75100@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANpmjNMiMuUPPPeOvL76V9O-amx9uyKZYtOf5Q2b73v8O_xHWw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 02:10:26PM +0100, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Mon, 5 Feb 2024 at 13:59, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Feb 05, 2024 at 01:54:24PM +0100, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > On 2/5/24 10:37, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >
> > > > ---
> > > > include/linux/compiler_types.h | 9 ++++-
> > > > lib/Kconfig.ubsan | 14 +++++++
> > > > lib/test_ubsan.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++
> > > > lib/ubsan.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > > lib/ubsan.h | 4 ++
> > > > scripts/Makefile.lib | 3 ++
> > > > scripts/Makefile.ubsan | 3 ++
> > > > 7 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/include/linux/compiler_types.h b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > index 6f1ca49306d2..ee9d272008a5 100644
> > > > --- a/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > +++ b/include/linux/compiler_types.h
> > > > @@ -282,11 +282,18 @@ struct ftrace_likely_data {
> > > > #define __no_sanitize_or_inline __always_inline
> > > > #endif
> > > >
> > > > +/* Do not trap wrapping arithmetic within an annotated function. */
> > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP
> > > > +# define __signed_wrap __attribute__((no_sanitize("signed-integer-overflow")))
> > > > +#else
> > > > +# define __signed_wrap
> > > > +#endif
> > > > +
> > > > /* Section for code which can't be instrumented at all */
> > > > #define __noinstr_section(section) \
> > > > noinline notrace __attribute((__section__(section))) \
> > > > __no_kcsan __no_sanitize_address __no_profile __no_sanitize_coverage \
> > > > - __no_sanitize_memory
> > > > + __no_sanitize_memory __signed_wrap
> > > >
> > >
> > > Given this disables all kinds of code instrumentations,
> > > shouldn't we just add __no_sanitize_undefined here?
> >
> > Yeah, that's a very good point.
> >
> > > I suspect that ubsan's instrumentation usually doesn't cause problems
> > > because it calls __ubsan_* functions with all heavy stuff (printk, locks etc)
> > > only if code has an UB. So the answer to the question above depends on
> > > whether we want to ignore UBs in "noinstr" code or to get some weird side effect,
> > > possibly without proper UBSAN report in dmesg.
> >
> > I think my preference would be to fail safe (i.e. leave in the
> > instrumentation), but the intent of noinstr is pretty clear. :P I wonder
> > if, instead, we could adjust objtool to yell about cases where calls are
> > made in noinstr functions (like it does for UACCESS)... maybe it already
> > does?
>
> It already does, see CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION (yes by default on x86).
This is actually a reason to not include the ubsan disabling in
__noinstr_section just to see what ends up in there so we can fix it
immediately....
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-06 11:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-02-05 9:37 [PATCH v3] ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer Kees Cook
2024-02-05 11:29 ` Marco Elver
2024-02-05 12:51 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-05 12:54 ` Andrey Ryabinin
2024-02-05 12:59 ` Kees Cook
2024-02-05 13:10 ` Marco Elver
2024-02-06 11:09 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2024-02-07 1:45 ` Justin Stitt
2024-02-07 11:04 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=202402060308.0FF75100@keescook \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
--cc=andreyknvl@gmail.com \
--cc=elver@google.com \
--cc=haoluo@google.com \
--cc=justinstitt@google.com \
--cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
--cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=masahiroy@kernel.org \
--cc=nathan@kernel.org \
--cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
--cc=nicolas@fjasle.eu \
--cc=ojeda@kernel.org \
--cc=peterz@infradead.org \
--cc=przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com \
--cc=ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox