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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,  Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org,  Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	 Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	 Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] x86/cpu: Ignore "mitigations" kernel parameter if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n
Date: Tue,  9 Apr 2024 10:51:07 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240409175108.1512861-4-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240409175108.1512861-1-seanjc@google.com>

Explicitly disallow enabling mitigations at runtime for kernels that were
built with CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n.  Because more Kconfigs are
buried behind SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS, trying to provide sane behavior for
retroactively enabling mitigations is extremely difficult, bordering on
impossible.  E.g. page table isolation and call depth tracking requrie
build-time support, BHI mitigations will still be off without additional
kernel parameters, etc.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  3 +++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                | 10 +++++++---
 kernel/cpu.c                                    |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 70046a019d42..7d623df11a1a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3423,6 +3423,9 @@
 			arch-independent options, each of which is an
 			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
+			Note, "mitigations" is supported on x86 if and only if
+			the kernel was built with SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y.
+
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 10a6251f58f3..f4e4dd360636 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2493,10 +2493,14 @@ menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 	default y
 	help
 	  Say Y here to enable options which enable mitigations for
-	  speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities.
+	  speculative execution hardware vulnerabilities.  Mitigations can
+	  be disabled or restricted to SMT systems at runtime via the
+	  "mitigations" kernel parameter.
 
-	  If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled. You really
-	  should know what you are doing to say so.
+	  If you say N, all mitigations will be disabled.  This CANNOT be
+	  overridden at runtime.
+
+	  Say 'Y', unless you really know what you are doing.
 
 if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
 
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 07ad53b7f119..d445763d8047 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -3214,6 +3214,8 @@ static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
 {
 	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
 		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS))
+		pr_crit("Kernel compiled without mitigations, system may still be vulnerable\n");
 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
 		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
 	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
-- 
2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-09 17:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-09 17:51 [PATCH 0/3] x86/cpu: Fix SPECULATIVE_MITIGATION=n kernels Sean Christopherson
2024-04-09 17:51 ` [PATCH 1/3] x86/cpu: Actually turn off mitigations by default for SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n Sean Christopherson
2024-04-10 14:31   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Sean Christopherson
2024-04-13  1:53   ` [PATCH 1/3] " Stephen Rothwell
2024-04-13  9:27     ` Michael Ellerman
2024-04-13  9:38       ` Michael Ellerman
2024-04-14 22:42         ` Stephen Rothwell
2024-04-15 11:16         ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2024-04-15 14:31           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-16 11:06             ` Michael Ellerman
2024-04-19 14:03             ` Will Deacon
2024-04-19 14:06               ` Sean Christopherson
2024-04-19 14:38                 ` Will Deacon
2024-04-15 11:13   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2024-04-09 17:51 ` [PATCH 2/3] x86/cpu: Disable BHI mitigation by default when SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n Sean Christopherson
2024-04-10 14:31   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Sean Christopherson
2024-04-09 17:51 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2024-04-10 14:18   ` [PATCH 3/3] x86/cpu: Ignore "mitigations" kernel parameter if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=n Ingo Molnar
2024-04-09 18:55 ` [PATCH 0/3] x86/cpu: Fix SPECULATIVE_MITIGATION=n kernels Daniel Sneddon

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