Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/random: Retry on RDSEED failure

Nikolay Borisov
2024-02-14T08:34:53Z

On 14.02.24 г. 6:32 ч., Theodore Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 13, 2024 at 04:53:06PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>>
>> Indeed it is. Typically when you have x86, riscv, arm, and s390 folks
>> all show up at a Linux Plumbers session [1] to talk about their approach
>> to handling a new platform paradigm, that is a decent indication that
>> the technology is more real than not. Point taken that it is not here
>> today, but it is also not multiple hardware generations away as the
>> Plumbers participation indicated.
>
> My big concerns with TDISP which make me believe it may not be a
> silver bullet is that (a) it's hyper-complex (although to be fair
> Confidential Compute isn't exactly simple, and (b) it's one thing to
> digitally sign software so you know that it comes from a trusted
> source; but it's a **lot** harder to prove that hardware hasn't been
> tampered with --- a digital siganture can't tell you much about
> whether or not the hardware is in an as-built state coming from the
> factory --- this requires things like wrapping the device with
> resistive wire in multiple directions with a whetstone bridge to
> detect if the wire has gotten cut or shorted, then dunking the whole
> thing in epoxy, so that any attempt to tamper with the hardware will
> result it self-destructing (via a thermite charge or equivalent :-)

This really reminds me of the engineering that goes into the omnipresent
POS terminals ate every store, since they store certificates from the
card (Visa/Master) operators. So I wonder if at somepoint we'll have a
pos-like device (by merit of its engineering) in every server....

>
> Remember, the whole conceit of Confidential Compute is that you don't
> trust the cloud provider --- but if that entity controls the PCI cards
> installed in their servers, and and that entity has the ability to
> *modify* the PCI cards in the server, all of the digital signatures
> and fancy-schmancy TDISP complexity isn't necessarily going to save
> you.

Can't the same argument go for the CPU, though it's a lot more
"integrated" into the silicong substrate, yet we somehow believe CoCo
ascertains that a vm is running on trusted hardware? But ultimately the
CPU is still a part that comes from the untrusted CSP.

<snip>