public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
	 Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Dionna Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
	 Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	 Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	 Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v6 03/10] x86/startup_64: Simplify calculation of initial page table address
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 15:29:56 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240226142952.64769-15-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240226142952.64769-12-ardb+git@google.com>

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

Determining the address of the initial page table to program into CR3
involves:
- taking the physical address
- adding the SME encryption mask

On the primary entry path, the code is mapped using a 1:1 virtual to
physical translation, so the physical address can be taken directly
using a RIP-relative LEA instruction.

On the secondary entry path, the address can be obtained by taking the
offset from the virtual kernel base (__START_kernel_map) and adding the
physical kernel base.

This is implemented in a slightly confusing way, so clean this up.

Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 25 ++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 1b054585bfd1..c451a72bc92b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -111,13 +111,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	call	__startup_64
 
 	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
-	addq	$(early_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+	leaq	early_top_pgt(%rip), %rcx
+	addq	%rcx, %rax
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	mov	%rax, %rdi
-	mov	%rax, %r14
-
-	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rdi
 
 	/*
 	 * For SEV guests: Verify that the C-bit is correct. A malicious
@@ -126,12 +124,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(startup_64)
 	 * the next RET instruction.
 	 */
 	call	sev_verify_cbit
-
-	/*
-	 * Restore CR3 value without the phys_base which will be added
-	 * below, before writing %cr3.
-	 */
-	 mov	%r14, %rax
 #endif
 
 	jmp 1f
@@ -171,18 +163,18 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	/* Clear %R15 which holds the boot_params pointer on the boot CPU */
 	xorq	%r15, %r15
 
+	/* Derive the runtime physical address of init_top_pgt[] */
+	movq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
+	addq	$(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
+
 	/*
 	 * Retrieve the modifier (SME encryption mask if SME is active) to be
 	 * added to the initial pgdir entry that will be programmed into CR3.
 	 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
-	movq	sme_me_mask, %rax
-#else
-	xorq	%rax, %rax
+	addq	sme_me_mask(%rip), %rax
 #endif
 
-	/* Form the CR3 value being sure to include the CR3 modifier */
-	addq	$(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
 1:
 
 	/*
@@ -207,9 +199,6 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	btsl	$X86_CR4_PSE_BIT, %ecx
 	movq	%rcx, %cr4
 
-	/* Setup early boot stage 4-/5-level pagetables. */
-	addq	phys_base(%rip), %rax
-
 	/*
 	 * Switch to new page-table
 	 *
-- 
2.44.0.rc0.258.g7320e95886-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-02-26 14:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-26 14:29 [PATCH v6 00/10] x86: Confine early 1:1 mapped startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:29 ` [PATCH v6 01/10] x86/startup_64: Simplify CR4 handling in " Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:29 ` [PATCH v6 02/10] x86/startup_64: Defer assignment of 5-level paging global variables Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:29 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2024-02-26 14:29 ` [PATCH v6 04/10] x86/startup_64: Simplify virtual switch on primary boot Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:29 ` [PATCH v6 05/10] x86/sme: Avoid SME/SVE related checks on non-SME/SVE platforms Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 21:37   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-27 14:55     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-27 15:11       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-02-26 14:29 ` [PATCH v6 06/10] efi/libstub: Add generic support for parsing mem_encrypt= Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:30 ` [PATCH v6 07/10] x86/boot: Move mem_encrypt= parsing to the decompressor Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:30 ` [PATCH v6 08/10] x86/sme: Move early SME kernel encryption handling into .head.text Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:30 ` [PATCH v6 09/10] x86/sev: Move early startup code into .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2024-02-26 14:30 ` [PATCH v6 10/10] x86/startup_64: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state Ard Biesheuvel

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20240226142952.64769-15-ardb+git@google.com \
    --to=ardb+git@google.com \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=brgerst@gmail.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=dionnaglaze@google.com \
    --cc=kevinloughlin@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox