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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Cc: "Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>,
	cve@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2024-35918: randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 06:56:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2024073029-clerk-trophy-b84c@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202407291715.017E39A4C@keescook>

On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 05:15:52PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 29, 2024 at 04:35:52PM +0200, Michal Koutný wrote:
> > On Sat, Jul 27, 2024 at 09:34:18AM GMT, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> > > We assigned a CVE to 9c573cd313433 as it was implied by many that this
> > > was "fixing a weakness" in the security feature in 39218ff4c625d.  If
> > > this is not the case, then we can revoke this CVE.
> > 
> > If 9c573cd313433 (fixup) is fixing a weakness of too few bits in stack offset
> > randomization, then 39218ff4c625d (feature) is fixing such a weakness too.
> > 
> > Or equivalently, if 39218ff4c625d is not fixing a weakness of too few
> > bits in stack offset randomization, then 9c573cd313433 is not fixing it
> > neither.
> > 
> > By this reasoning I'd be for stripping this CVE. Both patches would thus
> > be equal. (As suggested by Kees.)
> > (Also to avoid going into the rabbit hole of how many bits of
> > randomization are enough.)
> 
> Yeah, I think it's best to have neither be a CVE.

The CVE has now been rejected, thanks for the review!

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-30  4:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <2024051912-CVE-2024-35918-3fed@gregkh>
2024-07-26  9:45 ` CVE-2024-35918: randomize_kstack: Improve entropy diffusion Michal Koutný
2024-07-26  9:54   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-26 14:12     ` Kees Cook
2024-07-27  7:34       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2024-07-29 14:35         ` Michal Koutný
2024-07-30  0:15           ` Kees Cook
2024-07-30  4:56             ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2024-07-30  9:16               ` Michal Koutný

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