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From: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
To: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: "Zhangqiao (2012 lab)" <zhangqiao22@huawei.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@meta.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH sched_ext/for-6.12] sched_ext: Allow p->scx.disallow only while loading
Date: Wed, 31 Jul 2024 15:33:44 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240731203344.GA42857@maniforge> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZqqNLNWLfjsJ2E02@slm.duckdns.org>

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On Wed, Jul 31, 2024 at 09:14:52AM -1000, Tejun Heo wrote:
> p->scx.disallow provides a way for the BPF scheduler to reject certain tasks
> from attaching. It's currently allowed for both the load and fork paths;
> however, the latter doesn't actually work as p->sched_class is already set
> by the time scx_ops_init_task() is called during fork.
> 
> This is a convenience feature which is mostly useful from the load path
> anyway. Allow it only from the load path.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
> Reported-by: "Zhangqiao (2012 lab)" <zhangqiao22@huawei.com>
> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240711110720.1285-1-zhangqiao22@huawei.com
> Fixes: 7bb6f0810ecf ("sched_ext: Allow BPF schedulers to disallow specific tasks from joining SCHED_EXT")
> ---
>  include/linux/sched/ext.h |   11 ++++++-----
>  kernel/sched/ext.c        |   14 ++++++++------
>  2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 
> --- a/include/linux/sched/ext.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched/ext.h
> @@ -181,11 +181,12 @@ struct sched_ext_entity {
>  	 * If set, reject future sched_setscheduler(2) calls updating the policy
>  	 * to %SCHED_EXT with -%EACCES.
>  	 *
> -	 * If set from ops.init_task() and the task's policy is already
> -	 * %SCHED_EXT, which can happen while the BPF scheduler is being loaded
> -	 * or by inhering the parent's policy during fork, the task's policy is
> -	 * rejected and forcefully reverted to %SCHED_NORMAL. The number of
> -	 * such events are reported through /sys/kernel/debug/sched_ext::nr_rejected.
> +	 * Can be set from ops.init_task() while the BPF scheduler is being
> +	 * loaded (!scx_init_task_args->fork). If set and the task's policy is
> +	 * already %SCHED_EXT, the task's policy is rejected and forcefully
> +	 * reverted to %SCHED_NORMAL. The number of such events are reported
> +	 * through /sys/kernel/debug/sched_ext::nr_rejected. Setting this flag
> +	 * during fork is not allowed.
>  	 */
>  	bool			disallow;	/* reject switching into SCX */
>  
> --- a/kernel/sched/ext.c
> +++ b/kernel/sched/ext.c
> @@ -3399,18 +3399,17 @@ static int scx_ops_init_task(struct task
>  
>  	scx_set_task_state(p, SCX_TASK_INIT);
>  
> -	if (p->scx.disallow) {
> +	if (!fork && p->scx.disallow) {
>  		struct rq *rq;
>  		struct rq_flags rf;
>  
>  		rq = task_rq_lock(p, &rf);
>  
>  		/*
> -		 * We're either in fork or load path and @p->policy will be
> -		 * applied right after. Reverting @p->policy here and rejecting
> -		 * %SCHED_EXT transitions from scx_check_setscheduler()
> -		 * guarantees that if ops.init_task() sets @p->disallow, @p can
> -		 * never be in SCX.
> +		 * We're in the load path and @p->policy will be applied right
> +		 * after. Reverting @p->policy here and rejecting %SCHED_EXT
> +		 * transitions from scx_check_setscheduler() guarantees that if
> +		 * ops.init_task() sets @p->disallow, @p can never be in SCX.
>  		 */
>  		if (p->policy == SCHED_EXT) {
>  			p->policy = SCHED_NORMAL;
> @@ -3418,6 +3417,9 @@ static int scx_ops_init_task(struct task
>  		}
>  
>  		task_rq_unlock(rq, p, &rf);
> +	} else if (p->scx.disallow) {

Just to make it a bit easier on schedulers, should we do this:

} else if (p->scx.disallow && p->policy == SCHED_EXT)

That way if you have a task that isn't running with SCHED_EXT and forks,
the scheduler can set p->scx.disallow without having to check that it's
being set in a fork. Seems unnecessary to enforce that given that the
end result is the same.

Otherwise this LG. Feel free to apply if you agree, and add my ack:

Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>

Thanks,
David

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  reply	other threads:[~2024-07-31 20:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-07-11 11:07 [PATCH sched_ext/for-6.11] sched_ext: Reverting @p->sched_class if @p->disallow is set Zhangqiao (2012 lab)
2024-07-11 18:57 ` Tejun Heo
2024-07-16 11:32   ` Zhangqiao (2012 lab)
2024-07-16 20:48     ` Tejun Heo
2024-07-17  2:01       ` Zhangqiao (2012 lab)
2024-07-17 17:49         ` Tejun Heo
2024-07-18  6:04           ` Zhangqiao (2012 lab)
2024-07-31 19:14             ` [PATCH sched_ext/for-6.12] sched_ext: Allow p->scx.disallow only while loading Tejun Heo
2024-07-31 20:33               ` David Vernet [this message]
2024-08-01 23:32                 ` [PATCH v2 " Tejun Heo
2024-08-02  0:21                   ` David Vernet
2024-08-02 18:59                   ` Tejun Heo

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