Re: [PATCH 1/5] fs: Do not allow get_file() to resurrect 0 f_count

Kees Cook
2024-05-02T23:03:25Z

On Fri, May 03, 2024 at 12:53:56AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Fri, May 3, 2024 at 12:34 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > If f_count reaches 0, calling get_file() should be a failure. Adjust to
> > use atomic_long_inc_not_zero() and return NULL on failure. In the future
> > get_file() can be annotated with __must_check, though that is not
> > currently possible.
> [...]
> > static inline struct file *get_file(struct file *f)
> > {
> > - atomic_long_inc(&f->f_count);
> > + if (unlikely(!atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&f->f_count)))
> > + return NULL;
> > return f;
> > }
>
> Oh, I really don't like this...
>
> In most code, if you call get_file() on a file and see refcount zero,
> that basically means you're in a UAF write situation, or that you
> could be in such a situation if you had raced differently. It's
> basically just like refcount_inc() in that regard.

Shouldn't the system attempt to not make things worse if it encounters
an inc-from-0 condition? Yes, we've already lost the race for a UaF
condition, but maybe don't continue on.

> And get_file() has semantics just like refcount_inc(): The caller
> guarantees that it is already holding a reference to the file; and if

Yes, but if that guarantee is violated, we should do something about it.

> the caller is wrong about that, their subsequent attempt to clean up
> the reference that they think they were already holding will likely
> lead to UAF too. If get_file() sees a zero refcount, there is no safe
> way to continue. And all existing callers of get_file() expect the
> return value to be the same as the non-NULL pointer they passed in, so
> they'll either ignore the result of this check and barrel on, or oops
> with a NULL deref.
>
> For callers that want to actually try incrementing file refcounts that
> could be zero, which is only possible under specific circumstances, we
> have helpers like get_file_rcu() and get_file_active().

So what's going on in here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20240502223341.1835070-2-keescook@chromium.org/

> Can't you throw a CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION() or something like that in
> there instead?

I'm open to suggestions, but given what's happening with struct dma_buf
above, it seems like this is a state worth checking for?

--
Kees Cook