From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: "Gabriel Krisman Bertazi" <krisman@suse.de>,
linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org, cve@kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Tamás Koczka" <poprdi@google.com>
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-52656: io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS
Date: Sat, 25 May 2024 17:37:22 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024052515-usual-chewer-cbb4@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ededb63f-7abc-4cca-8bf7-c767e6026e48@kernel.dk>
On Sat, May 25, 2024 at 09:28:35AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> On 5/25/24 9:09 AM, Eduardo' Vela" <Nava> wrote:
> > On Sat, 25 May 2024, 09:15 Greg Kroah-Hartman, <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, May 24, 2024 at 10:57:07AM -0600, Jens Axboe wrote:
> > > On 5/24/24 10:45 AM, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
> > > > Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org <mailto:gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>> writes:
> > > >
> > > >> Description
> > > >> ===========
> > > >>
> > > >> In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
> > > >>
> > > >> io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS
> > > >>
> > > >> This is dead code after we dropped support for passing io_uring fds
> > > >> over SCM_RIGHTS, get rid of it.
> > > >>
> > > >> The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52656 to this issue.
> > > >
> > > > Hello Greg,
> > > >
> > > > [+Jens in Cc]
> > > >
> > > > This is stable material, but doesn't deserve CVE status. There is
> > > > nothing exploitable that is fixed here. Instead, this commit is dropping
> > > > unreachable code after the removal of a feature, following another CVE
> > > > report. Doing the clean up in the original patch would have made the
> > > > real security fix harder to review.
> > > >
> > > > The real issue was reported as CVE-2023-52654 and handled by a different
> > > > commit.
> > >
> > > FWIW, the same is true for a number of other commits recently. They are
> > > nowhere near CVE material, it's just generic bug fixes.
> >
> > Ok, glad to revoke them if you do not think they are user triggerable
> > issues. I'll go reject this one right now, thanks.
> >
> >
> > Good day!
> >
> > So, either I'm completely lost or CVE-2023-52656 shouldn't have been
> > rejected. Forgive me for mudding the problem even more.
> >
> > I think we need to unreject this CVE (CVE-2023-52656) or
> > CVE-2023-52654 should be amended to include the dead code removal
> > commit.. that said, that'll be weirder than just unrejecting this
> > commit.
> >
> > The reason is that the commit "io_uring/af_unix: disable sending
> > io_uring over sockets" is not enough to fix the vulnerability in
> > stable branches, because e.g. bcedd497b3b4a0be56f3adf7c7542720eced0792
> > on 5.15 only fixes one path (io_sqe_file_register) to reach
> > unix_inflight(), but it is still reachable via another path
> > (io_sqe_fileS_register) which is only removed by
> > d909d381c3152393421403be4b6435f17a2378b4 ("io_uring: drop any code
> > related to SCM_RIGHTS").
> >
> > Although that patch claims "it is dead code", this claim was only true
> > on upstream, but not on stable branches (or at least on 5.15 where the
> > vulnerability was proven to be reachable).
> >
> > What a mess! ?
>
> Ah right, yeah it was a mess because of the stable backports, it was not
> for the upstream front. Agree Greg, let's just keep it because of the
> stable side.
Now republished, thanks!
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-25 15:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2024051338-CVE-2023-52656-6545@gregkh>
2024-05-24 16:45 ` CVE-2023-52656: io_uring: drop any code related to SCM_RIGHTS Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
2024-05-24 16:57 ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-25 7:15 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
[not found] ` <CAFswPa9jR6mKAsCrdmspCARe-evk16s1t0SG9LrRLCze_f6Ydw@mail.gmail.com>
2024-05-25 15:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-05-25 15:28 ` Jens Axboe
2024-05-25 15:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-05-25 18:15 ` Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
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