From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC/PATCH 4/4] perf/x86: Relax privilege filter restriction on AMD IBS
Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2024 10:54:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240903085454.GR4723@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAM9d7cg-7USE-Ofusc1VDpr3qtviX4xZmoKmBjmEfBDw9XJ+nw@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Sep 02, 2024 at 10:30:19AM -0700, Namhyung Kim wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 2, 2024 at 2:12 AM Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Aug 30, 2024 at 04:29:10PM -0700, Namhyung Kim wrote:
> > > While IBS is available for per-thread profiling, still regular users
> > > cannot open an event due to the default paranoid setting (2) which
> > > doesn't allow unprivileged users to get kernel samples. That means
> > > it needs to set exclude_kernel bit in the attribute but IBS driver
> > > would reject it since it has PERF_PMU_CAP_NO_EXCLUDE. This is not what
> > > we want and I've been getting requests to fix this issue.
> > >
> > > This should be done in the hardware, but until we get the HW fix we may
> > > allow exclude_{kernel,user} in the attribute and silently drop the
> > > samples in the PMU IRQ handler. It won't guarantee the sampling
> > > frequency or even it'd miss some with fixed period too. Not ideal,
> > > but that'd still be helpful to regular users.
> >
> > Urgh.... this is really rather bad. And I'm sure a bunch of people are
> > going to be spending a lot of time trying to figure out why their
> > results don't make sense.
>
> I agree it can be confusing but there are use cases where regular users
> want IBS information like memory data source, data address and so on.
Sure, but I'm a bit worried about users not being aware of this
trickery. This makes IBS events that have exclude_kernel=1 behave
significantly different from those that don't have it.
At the very least you should kill the IBS forward in amd_pmu_hw_config()
when this is active. But perhaps we should also emit a one time
KERN_INFO message when such an event gets created?
> Also I realized that software events like cpu-clock use the same logic to
> discard samples by privilege mode already.
Right, but everybody expects the software things to suck :-) And they
always suck, unconditionally.
While the IBS thing only sucks when you use exclude_[user,kernel]
things. Stealth suckage is bad and enrages people.
> > I realize that having entry hooks to disable/enable the counters is also
> > not going to happen, this has a ton of problems too.
>
> Do you mean kernel/user mode change hook? I guess it'd be too costly.
Yep, insanely expensive :-)
> > Also, that PMU passthrough patch set has guest hooks, so you can
> > actually do the exclude_host/guest nonsense with those, right?
>
> Oh.. this patch is about exclude_user/kernel not host/guest. Anyway
> it'd be great if IBS could support the guest hooks and allow the exclude
> bits.
Right, but since your other patchset about disabling exclude_guest
because IBS don't support it I figured I'd mention that it would be
fairly simple to fix.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-09-03 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-08-30 23:29 [RFC/PATCH 0/4] perf: Relax privilege restriction on AMD IBS (v2) Namhyung Kim
2024-08-30 23:29 ` [RFC/PATCH 1/4] perf/core: Add PERF_FORMAT_DROPPED Namhyung Kim
2024-08-30 23:29 ` [RFC/PATCH 2/4] perf/core: Export perf_exclude_event() Namhyung Kim
2024-08-30 23:29 ` [RFC/PATCH 3/4] perf/core: Account dropped samples from BPF Namhyung Kim
2024-08-30 23:29 ` [RFC/PATCH 4/4] perf/x86: Relax privilege filter restriction on AMD IBS Namhyung Kim
2024-09-02 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2024-09-02 17:30 ` Namhyung Kim
2024-09-03 8:54 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
[not found] ` <CAM9d7ch8fwk-o7W6KrTgtJ5n8-oVMGqzxvW_zd_hrcWFoE2AHg@mail.gmail.com>
2024-09-04 6:53 ` Ravi Bangoria
2024-09-04 11:39 ` Peter Zijlstra
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