Re: [PATCH] security: fix integer overflow in lsm_set_self_attr() syscall

Paul Moore
2024-02-15T13:02:20Z

On February 14, 2024 7:45:43 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 14, 2024 at 08:53:52AM -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 2/14/2024 8:05 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
>>> security_setselfattr() has an integer overflow bug that leads to
>>> out-of-bounds access when userspace provides bogus input:
>>> `lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)` is checked against `lctx->len` (and,
>>> redundantly, also against `size`), but there are no checks on
>>> `lctx->ctx_len`.
>>> Therefore, userspace can provide an `lsm_ctx` with `->ctx_len` set to a
>>> value between `-sizeof(struct lsm_ctx)` and -1, and this bogus `->ctx_len`
>>> will then be passed to an LSM module as a buffer length, causing LSM
>>> modules to perform out-of-bounds accesses.
>>>
>>> The following reproducer will demonstrate this under ASAN (if AppArmor is
>>> loaded as an LSM):
>>> ```
>>> #define _GNU_SOURCE
>>> #include <unistd.h>
>>> #include <stdint.h>
>>> #include <stdlib.h>
>>> #include <sys/syscall.h>
>>>
>>> struct lsm_ctx {
>>> uint64_t id;
>>> uint64_t flags;
>>> uint64_t len;
>>> uint64_t ctx_len;
>
> Do we want to take the opportunity to reduce this to u32 for len and u32
> for ctx_len? All FS operations are limited to INT_MAX anyway...

Not at this point, no.

--
paul-moore.com