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From: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	hca@linux.ibm.com, agordeev@linux.ibm.com, gor@linux.ibm.com,
	borntraeger@de.ibm.com, svens@linux.ibm.com,
	frankja@linux.ibm.com, seiden@linux.ibm.com, nsg@linux.ibm.com,
	nrb@linux.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/uv: Panic if the security of the system cannot be guaranteed.
Date: Thu,  1 Aug 2024 13:25:48 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240801112548.85303-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> (raw)

The return value uv_set_shared() and uv_remove_shared() (which are
wrappers around the share() function) is not always checked. The system
integrity of a protected guest depends on the Share and Unshare UVCs
being successful. This means that any caller that fails to check the
return value will compromise the security of the protected guest.

No code path that would lead to such violation of the security
guarantees is currently exercised, since all the areas that are shared
never get unshared during the lifetime of the system. This might
change and become an issue in the future.

The Share and Unshare UVCs can only fail in case of hypervisor
misbehaviour (either a bug or malicious behaviour). In such cases there
is no reasonable way forward, and the system needs to panic.

This patch replaces the return at the end of the share() function with
a panic, to guarantee system integrity.

Fixes: 5abb9351dfd9 ("s390/uv: introduce guest side ultravisor code")
Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
---
 arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
index 0b5f8f3e84f1..153d93468b77 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h
@@ -441,7 +441,10 @@ static inline int share(unsigned long addr, u16 cmd)
 
 	if (!uv_call(0, (u64)&uvcb))
 		return 0;
-	return -EINVAL;
+	pr_err("%s UVC failed (rc: 0x%x, rrc: 0x%x), possible hypervisor bug.\n",
+	       uvcb.header.cmd == UVC_CMD_SET_SHARED_ACCESS ? "Share" : "Unshare",
+	       uvcb.header.rc, uvcb.header.rrc);
+	panic("System security cannot be guaranteed unless the system panics now.\n");
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.45.2


             reply	other threads:[~2024-08-01 11:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-08-01 11:25 Claudio Imbrenda [this message]
2024-08-01 13:20 ` [PATCH v1 1/1] s390/uv: Panic if the security of the system cannot be guaranteed Janosch Frank
2024-08-05 10:46   ` Claudio Imbrenda
2024-08-02 12:40 ` Steffen Eiden
2024-08-02 13:11 ` Christian Borntraeger

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