From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
<bp@alien8.de>, <x86@kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <mingo@redhat.com>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
<dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v9 16/24] x86/sev: Drop sev_guest_platform_data structure
Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 10:00:30 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240531043038.3370793-17-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240531043038.3370793-1-nikunj@amd.com>
SEV guest platform data structure was used to pass the secrets page
physical address. As the SNP guest messaging initialization routines are
local and secrets page address is cached in sev.c, use that instead of
sending it to the SEV guest driver and getting the same address back.
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 9 ++-------
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 10 ++--------
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 8 +-------
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index f58052fd6cb3..128bf71302a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -116,10 +116,6 @@ struct snp_req_data {
unsigned long resp_gpa;
};
-struct sev_guest_platform_data {
- u64 secrets_gpa;
-};
-
#define VMPCK_MAX_NUM 4
/*
@@ -324,7 +320,7 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void);
void sev_show_status(void);
bool snp_assign_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, unsigned int vmpck_id);
bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev);
-int snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 secrets_gpa);
+int snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev);
void snp_guest_messaging_exit(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev);
int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req,
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
@@ -393,8 +389,7 @@ static inline void sev_show_status(void) { }
static inline bool snp_assign_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,
unsigned int vmpck_id) { return false; }
static inline bool snp_is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { return true; }
-static inline int
-snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 secrets_gpa) { return -EINVAL; }
+static inline int snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { return -EINVAL; }
static inline void snp_guest_messaging_exit(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { }
static inline int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_req *req,
struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) { return -EINVAL; }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 141a670d2a85..c56cb2f15ec7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -2239,15 +2239,9 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = {
static int __init snp_init_platform_device(void)
{
- struct sev_guest_platform_data data;
-
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
return -ENODEV;
- data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa;
- if (platform_device_add_data(&sev_guest_device, &data, sizeof(data)))
- return -ENODEV;
-
if (platform_device_register(&sev_guest_device))
return -ENODEV;
@@ -2597,11 +2591,11 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_send_guest_request);
-int snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 secrets_gpa)
+int snp_guest_messaging_init(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
{
int ret = -ENOMEM;
- snp_dev->secrets = (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
+ snp_dev->secrets = (__force void *)ioremap_encrypted(secrets_pa, PAGE_SIZE);
if (!snp_dev->secrets) {
pr_err("Failed to map SNP secrets page.\n");
return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 41878bd968d5..8d026d485028 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -406,7 +406,6 @@ static void unregister_sev_tsm(void *data)
static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
- struct sev_guest_platform_data *data;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev;
struct miscdevice *misc;
@@ -415,11 +414,6 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
return -ENODEV;
- if (!dev->platform_data)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data;
-
snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!snp_dev)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -430,7 +424,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return ret;
}
- if (snp_guest_messaging_init(snp_dev, data->secrets_gpa)) {
+ if (snp_guest_messaging_init(snp_dev)) {
dev_err(dev, "Unable to setup SNP Guest messaging using VMPCK%u\n",
snp_dev->vmpck_id);
return ret;
--
2.34.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-31 4:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-31 4:30 [PATCH v9 00/24] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 01/24] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-12 17:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-13 3:40 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 02/24] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 03/24] virt: sev-guest: Make payload a variable length array Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-17 20:51 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-21 16:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-23 16:16 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24 6:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 10:03 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-24 13:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-24 13:39 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-06-24 18:12 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-25 12:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 04/24] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 05/24] virt: sev-guest: Fix user-visible strings Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 5:58 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 06/24] virt: sev-guest: Simplify VMPCK and sequence number assignments Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-06-18 21:27 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 6:06 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-06-19 15:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2024-06-19 15:20 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 07/24] virt: sev-guest: Store VMPCK index to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 08/24] virt: sev-guest: Take mutex in snp_send_guest_request() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 09/24] virt: sev-guest: Carve out SNP guest messaging init/exit Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 10/24] x86/sev: Move core SEV guest driver routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 11/24] x86/sev: Replace dev_[err,alert] with pr_[err,alert] Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 12/24] x86/sev: Make snp_issue_guest_request() static Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 13/24] x86/sev: Make sev-guest driver functional again Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 14/24] x86/sev: Handle failures from snp_init() Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 15/24] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 17/24] x86/cc: Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 18/24] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 19/24] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 20/24] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 21/24] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 22/24] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 23/24] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-05-31 4:30 ` [PATCH v9 24/24] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
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