From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org, "Ondrej Kozina" <okozina@redhat.com>,
"Milan Broz" <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
"Thomas Staudt" <tstaudt@de.ibm.com>,
"Daniel P . Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
"Kairui Song" <ryncsn@gmail.com>,
"Jan Pazdziora" <jpazdziora@redhat.com>,
"Pingfan Liu" <kernelfans@gmail.com>,
"Baoquan He" <bhe@redhat.com>, "Dave Young" <dyoung@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Vitaly Kuznetsov" <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
"Eric Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly
Date: Sat, 8 Jun 2024 11:12:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024060842-entryway-gurgle-4ae2@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240607122622.167228-2-coxu@redhat.com>
On Fri, Jun 07, 2024 at 08:26:11PM +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:
> Currently, kexec_buf is placed in order which means for the same
> machine, the info in the kexec_buf is always located at the same
> position each time the machine is booted. This may cause a risk for
> sensitive information like LUKS volume key. Now struct kexec_buf has a
> new field random which indicates it's supposed to be placed in a random
> position.
>
> Suggested-by: Jan Pazdziora <jpazdziora@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <coxu@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/kexec.h | 4 ++++
> kernel/kexec_file.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/kexec.h b/include/linux/kexec.h
> index f0e9f8eda7a3..c45bfc727737 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kexec.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kexec.h
> @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ int kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(struct kimage *image);
> * @buf_min: The buffer can't be placed below this address.
> * @buf_max: The buffer can't be placed above this address.
> * @top_down: Allocate from top of memory.
> + * @random: Place the buffer at a random position.
> */
> struct kexec_buf {
> struct kimage *image;
> @@ -182,6 +183,9 @@ struct kexec_buf {
> unsigned long buf_min;
> unsigned long buf_max;
> bool top_down;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
> + bool random;
> +#endif
Why is the ifdef needed?
> };
>
> int kexec_load_purgatory(struct kimage *image, struct kexec_buf *kbuf);
> diff --git a/kernel/kexec_file.c b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> index 3d64290d24c9..f7538d8f67e0 100644
> --- a/kernel/kexec_file.c
> +++ b/kernel/kexec_file.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,9 @@
> #include <linux/elfcore.h>
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
> +#include <linux/prandom.h>
> +#endif
No ifdef in .c files please. This should not be an issue.
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> #include "kexec_internal.h"
> @@ -437,6 +440,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kexec_file_load, int, kernel_fd, int, initrd_fd,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
> +static unsigned long kexec_random_start(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
> +{
> + unsigned long temp_start;
> + unsigned short i;
> +
> + get_random_bytes(&i, sizeof(unsigned short));
> + temp_start = start + (end - start) / USHRT_MAX * i;
> + return temp_start;
> +}
> +#endif
This #ifdef should be handled properly in the .h file.
> +
> static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
> struct kexec_buf *kbuf)
> {
> @@ -445,6 +460,10 @@ static int locate_mem_hole_top_down(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
>
> temp_end = min(end, kbuf->buf_max);
> temp_start = temp_end - kbuf->memsz + 1;
> +#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP
> + if (kbuf->random)
> + temp_start = kexec_random_start(temp_start, temp_end);
> +#endif
Same with this.
And why do you need the boolean at all, why not just have
kexec_random_start() handle this properly for you?
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-08 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-06-07 12:26 [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 1/7] kexec_file: allow to place kexec_buf randomly Coiby Xu
2024-06-08 3:51 ` kernel test robot
2024-06-08 4:23 ` kernel test robot
2024-06-08 9:12 ` Greg KH [this message]
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 2/7] crash_dump: make dm crypt keys persist for the kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-06-08 9:19 ` Greg KH
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 3/7] crash_dump: store dm crypt keys in kdump reserved memory Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 4/7] crash_dump: reuse saved dm crypt keys for CPU/memory hot-plugging Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 5/7] crash_dump: retrieve dm crypt keys in kdump kernel Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 6/7] x86/crash: pass dm crypt keys to " Coiby Xu
2024-06-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v5 7/7] x86/crash: make the page that stores the dm crypt keys inaccessible Coiby Xu
2024-06-08 1:26 ` [PATCH v4 0/7] Support kdump with LUKS encryption by reusing LUKS volume keys Coiby Xu
2024-06-08 9:10 ` Greg KH
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