From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1E15980C02; Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:23:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707783787; cv=none; b=A/5bm5UicjXS/9F8VCn8RPBTmuBIuvy4AwQJOjlDKOZ3Z/fHdZgQ69nNzNL1V3obZ766L/tOtq8PK51as20NCPtdvfVjDlx1ZMPJGrTPzjH3veCMJl7v4Mw5uJOA3gk8xfeZRI1HK0Cf1OcQDBauJsKe9jz0AZCGN2s9C/yPl+A= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1707783787; c=relaxed/simple; bh=c1l0pSe41YUkhs2Tw6L2wnUWVrWtQcjCg6uEUhLP0/A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=GIJidwcgwiAkL8nxm6bN+tNn9O4ZDTxSTmFfi3RM5dVj3fz5yBZ6BrsxGETU62mhR+xhN3Lf5j7rZoQ+Gx6fDHUrDRdcnHSixlV2sHWu+g9xvsiqiHtLg9uW5Uzjt+Qz7qNWvNIAs5g5fcuL9M8I9sfZzLXiqZ3lfRSxhWoV/gQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Fhg7r6hl; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Fhg7r6hl" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 72753C43390; Tue, 13 Feb 2024 00:23:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1707783786; bh=c1l0pSe41YUkhs2Tw6L2wnUWVrWtQcjCg6uEUhLP0/A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Fhg7r6hlC1oTIEyC6PBpgKDfpf9thb2ADYMKSaGZ2HDejrctDv+zm4ps3jiScPVl/ qMmXoRfc3soMyobx6cD5Gu3jlIR6Uva5a9TuFkrqH7/v2t9GZspOvejbzq8RoR8nvu KRqGH704uqx3jLHFMMqqHreFHdkO8ZDifIrBkyriAEmkmPIRhkQXlqq2BVeMVJ+5hd 9vexgk0wPAZZCuDBN1heMTkFMz8ys64ApFPY5qBsQd26f8yDVFFB1BrMy8EaVWDVkh 18S7/0u+bMKyYl45T8d2AtdEh36ck/vKKlwilWmEoUZZuxxOtZthJUHErXYvU7z0NE oFqlM4jRvicnA== From: Sasha Levin To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Masahiro Yamada , Huacai Chen , Sasha Levin , chenhuacai@kernel.org, loongarch@lists.linux.dev Subject: [PATCH AUTOSEL 6.1 21/28] LoongArch: Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP to use the common SECCOMP menu Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 19:22:19 -0500 Message-ID: <20240213002235.671934-21-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240213002235.671934-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <20240213002235.671934-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: Ignore X-stable-base: Linux 6.1.77 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Masahiro Yamada [ Upstream commit 6b79ecd084c99b31c8b4d0beda08893716d5558e ] LoongArch missed the refactoring made by commit 282a181b1a0d ("seccomp: Move config option SECCOMP to arch/Kconfig") because LoongArch was not mainlined at that time. The 'depends on PROC_FS' statement is stale as described in that commit. Select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP, and remove the duplicated config entry. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- arch/loongarch/Kconfig | 18 +----------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig index b1b4396dbac6..fa3171f56327 100644 --- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ config LOONGARCH select GPIOLIB select HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS if MMU + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE @@ -462,23 +463,6 @@ config PHYSICAL_START specified in the "crashkernel=YM@XM" command line boot parameter passed to the panic-ed kernel). -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - depends on PROC_FS - default y - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via /proc//seccomp, it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - - If unsure, say Y. Only embedded should say N here. - endmenu config ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL -- 2.43.0