From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4FB07629F1; Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:21:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707783702; cv=none; b=WN/9D9dcV3RIicYqew+TmsMOR2+ebU0sBuChxlU8i1Ctbu+qAs/XIjNb1UeinVoXaLyN82e19kFGWItbi+y8gclKwTY7DcaGA9dVrFy27k7uDwsmx15MEXBJkjXY6HE0LXHljOeZXAQL/vE6r8Dk57QiD8u7BfVeIvn3gzjSHZ4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707783702; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IAVfEIqCC1DX0pBdkoRi4ZbUxIfmLHz4rd7R3C4mcEc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ZEW3M8bwNeuxaNOBU+EpK2LlBGxL2W/Q7037HMhEj/GseeQVgbvHhGQGrXO7LW2H0jR/9h9ZVO6TPKf8cZPxeEUXYITEnFhpzC7tvSSucWPgDMdMcDFyanObI7ii2N5xHGa9WMrPie+MYtNFnRo9dbjzQ5K7vKqfvmuOioubm4A= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=FOD0t7VV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="FOD0t7VV" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4314DC433C7; Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:21:41 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1707783702; bh=IAVfEIqCC1DX0pBdkoRi4ZbUxIfmLHz4rd7R3C4mcEc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=FOD0t7VVjCCqZgGNQwOFoQEPaUZppPalSnrrWUkgna+0uUHNq06g8B2I4eWLoP4Zb 84VsGl5ncetG1g4igpKkbWGtq+8skvXD3yqG0TOPopjaPKRW6+9TqBxV99riZ5PIIw B9AnfMjZP2lf6V9xQYWNxyWKS/C6xFdSUJ01cmxaGpLekWkzeicqyufeAhmEyknEHV jy0QRo+9U3MwcdS7BpXs5HKa3N7WgDk5myySQicRuqgls9lBWniv4+WDk/a6UfdQai qcNUw6QDmb/SJvD+z4vxGLOIZoU3jhkxyBPtOOsSwR1C3qwECvevMl5GkE2r3yTV3a G3QDxePadT7DQ== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masahiro Yamada , Huacai Chen , Sasha Levin , chenhuacai@kernel.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 34/51] LoongArch: Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP to use the common SECCOMP menu Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 19:20:11 -0500 Message-ID: <20240213002052.670571-34-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240213002052.670571-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20240213002052.670571-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore X-stable-base: Linux 6.6.16 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Masahiro Yamada [ Upstream commit 6b79ecd084c99b31c8b4d0beda08893716d5558e ] LoongArch missed the refactoring made by commit 282a181b1a0d ("seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") because LoongArch was not mainlined at that time. The 'depends on PROC_FS' statement is stale as described in that commit. Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP, and remove the duplicated config entry. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index f29a0f2a4f18..9fd8644a9a4c 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ config LOONGARCH select HAVE_ARCH_KFENCE select HAVE_ARCH_KGDB if PERF_EVENTS select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE @@ -604,23 +605,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET This is limited by the size of the lower address memory, 256MB. -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - depends on PROC_FS - default y - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via /proc//seccomp, it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - - If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. - endmenu config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL -- 2.43.0