From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Bjorn Helgaas <helgaas@kernel.org>
Cc: "Carlos López" <clopez@suse.de>,
cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Bjorn Helgaas" <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Jonas Gorski" <jonas.gorski@gmail.com>,
"Andy Shevchenko" <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
"Mika Westerberg" <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52466: PCI: Avoid potential out-of-bounds read in pci_dev_for_each_resource()
Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2024 18:24:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024022706-kindle-tapering-5f66@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240227150744.GA235367@bhelgaas>
On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 09:07:44AM -0600, Bjorn Helgaas wrote:
> [+cc Mika, author of 09cc90063240]
>
> On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 02:26:26PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > On Tue, Feb 27, 2024 at 02:18:51PM +0100, Carlos López wrote:
> > > On 25/2/24 9:16, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > > There is no actual issue right now because we have another check
> > > > afterwards and the out-of-bounds read is not being performed. In
> > > > any case it's better code with this fixed, hence the proposed
> > > > change.
> > >
> > > Given that there is no actual security issue this looks more like a
> > > hardening, and thus not deserving of a CVE, no?
> >
> > This was a tricky one, I think it's needed as we do not know how people
> > are really using these macros, right? If the PCI maintainer agrees (on
> > the cc:), I'll be glad to revoke it, it's their call.
>
> 09cc90063240 ("PCI: Introduce pci_dev_for_each_resource()") added
> pci_dev_for_each_resource(), which expands to:
>
> for (...; res = (&(dev)->resource[(bar)]), bar < PCI_NUM_RESOURCES; ...)
>
> We compute "res" before the bounds-check of "bar", so the pointer may
> be out-of-bounds, but the body of the pci_dev_for_each_resource() loop
> is never executed with that out-of-bounds value.
>
> So I don't think this is a security issue, no matter how
> pci_dev_for_each_resource() is used, unless the mere presence of an
> invalid address in a register is an issue.
Ah, yeah, now I remember, stuff like this was fixed up in other loops as
just reading off into the wild can be a speculation issue and so we had
to fix up a bunch of places in the kernel where we did have "invalid
data" in a register. The code didn't use that, but the processor would
fetch from there, and boom, speculation mess. There's a whole research
paper published on this type of thing somewhere...
So let's keep this as a CVE unless someone really doesn't want it marked
as such. Again, it is a "weakness that is fixed" in the kernel, and
because of that, a CVE can be allocated for it.
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-02-27 17:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024022544-CVE-2023-52466-fea5@gregkh>
2024-02-27 13:18 ` CVE-2023-52466: PCI: Avoid potential out-of-bounds read in pci_dev_for_each_resource() Carlos López
2024-02-27 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-02-27 15:07 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-02-27 17:24 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-02-27 17:39 ` Bjorn Helgaas
2024-02-28 9:20 ` Jiri Kosina
2024-03-03 7:28 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=2024022706-kindle-tapering-5f66@gregkh \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
--cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
--cc=clopez@suse.de \
--cc=cve@kernel.org \
--cc=helgaas@kernel.org \
--cc=jonas.gorski@gmail.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox