From: Ferry Meng <mengferry@linux.alibaba.com>
To: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>, Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>,
ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ferry Meng <mengferry@linux.alibaba.com>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()
Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 21:29:33 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240515132934.69511-2-mengferry@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240515132934.69511-1-mengferry@linux.alibaba.com>
Just add redundant (perhaps paranoia) checks to make sure it doesn't
stray beyond valid meory region of ocfs2 xattr entry array during a
single match.
Maybe this patch can prevent some crash caused by crafted poison images.
Signed-off-by: Ferry Meng <mengferry@linux.alibaba.com>
---
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 14 +++++++++-----
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 3b81213ed7b8..37be4a286faf 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -1062,8 +1062,8 @@ ssize_t ocfs2_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
return i_ret + b_ret;
}
-static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(int name_index,
- const char *name,
+static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, void *end,
+ int name_index, const char *name,
struct ocfs2_xattr_search *xs)
{
struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;
@@ -1076,6 +1076,10 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(int name_index,
name_len = strlen(name);
entry = xs->here;
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(xs->header->xh_count); i++) {
+ if ((void *)entry >= end) {
+ ocfs2_error(inode->i_sb, "corrupted xattr entries");
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
cmp = name_index - ocfs2_xattr_get_type(entry);
if (!cmp)
cmp = name_len - entry->xe_name_len;
@@ -1166,7 +1170,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get(struct inode *inode,
xs->base = (void *)xs->header;
xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries;
- ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs);
+ ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, xs->end, name_index, name, xs);
if (ret)
return ret;
size = le64_to_cpu(xs->here->xe_value_size);
@@ -2698,7 +2702,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_ibody_find(struct inode *inode,
/* Find the named attribute. */
if (oi->ip_dyn_features & OCFS2_INLINE_XATTR_FL) {
- ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs);
+ ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, xs->end, name_index, name, xs);
if (ret && ret != -ENODATA)
return ret;
xs->not_found = ret;
@@ -2833,7 +2837,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_block_find(struct inode *inode,
xs->end = (void *)(blk_bh->b_data) + blk_bh->b_size;
xs->here = xs->header->xh_entries;
- ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(name_index, name, xs);
+ ret = ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(inode, xs->end, name_index, name, xs);
} else
ret = ocfs2_xattr_index_block_find(inode, blk_bh,
name_index,
--
2.32.0.3.g01195cf9f
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-15 13:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-15 13:29 [PATCH 0/2] ocfs2: add checks in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() to avoid potential out-of-bound access Ferry Meng
2024-05-15 13:29 ` Ferry Meng [this message]
2024-05-16 1:25 ` [PATCH 1/2] ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() Joseph Qi
2024-05-15 13:29 ` [PATCH 2/2] ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry() Ferry Meng
2024-05-16 1:41 ` Joseph Qi
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